Barbour v. Goodloe

13 Ky. Op. 233, 6 Ky. L. Rptr. 601, 1885 Ky. LEXIS 130
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedFebruary 5, 1885
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 13 Ky. Op. 233 (Barbour v. Goodloe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barbour v. Goodloe, 13 Ky. Op. 233, 6 Ky. L. Rptr. 601, 1885 Ky. LEXIS 130 (Ky. Ct. App. 1885).

Opinion

Opinion by

Judge Eryor:

The legislature at its last session passed an act entitled an act to equalize assessments for revenue purposes and to provide for a State Board of Equalization. The board having been appointed as provided by the act assembled at the capital of the state in June last and proceeded to equalize the assessments, and made their final report to the Auditor that the latter might report to the various tax collectors (the sheriffs) the result of the board’s action. In equalizing the value of the personal property between the several counties the board added six per cent, to the aggregate value of the personal property in the County of Jefferson, thereby increasing the amount of the tax to be paid to that extent on the personal property in that county, which necessarily lessened it in other counties. In other words there was a deduction as to values in some counties and an increase in others. The appellee, Goodloe, in listing his property with the assessor gave in under the equalization law his cash, notes and the amount of his money deposited in bank. The notes were given in at what they called for, and the number of dollars deposited in bank correctly reported. This included all the money and notes he had or owned and amounted to $-. The Sheriff of Jefferson county having been notified by the Auditor of the increase made by the board proceeded to collect from the appellee the tax on the increased value of his personal estate, embracing his notes and money that had been included by the board in the class designated as personal property. The appellee resisted payment on this fund to the extent that his notes and money had been increased in value by the board, insisting that such was not the legislative intent, and if so that the act in this regard was unconstitutional.

The chancellor below restrained its collection and from that judgment the appeal is taken. The sole and only purpose of the act [235]*235in question was to secure a just equalization of assessments throughout the state by lessening the burden of those who had attempted to place a fair estimate upon their property and placing it upon those who were not contributing to discharge their just proportion of taxation. In so far as the state is concerned the aggregate amount of taxes paid into the treasury is neither increased nor diminished, and the only object in view by the enactment was to equalize the burden between the tax-payers. The board is required to equalize the value of property as listed and assessed in the different counties of the state, and by the sixth section “shall not reduce the aggregate assessed valuation in the state, neither shall it increase said aggregate valuation except in such an amount as may reasonably be necessary to a just equalization;” that it, the board, shall not increase the valuation in any one county to a greater extent than may be necessary to produce equality as between the tax-payers throughout the state. They can only equalize by increasing the value when too low and diminishing it when too high. It is the valuation of property the board is called on to equalize, and when this is done and reported to the Auditor their duties end.

The seventh section provides that “said board in equalizing the valuation of property as listed and assessed in different counties shall consider the following clauses of property separately, viz: personal property, lands, and town and city lots, and upon such consideration determine such rates of addition to or deduction from the listed or assessed value of each of said classes of property in such county, or to or from the aggregate assessed value of each of said classes in the state as may be deemed by the board to be equitable and just.”

The eighth section provides that “In equalizing the value of personal property between the several counties said board shall obtain from the aggregate footings of the number and value of each, and the value of the several kinds of enumerated property in each county shall be obtained at those values, and the values of enumerated property thus obtained as compared with the assessed value of such property in each county, shall be taken by said board to obtain a rate per cent, to be added to or deducted from the total assessed value of personal property in each county, etc.” The enumerated articles of personal property valued by the assessor consists of [236]*236horses, mules, cattle, stores, carriages and plate, etc., and all are plainly designated by the statute and the approximate value of each kind are presumed to be within the knowledge of the board, whose duty it is to make this equality in the burden. The aggregate footings of the number and value of each in a particular county will determine when compared with other counties whether the valuation is too high or low, and the aggregate value being increased or diminished as the case may be will determine the amounts to be paid by the tax-payer. In this estimate or aggregate amount is not to be included the estimate or value under the equalization law, as it was never contemplated by the provisions of this law that the board should undertake to value that of which they could have no knowledge or means of ascertaining except from the statement of the tax-payer and the list upon the assessor’s book. They are not empowered by any provision of the act in question to investigate the extent of the estate, real or personal, of the tax-payer and to list for him property that he may have omitted to list, or erase from the assessor’s book property that he may have improperly listed. They are required to deal with values only, and have no power to- effect the assessment as made except as to value. In this case the appellee has listed his notes at the amounts appearing on their face; has reported every dollar that he owns or has on deposit, and yet if the residuum or the amount under the equalization law is included in the words “personal property” or by any provision of the enactment he is required to- pay a tax upon an additional sum of money in excess of what he actually owns and has actually and in good faith listed for taxation. It has not been valued by the board and is not susceptible of any other valuation than is already fixed by the tax-payer. If he has five thousand dollars on deposit, the board has no power to say that he shall pay tax on six thousand dollars or that the five thousand dollars is worth six thousand ■ dollars, or if he holds promissory notes amounting to five thousand dollars this board has no right to say that they are worth fifty-five hundred dollars. When the tax-payer who holds money or cash notes fails to list them the mode of correcting his list is with the county board, and the state board is confined to equalizing the value of property listed and valued by the assessor. If the board can compel the tax-payer to pay taxes on a larger sum than he reports under the Equalization Law, they can require [237]*237the same tax-payer to pay tax on a greater quantity of land than he reports or a greater number of horses than is listed, and in this manner increase or diminish his taxes regardless of value. Such a construction of the act must also necessarily produce inequality that is sought to be prevented by its adoption. “A,” as guardian of infants living in the County of Boone, gives in their residuum at $10,000; “B,” living in the County of Gallatin, guardian of infants, gives in their residuum at the same sum. The valuation of the $10,000 is increased in Boone, and “A” pays taxes on $11,000 when he has but $10,000 while the tax in Gallatin is diminished and “B” pays tax on $9,000.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
13 Ky. Op. 233, 6 Ky. L. Rptr. 601, 1885 Ky. LEXIS 130, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barbour-v-goodloe-kyctapp-1885.