Barberton v. Woodarski

2024 Ohio 2156

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 5, 2024
• Docket: 30659
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Barberton v. Woodarski, 2024-Ohio-2156.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

CITY OF BARBERTON C.A. No. 30659

Appellee

v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE RENEE WOODARSKI BARBERTON MUNICIPAL COURT COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO Appellant CASE No. 22CRB00844

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: June 5, 2024

HENSAL, Judge.

{¶1} Renee Woodarski appeals the judgment of the Barberton Municipal Court. This

Court affirms.

I.

{¶2} Someone phoned the police to report that a female customer was threatening

employees at Dollar General and refusing the leave the store at closing time. Officer Cody Mitchen

arrived six minutes after he was dispatched and observed a female standing just outside the store’s

doors. When he approached the female, he greeted her and asked for her I.D. The female told

Officer Mitchen that he did not need her I.D. He repeatedly commanded her to produce it, but she

refused. After multiple refusals and a warning that she would be placed in handcuffs if she did not

comply, Officer Mitchen reached toward the female to secure her arm. The female then pulled

away and attempted to reach inside her purse. 2

{¶3} Officer Mitchen struggled with the female for several seconds as she pulled away

and told him not to place her in handcuffs. Once he finally secured her arms and placed her in

handcuffs, he removed her I.D. from her purse. He identified the female as Ms. Woodarski. He

ultimately issued Ms. Woodarski a citation for resisting arrest and released her at the scene.

{¶4} A jury found Ms. Woodarski guilty of resisting arrest. The trial court sentenced

her to house arrest, a suspended jail sentence, and a fine. Ms. Woodarski succeeded in securing a

stay of her sentence for the purpose of filing an appeal. She assigns two errors for review.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING DEFENDANT RENEE WOODARSKI’S CRIM.R. 29(A) MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL[.]

{¶5} In her first assignment of error, Ms. Woodarski argues that the trial court should

have granted her motions for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to

support her conviction. Under Criminal Rule 29(A), a defendant is entitled to a judgment of

acquittal on a charge against her “if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction * * *.”

Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law, which we review de

novo. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). In carrying out this review, our

“function * * * is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if

believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. “The relevant inquiry is

whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Id. 3

{¶6} “No person, recklessly or by force, shall resist or interfere with a lawful arrest * *

*.” R.C. 2921.33(A). “A lawful arrest is an essential element of the crime of resisting arrest.”

State v. Vactor, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 02CA008068, 2003-Ohio-7195, ¶ 34. “‘An arrest is ‘lawful’

if the surrounding circumstances would give a reasonable police officer cause to believe that an

offense has been or is being committed.’” State v. Wigle, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25593, 2011-Ohio-

6239, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Sansalone, 71 Ohio App.3d 284, 285-286 (1st Dist.1991). The

standard is an objective one. State v. Hostetler, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 18AP0058, 2019-Ohio-3413,

¶ 10. An officer’s subjective intentions or conclusions about probable cause to arrest are irrelevant

so long as, under the circumstances, “there was evidence to support an objective finding that

probable cause existed to arrest * * *.” State v. Scott, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 08CA009446, 2009-

Ohio-672, ¶ 16. Further, when proving the element of lawful arrest, “[t]he state need not prove

that the defendant was in fact guilty of the offense for which the arrest was based * * *.” Vactor

at ¶ 34.

{¶7} Officer Mitchen testified that he was dispatched to Dollar General because a female

was refusing to leave the business after store hours and was threatening its employees. He arrived

at the store at 10:09 p.m., nine minutes after it closed. A female was standing in the parking lot

just outside the store’s closed doors. He testified that the female was yelling at a store employee.

Officer Mitchen approached the female and asked for her I.D. He testified that he needed to

identify the female so he could complete an incident report. Officer Mitchen identified Ms.

Woodarski in court as the female he approached.

{¶8} The State introduced a recording taken from Officer Mitchen’s body camera. The

recording showed him greeting Ms. Woodarski and asking whether she had her I.D. Ms.

