Barber v. Mercer

303 S.W.3d 786, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 8621, 2009 WL 3337192
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 15, 2009
Docket2-08-079-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by36 cases

This text of 303 S.W.3d 786 (Barber v. Mercer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barber v. Mercer, 303 S.W.3d 786, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 8621, 2009 WL 3337192 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).

Opinion

OPINION

TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice.

Appellants Malcolm and Leann Barber sued Leo C. Mercer, Jr., M.D., appellee, and others for negligence in the treatment and care of Malcolm’s heart condition during a heart bypass procedure. Dr. Mercer was the general surgeon who assisted the lead surgeon by harvesting a saphenous vein from Malcolm’s leg. This case currently involves only Dr. Mercer. The Barbers challenge the trial court’s dismissal of their claim against Dr. Mercer for failure to comply with the expert report requirements of the civil practice and remedies code. We reverse and remand.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Barbers sued numerous defendants, including Dr. Mercer, for negligence in connection with the diagnosis and surgical treatment of Malcolm’s heart condition (an interlocutory appeal between the Barbers and several of the other defendants is currently pending in this court under cause number 2-07-353-CV). Malcolm underwent a multi-vessel coronary artery bypass *789 graft (CABG) procedure at United Regional Health Care System in Wichita Falls, Texas, in early 2004. The surgery lasted over six hours, and afterwards, Malcolm suffered numbness, pain, and weakness in his left upper arm that led to a diagnosis of left ulnar nerve lesion and ulnar cubital syndrome. He required additional surgery and therapy and ultimately sued the physicians, nurse practitioners, and the hospital involved in his care for damages resulting from the padding and positioning of his arm. Dr. Mercer, a general surgeon, had assisted Mikko P. Tauriainen, M.D., a cardiovascular and thoracic surgeon, in performing the CABG procedure on Malcolm; Dr. Mercer was responsible for harvesting the left saphenous vein from Malcolm’s leg.

In the Barbers’ original petition they alleged multiple basis of negligence including specifically that the various defendants negligently failed to timely, properly, safely, or adequately supervise or care for Malcolm’s condition during the CABG procedure and postoperatively, particularly relating to his “left upper extremity difficulties.” Furthermore, the Barbers alleged that several of the defendant doctors failed to adequately train or supervise others who were assisting in Malcolm’s procedure.

After they filed suit, the Barbers timely filed their expert reports. Dr. Mercer objected to the Barbers’ first expert report dated August 5, 2006 on the grounds that their expert, Jeffrey Alan Wagner, M.D., M.B.A., a board certified anesthesiologist, was not qualified to provide the report and that Dr. Wagner failed to provide a fair summary of his opinions in accordance with section 74.351(r)(6) of the civil practice and remedies code. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351(r)(6) (Vernon Supp. 2009). After a hearing on the issue in July 2007, the trial court specifically overruled Dr. Mercer’s objections to Dr. Wagner’s qualifications to opine, but it sustained his objections as to the report’s failure to provide a fair summary of the applicable standard of care, breach of that standard as to each defendant, and causation under section 74.351.

On September 25, 2007, the trial court entered an order giving the Barbers thirty days to correct the defects in their first expert report as to Dr. Mercer. 1 The order stated, “[Ojbjections to the Expert Report of Jeffrey Alan Wagner, M.D. are hereby OVERRULED to the extent that such Objections challenge Dr. Wagner’s qualifications to opine as an expert, pursuant to Sections 74.401 and 74.402.... ” However, the trial court denied the Barbers’ oral request to supplement with a new expert as to defendants Mercer, Robert Lee Moss, M.D., United Regional Health Care System, Inc., and Shellie Barnett-Wright, PA-C. The Barbers immediately filed a more extensive report by Dr. Wagner, particularly expanded as to standard of care, breach, and causation as to each named defendant since the trial court had denied Dr. Mercer’s objections to Dr. Wagner’s qualifications.

After the Barbers filed their amended report through their same expert, Dr. Wagner, Dr. Mercer filed a second motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted on the sole ground that the expert was not qualified “to opine as an expert against Dr. Mercer.” 2 In all other respects, the trial *790 court determined that the expert’s amended report, dated September 28, 2007, “satisfies the requirements of section 74.351 ... as to Dr. Mercer, and all other objections by Dr. Mercer are overruled.” The trial court then granted Dr. Mercer’s motion to dismiss him with prejudice. The Barbers appealed. See Tex. Civ. Prae. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(10) (Vernon 2008).

Issue on Appeal

In the Barbers’ sole issue on appeal, they contend that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Dr. Mercer’s second motion to dismiss on the basis that Dr. Wagner was not a qualifying “expert” sufficient to give an opinion on whether Dr. Mercer departed from accepted medical care under the civil practice and remedies code. Dr. Wagner’s complete amended report is attached to this opinion as appendix “A.”

Standard of Review

Although the Barbers ask us to reevaluate the standard of review for expert report challenges, Texas courts and our supreme court, in particular, agree that review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss under section 74.351 is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Tex.2001) (applying abuse of discretion standard to predecessor statute); Craig v. Dearbonne, 259 S.W.3d 308, 310 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2008, no pet.); San Jacinto Methodist Hosp. v. Bennett, 256 S.W.3d 806, 811 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.); Lal v. Harris Methodist Fort Worth, 230 S.W.3d 468, 471 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). We have previously declined the opportunity to apply a de novo standard of review to this issue and therefore decline the Barbers’ invitation now. Ctr. for Neurological Disorders, P.A. v. George, 261 S.W.3d 285, 291 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied). Furthermore, a trial court’s decision on whether a physician is qualified to offer an expert opinion in a health care liability claim is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Mem’l Hermann Healthcare Sys. v. Burrell, 230 S.W.3d 755, 757 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, we must decide whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles; in other words, we must decide whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc.,

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Bluebook (online)
303 S.W.3d 786, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 8621, 2009 WL 3337192, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barber-v-mercer-texapp-2009.