Barber v. State

142 S.W. 582, 64 Tex. Crim. 89, 1911 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 525
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas·Decided December 6, 1911·No. No. 1348.·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

HARPER, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of the offense of forgery, and sentenced to five years' confinement in the penitentiary.

The indictment in this case reads as follows: “The grand jurors for the county -of Palo Pinto, State aforesaid, duly organized as such at the March, term, A. D., 1910, of the District Court of said county, upon their oaths in said court, present that Flake Barber, on or about *91 the 23d day of September, One thousand nine hundred and seven, and anterior to the presentment of this indictment, in the county of Palo Pinto and State of Texas, did then and there unlawfully, without lawful authority, and with intent to injure and defraud, did unlawfully and fraudulently make a certain false instrument in writing, which said false instrument is to the tenor as follows:

September 23, 1907.

This is to apply on note dated June 26, 1907, due June 26, 1909, for $1000.00, bearing 8%.

Mrs. Nona Shannon.

Witness,

J. H. Dodd.

“The said Flake Barber, at the time he made such false instrument in writing, was indebted to the said Mrs. Nona Shannon, as evidenced by liis promissory note in favor of the said Mrs. Nona Shannon, for one thousand dollars, drawing interest at the rate of eight percent per annum from date, and dated June 26th, 1907, and falling due June 26th, 1909, and being the same note mentioned in the said false instrument in writing, and the said false instrument in writing, when it was so made by the said Flake Barber, was intended by him as a receipt against the above said promissory note, and in settlement of the same to-the extent of one thousand dollars, and in fact, said false instrument in writing, if it had been true, would have operated as a credit against* said promissory note and indebtedness to the extent of one thousand dollars, and would have defeated, diminished and discharged said pecuniary obligation and indebtedness to the extent #of one thousand dollars, against the peace and dignity of the State.”

The appellant in this case filed a motion in arrest of judgment on the ground that the indictment is insufficient on the following grounds: (1) “That it does not allege that said instrument to be the act of Mrs. Nona Shannon, and does not name whose act such instrument purports to be.” This is not necessary in an indictment for forgery. (Labbaite v. State, 6 Texas Crim. App., 257; Carter v. State, 55 Texas Crim. Rep., 43; Allen v. State, 44 Texas Crim. Rep., 63.) (2) “That the instrument is not such an instrument as the making of which would constitute forgery.” The instrument is very vague and indefinite, but by explanatory averments, it is said that the instrument was intended to, and if genuine, would have operated as a credit on a note due by appellant to Mrs. Nona Shannon. With these innuendo averments, we think such an instrument can form the basis for an .indictment for forgery. In Fonville v. State, 17 Texas Crim. App., 382, Judge Hurt says: “It is not required that the instrument, if true, should in fact discharge or defeat the obligation; it will be the subject of forgery if its tendency is such.” „ And in Branch’s Criminal Digest the rule is laid down thus: “Ordinarily, a fair test of whether *92 an instrument is the subject of forgery is, would the holder of same, if the same were true, be enabled to maintain or defeat a civil suit by such instrument ?” .citing Scott v. State, 40 Texas Crim. Rep., 107; Daud v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 460; Gray v. State, 44 Texas Crim. Rep., 477.

In this case Mrs. Shannon brought suit' on the note for $1,000, dated June 26, 1907, due June 26, 1909, and as shown by the evidence in this case, defendant plead that he had paid the note in full, and that Mrs. Shannon had executed and delivered the instrument on which this prosecution is predicated as a receipt in full payment of said note. The other grounds in the motion in arrest of judgment all hinge around the above two propositions. Inasmuch as the innuendo averments properly set forth the object and intention in executing said instrument, and as the evidence shows that defendant attempted to so use it, the court did not err in- overruling the motion in arrest of judgment.

1. Appellant objected to the introduction of the instrument in evidence, because said instrument is unintelligible and meaningless, and it was not shown to have been made or executed in evidence. Under the evidence in this case the court did not err in admitting it in evidence.

2. It appears from the evidence that at one timfe, Mrs. Shannon had defendant transacting some business for her, and at that time, placed in defendant’s hands, $1,000, to be held by him as a forfeit on a land trade. The trade was not completed, and Mrs. Shannon instructed defendant to use the $1,000 in his hands to pay a note she was due Cicero Smith, and defendant did so, and it was on the same date that the aHeged receipt bears date. Defendant had testified in the civil suit, as shown by the evidence, that this $1,000 was his individual funds, and not the funds of Mrs. Shannon, and it was for paying this note that Mrs. Shannon had executed and delivered to him the instrument on which this prosecution was based, as a receipt for $1,000 to be applied on a note due by him to her. There was no error in permitting a witness to state what had been the testimony of this defendant in the civil suit, insofar as it related to this transaction.

Defendant also objected to the testimony of P. S. Carter, an attorney, who testified that Mrs. Shannon had given to him for collection, the note given to her by this defendant. Defendant had plead in the civil suit, that at the time Mrs. Shannon had executed the receipt, she had also delivered to him his note, and he was then in possession of same. It was proper for the court to permit Mr. Carter to testify, that long subsequent to this time, Mrs. Shannon was in possession of defendant’s note, and had delivered it to him for collection, and that same had been abstracted from his office without his knowledge or consent.

Defendant objected to the witness, W. H. Penix, being permitted to testify “that in his opinion, the signature to the alleged receipt *93 (the instrument described in the indictment), was a forgery, and that Mrs. Shannon’s name had been traced thereon from the signature to the Cicero Smith note.” The court, in approving the bill, states: “Which is done with the explanation, that the witness testified that he knew Mrs. Shannon’s signature, had been her attorney for some time, and had- often seen her write, and that the alleged receipt, described in the indictment, and then held in his hand, was not Mrs. Shannon’s signature, but that it bore evidence of having been traced from Mrs. Shannon’s signature to the Cicero Smith note, which note and the alleged receipt were by the defendant, Flake Barber, produced together and put in evidence in a certain civil suit.”

By order of the court, the original receipt and note have been sent to this court for our inspection, and in the light of the witness’ testimony, and the explanation of the court, we think the testimony was admissible. What the witness really testified is as follows:

“I am a practicing lawyer, a member of the firm of Penix & Eberhart, and reside at Mineral Wells. I have known Mrs.

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Barber v. State, 142 S.W. 582, 64 Tex. Crim. 89, 1911 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 525 (Tex. 1911).

142 S.W. 582 (Barber v. State) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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