Woodarski responded by telling Officer Mitchen that he did not need her I.D. When the officer 4

confirmed that he needed Ms. Woodarski’s I.D., she replied, “sir, you don’t need my I.D.” Officer

Mitchen then told Ms. Woodarski he would give her one last chance to present him with her I.D.

before he handcuffed her. Rather than comply, Ms. Woodarski crossed her arms, asked Officer

Mitchen why he would place her in handcuffs, and claimed a store employee had threatened to

assault her. Officer Mitchen explained to Ms. Woodarski that she had refused to leave the store,

and he repeated his demand for her I.D. Ms. Woodarski replied that she had left the store and was

not in the store. When she finished speaking, Officer Mitchen told her that he was going to ask

for her I.D. one final time. He held out his hand for her I.D., but Ms. Woodarski remained standing

with her arms crossed. When she failed to move, Officer Mitchen reached out to grab her arm. At

that point, Ms. Woodarski quickly pulled both of her arms away and behind her back.

{¶9} As Officer Mitchen tried to secure Ms. Woodarski’s arms, she stated that she was

getting her I.D. She told Officer Mitchen not to place her in handcuffs and continued to struggle

against his efforts to secure her. Even after Officer Mitchen secured one of her arms and repeatedly

instructed her to turn around, Ms. Woodarski refused to cooperate and tried reaching inside her

purse. A brief struggle ensued, during which Officer Mitchen commanded Ms. Woodarski to let

go of her bag and she said her hand was caught inside it. When Officer Mitchen finally secured

both of Ms. Woodarski’s arms and handcuffed her, he located her I.D. inside her bag. He

ultimately released her and cited her for resisting arrest.

{¶10} Officer Mitchen testified that, had Ms. Woodarski complied with his initial requests

for her I.D., he would not have placed her in handcuffs. Instead, he would have cautioned her

against returning to the store and might have completed a formal report or charged her with

trespassing, depending on how the store wished to proceed. Officer Mitchen testified that he was

trained to ask for an individual’s I.D. rather than depend on the individual to accurately relay their 5

name, date of birth, and social security number. He admitted that he never asked Ms. Woodarski

to verbally supply those identifiers.

{¶11} Ms. Woodarski challenges her conviction for resisting arrest on the basis that the

State failed to prove the lawful arrest element of that charge. The State argued that her arrest was

lawful because Officer Mitchen had probable cause to arrest her for either failing to disclose her

personal information or trespassing. Regarding her failure to disclose personal information, Ms.

Woodarski claims Officer Mitchen had no legal right to demand to see her I.D. rather than simply

ask for her name, date of birth, or address. Regarding her alleged trespass, she argues that there

was no evidence Officer Mitchen ever intended to arrest her for that offense. She further argues

that trespassing could not have formed the basis for her arrest because Officer Mitchen did not

personally observe her committing that misdemeanor offense. We begin by discussing trespassing.

{¶12} A person commits a criminal trespass if, lacking privilege to do so, she

“[k]nowingly enter[s] or remain[s] on the land or premises of another, the use of which is lawfully

restricted to certain persons, purposes, modes, or hours, when [she] knows [she] is in violation of

any such restriction or is reckless in that regard * * *.” R.C. 2911.21(A)(2). Criminal trespass in

violation of Revised Code 2911.21(A)(2) is a fourth-degree misdemeanor. R.C. 2911.21(D)(1).

{¶13} “As a general rule, an officer may not make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor

unless the offense is committed in the officer’s presence.” State v. Henderson, 51 Ohio St.3d 54,

56 (1990). Accord State v. Stacy, 9 Ohio App.3d 55, 57 (9th Dist.1983) (officers generally may

not arrest misdemeanants “on the basis of hearsay evidence alone”). That is because the law only

imbues officers with the power to arrest misdemeanants to prevent breaches of the peace. State v.

Lewis, 50 Ohio St. 179, 185 (1893).

Where * * * [a misdemeanor] offense is an accomplished fact, its prevention is no longer possible, and, if public order has been fully restored before the officer 6

appears, the power to arrest without warrant for a mere breach of the peace or other minor offense is no longer necessary; for the end—to maintain the public peace— for which such authority is given is no longer attainable.

Id. at 187. Certain types of misdemeanors are exempt from the general rule. See, e.g., State v.

Henderson, 51 Ohio St.3d 54, 56-57 (1990) (upholding warrantless arrest for misdemeanor OVI

when officer relied on fellow officer’s recitation of the events); R.C. 2935.03(B)(1) (authorizing

officers to arrest for certain, listed misdemeanor offenses). Further, in the case of all

misdemeanors, “an exception exists where, from the surrounding circumstances, including

admissions by the defendant, the officer is able to reasonably conclude that an offense has been

committed.” State v. Reymann, 55 Ohio App.3d 222, 224 (9th Dist.1989).

