Barbosa Gordillo v. Blanche
This text of Barbosa Gordillo v. Blanche (Barbosa Gordillo v. Blanche) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 22 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HUGO ALEJANDRO BARBOSA No. 25-966 GORDILLO, Agency No. A206-245-027 Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 20, 2026** Phoenix, Arizona
Before: BERZON, M. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Hugo Alejandro Barbosa Gordillo, a native and citizen of Colombia, petitions
for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing
an appeal from an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum and
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). withholding of removal.1 Barbosa also challenges the BIA’s denial of his motion to
remand. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.
1. Barbosa argues that the BIA erred in concluding that he forfeited any
challenge to the IJ’s dispositive finding that the Colombian government was not
unable or unwilling to protect him. We disagree. An appeal to the BIA must not only
request reversal of the IJ’s decision but also identify “what issues would warrant
such reversal.” Gonzalez-Lara v. Garland, 104 F.4th 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2024).
The section of Barbosa’s counseled BIA brief titled “Government quiescence”
consists of only one sentence: “The Colombian government cannot provide
Respondent with protection.” Because this did not sufficiently “put the BIA on
notice of what was being challenged,” the issue is unexhausted. Umana-Escobar v.
Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(d)(1).
2. Barbosa also contends that the BIA erred in denying his motion to
remand. “We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to remand for abuse of discretion.”
Ani v. Bondi, 155 F.4th 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2025). A petitioner seeking remand
based on changed country conditions must “demonstrate that the new evidence,
when considered together with the evidence presented at the original hearing, would
1 The IJ also denied protection under the Convention Against Torture. Barbosa does not challenge that determination.
2 25-966 establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.” Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d
1198, 1204 (9th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up); Gonzalez-Lara v. Garland, 104 F.4th 1109,
1115 (9th Cir. 2024) (“A motion to remand is akin to a motion to reopen.”). But
Barbosa does not explain why evidence that “the President of Colombia was shot at
in a helicopter” and that “community activists face pervasive death threats and
violence” establishes that the Colombian government is unable or unwilling to
protect him. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the agency did not err in denying a motion to reopen where new evidence
“simply recount[ed] generalized conditions in Iran that fail[ed] to demonstrate that
[the petitioner’s] predicament is appreciably different from the dangers faced by her
fellow citizens” (cleaned up)).
3. Barbosa argues that he was denied due process because the IJ failed to
cite and apply Matter of L-E-A-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 304 (A.G. 2021), when determining
whether his proposed particular social group of immediate members of the Gordillo
Amado family was cognizable. “Claims of due process violations in immigration
proceedings are reviewed de novo.” Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1040 (9th
Cir. 1999). Even assuming error, however, Barbosa was not prejudiced given the
IJ’s dispositive conclusion that the Colombian government was not unable or
unwilling to protect him. See Ramirez-Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 365, 383 (9th
Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“As a predicate to obtaining relief for a violation of procedural
3 25-966 due process rights in immigration proceedings, an alien must show that the violation
prejudiced him.”).
4. To the extent Barbosa argues that he was denied due process because
the IJ took administrative notice of the Colombia 2020 Human Rights Report, the
argument fails. The IJ provided clear notice that he was doing so, Barbosa’s counsel
stated he had no objection, and Barbosa had ample opportunity to respond to the
report. See Circu v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 990, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(holding that where a country conditions report “contains extra-record facts that are
‘controversial,’” an applicant is “entitled both to notice of the IJ’s intent to take
administrative notice” and “an opportunity to respond to that report” (cleaned up)).
Moreover, Barbosa independently submitted the 2020 Report to the IJ prior to the
merits hearing.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.2
2 The stay of removal, Dkt. 3, will dissolve upon issuance of the mandate.
4 25-966
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