Barber-Asphalt Paving Co. v. Hezel

76 Mo. App. 135, 1898 Mo. App. LEXIS 168
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 21, 1898
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 76 Mo. App. 135 (Barber-Asphalt Paving Co. v. Hezel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barber-Asphalt Paving Co. v. Hezel, 76 Mo. App. 135, 1898 Mo. App. LEXIS 168 (Mo. Ct. App. 1898).

Opinions

Bland, P. J.

statement Plaintiff brought suit to recover the amount of a special tax bill assessed against the property of defendants on account of the reconstruction of a portion of Jefferson avenueinthe city of St. Louis. The petition is in the ordinary form of petitions in similar suits. The tax bill was filed as an exhibit, and the ordinance number 17,151 under which the work was done was set out in full. An amended answer was filed, which in addition to a plea of the general issue, stated eight special defenses, and contained also a cross-bill, which asked for a cancellation of the special tax bill, filed as an exhibit with the petition. The first of these special defenses in substance is that ordinance number 17,151, under which the work was done is void, for the reason that the Board of Public Improvements did not specify the material to be used in the work of repair and maintenance, the manner and regulations under which the nine year’s maintenance should be regulated, and made no estimate of the cost of such maintenance as is required by section 15, article 6, of the city’s charter, and did not prepare and submit to the municipal assembly an estimate of the cost of the work of repair and maintenance proposed by said ordinance as required by section 27, article 6, of the city’s charter; that no special appropriation for the cost of repair and maintenance is made by the ordinance as required by section 28, article 6, of the charter.

[139]*139The second special defense in substance is, that the committee of the municipal assembly, to which the ordinance was referred (if referred) after its second reading, failed and refused'to obtain the indorsement of the comptroller of the city; that sufficient unappropriated means stood to the credit of the fund set aside for street repairs — reconstructed streets, to meet the requirements of the ordinance, as required by section 12, article 5, city charter.

The third special defense is in substance, that the ordinance provided for the advertising and letting in one advertisement and one letting for the reconstruction and repair and maintenance for nine years of Jefferson avenue, and that in fact the contract for reconstruction and nine years’ maintenance were bid for and awarded to the appellant in one bid and one and the same contract; that such a combination is to the prejudice of the property holders and is unlawful, in that such a contract taxes specially the adjacent property with the cost of repairs and maintenance, which the city under its charter is bound to pay.

The fourth special defense is in substance, that the Board of Public Improvements in recommending and directing the work on Jefferson avenue, acted in pursuance of section 542 of the Revised Ordinances of 1887, in force at the date of the passage of ordinance number 17,151; that said section 542 of Revised Ordinances of 1887 and ordinance number 17,151 are void for the reason that they are in conflict with sections 14, 15, 17, 18, 24, 27 and 28, article 6 of the city charter.

The fifth special defense is in substance, that the Board of Public Improvements arbitrarily fixed the price and rate at fifty cents per square for maintenance, instead of submitting estimates for such work, as required by the city’s charter. As a consequence,of this [140]*140arbitrary ruling of the board, the defendants for a sixth special defense state substantially, that the cost of repairs and maintenance was in part, if not wholly, incorporated in the estimates, bid letting and contracting for reconstruction, and that this excess of charge for reconstruction was taxed against the defendants in the tax bill, whereas it should be paid by the city.

The seventh special defense was stricken out on motion of the plaintiff on the authority of Verdin v. St. Louis, 131 Mo. 26.

The eighth special defense is as follows: “By designating the Barber Asphalt Paving Company as the only bidder for reconstruction, and unlawfully requiring the said work of repair and maintenance, to be let together with the reconstruction, in the same contract, to the same contractor, the Board of Public Improvements, and the Municipal Assembly of the city of St. Louis by adopting said ordinance number 17,151, violated section 27, article 6, of the charter, which provides that contracts for repairs for a period exceeding one year shall be submitted to competitive bidding, and let to the lowest bidder.”

By agreement the court tried the case without the aid of a jury, upon facts mostly agreed upon. To make out its ease the plaintiff offered the following agreed state of facts:

“The signatures of the president of the Board of Public Improvements of the city of St. Louis and of the comptroller of the city of St. Louis, appearing on the tax bill No. 3170 sued on are genuine. The said tax bill was issued and delivered to and is owned by the plaintiff herein, the Barber Asphalt Paving Company, as alleged in the petition.
“Defendants are the owners of the land described in the petition and tax bill sued on. Demand of payment of tax bills sued on was made by plaintiff of [141]*141defendants upon the date stated in the petition. Plaintiff offers in evidence said special tax bill, which is exhibit “A” attached to its petition and rests.”
dependants’ case.
“1. Defendants offer in evidence ordinance No. 17,151, together with all indorsements thereon, which ordinance is correctly set out in plaintiff’s petition, and the indorsements thereon are as follows:”

Upon the front is the following:

“E. N. R.
EVIDENCE. “House bill No. 401, Regular Session, 1892-1893. An Ordinance to reconstruct Jefferson avenue from Adam street to Market street. Recommended by the Board of Public Improvements.”
“First reading, March 7, 1893; second reading, March 10, 1893, referred to the Committee on Public Improvements. March 14,1893, engrossed, read third time and passed. Enrolled, March 22, 1893; approved March 28, 1893. No. 17,151.
“Thomas E. Barrett,
“Clerk House of Delegates.”

And upon the inside fold the following indorsements:

“Oppice op the Board op Public Improvements.
“St Louis, February, 28th, 1893.
“The Board of Public Improvements estimates the cost of the entire work contemplated by the within ordinance to be done at the expense of the city, at one thousand and forty-five dollars, and at the expense of property owners fifteen thousand, five hundred and three dollars. GIeorge Burnet,
“Attest: President Board of Public Improvements.
“Emory S. Foster, Secretary.”
[142]*142“Comptroller’s Oeeice, March 11th, 1893.
“I certify that sufficient unappropriated means stand to the credit of the street reconstruction fund to meet the proposed appropriation, say one thousand and forty-five dollars, and to the credit of special tax fund- — new work, to meet the proposed appropriation of two hundred and sixty-three dollars.
“John D. Stevenson,
“Comptroller.”

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Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Hezel
56 S.W. 449 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1900)

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Bluebook (online)
76 Mo. App. 135, 1898 Mo. App. LEXIS 168, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barber-asphalt-paving-co-v-hezel-moctapp-1898.