{¶14} Misdemeanor trespassing is not exempt from the general rule prohibiting

warrantless arrests for misdemeanors allegedly committed outside the presence of the arresting

officer. See Henderson at 56; R.C. 2935.03(B)(1). Accordingly, Officer Mitchen could only

lawfully arrest Ms. Woodarski for trespassing if he was able to reasonably conclude from the

surrounding circumstances that she committed that offense. See id. Viewing the evidence in a

light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the State proved

the element of lawful arrest because Officer Mitchen had probable cause to arrest Ms. Woodarski

for trespassing. See Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 at paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶15} When Officer Mitchen arrived on scene, Ms. Woodarski was standing in the Dollar

General parking lot, just outside its closed doors. The store had closed nine minutes earlier, and

he arrived within six minutes of being dispatched. From the call notes he received with the

dispatch, he knew a female had refused to leave the store and had threatened its employees. He

observed Ms. Woodarski yelling at a nearby individual when he arrived. Moreover, when he spoke

with her, she did not deny that she had been inside the store. She indicated that she had left the 7

store and claimed that one of its employees had threatened her. Officer Mitchen reasonably could

have concluded that Ms. Woodarski was trespassing based on her continued physical presence on

Dollar General’s property, her admission that she had been inside the store, his observation of her

yelling at an individual nearby, and the call notes he received upon being dispatched to the store.

See Reymann at 224. See also Cleveland v. Murad, 84 Ohio App.3d 317, 321-322 (8th Dist.1992).

Even if he never intended to arrest her for trespassing, his subjective intentions were immaterial.

See Scott, 2009-Ohio-672, at ¶ 16. As noted, the probable cause standard is an objective one. See

Wigle, 2011-Ohio-6239, at ¶ 11. Under the foregoing circumstances, a reasonable officer could

have concluded that Ms. Woodarski had committed or was committing the crime of trespassing.

Accordingly, she has not shown that she was subject to an unlawful arrest.

{¶16} Ms. Woodarski also argues that her arrest was unlawful because Officer Mitchen

lacked probable cause to arrest her for failing to disclose personal information. We need not

address her argument, as it has been rendered moot. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). We have already

determined that her arrest was supported by probable cause on other grounds. Accordingly, we

reject her argument that her conviction for resisting arrest is based on insufficient evidence. Ms.

Woodarski’s first assignment of error is overruled.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OFFERING AN IRRELEVANT AND INAPPLICABLE INSTRUCTION ON CRIMINAL TRESPASS TO JURORS[.]

{¶17} In her second assignment of error, Ms. Woodarski argues the trial court erred when

it instructed the jury on criminal trespass. We disagree.

{¶18} “[A] trial court must fully and completely give the jury all instructions which are

relevant and necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence and discharge its duty as the fact finder.”

State v. Comen, 50 Ohio St.3d 206 (1990), paragraph two of the syllabus. “Requested jury 8

instructions should ordinarily be given if they are correct statements of law, if they are applicable

to the facts in the case, and if reasonable minds might reach the conclusion sought by the requested

instruction.” State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 240. “This Court reviews a

trial court’s decision to give or decline to give a particular jury instruction for an abuse of discretion

under the facts and circumstances of the case.” State v. Sanders, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24654,

2009-Ohio-5537, ¶ 45. The abuse of discretion standard implies that a trial court acted

unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219

(1983).

{¶19} Ms. Woodarski has not argued that the trial court’s instruction on criminal trespass

included any incorrect statements of law. Instead, she argues the trial court erred by instructing

the jury on trespass because there was no evidentiary basis to support its instruction. We have

already determined, however, that a rational trier of fact could have found Ms. Woodarski was

subject to a lawful arrest. Because there was evidentiary support for the trial court’s instruction

on criminal trespass, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by including that

instruction. See Adams at ¶ 240. Ms. Woodarski’s second assignment of error is overruled.

III.

{¶20} Ms. Woodarski’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the

Barberton Municipal Court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 9

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Barberton Municipal

Court, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.

JENNIFER HENSAL FOR THE COURT

STEVENSON, P. J. SUTTON, J. CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

LOUIS E. GRUBE and KENDRA DAVITT, Attorneys at Law, for Appellant.

MICHELLE L. BANBURY, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.