Barbara Sanchez v. NuSil Technology, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedJune 30, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-03329
StatusUnknown

This text of Barbara Sanchez v. NuSil Technology, LLC (Barbara Sanchez v. NuSil Technology, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barbara Sanchez v. NuSil Technology, LLC, (C.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JS 6 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA ~

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 20-3329 FMO (ASx) Date June 30, 2020 Title Barbara Sanchez v. Does 1 through 100, et al.

Present: The Honorable Fernando M. Olguin, United States District Judge Vanessa Figueroa None Present Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants: None Present None Present Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order Remanding Action On June 12, 2019, plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Santa Barbara County Superior Court asserting state law claims against defendants Praxair, Inc. (“Praxair”) and Nusil Technology LLC (“NuSil’). (See Barbara Sanchez v. Does 1 through 100, Inclusive, CV 20-1867 FMO (ASx) (“Sanchez |”) Dkt. 1, Notice of Removal (“NOR”) at ¥ 5; Dkt. 1-1, Exh. A, Complaint). On February 26, 2020, Praxair removed that action on diversity jurisdiction grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. NuSil joined in Praxair’s removal. (See id., Dkt. 1, NOR at J 9; Dkt. 1-3, Defendant NuSil Technology LLC’s Consent and Joinder in Removal (“NuSil Consent”)). The court subsequently remanded the case for failure to establish diversity jurisdiction with respect to NuSil. (See id. at Dkt. 15). On April 9, 2020, the case was removed again on diversity jurisdiction grounds but this time by defendant NuSil. (See Dkt. 1, Defendant Nusil Technology LLC’s Notice of Removal (“NOR”) at J 3). NuSil acknowledges that it was served with the summons and complaint on or about February 14, 2020,' (see id. at J 10), but asserts that its removal was timely. (See id. at □□□ 16- 20). Plaintiff now moves to remand. (See Dkt. 11, Motion). The court finds that oral argument is not necessary to resolve the Motion, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Local Rule 7-15; Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 244 F.3d 675, 684 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2001), and having reviewed the briefing and the record, the court hereby remands this action to state court. LEGAL STANDARD In general, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden

' According to plaintiff, NuSil was served on February 11, 2020. (See Dkt. 11, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand Action to Santa Barbara Superior Court (“Motion”) at 3). For purposes of this

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 20-3329 FMO (ASx) Date June 30, 2020 Title Barbara Sanchez v. Does 1 through 100, et al. of establishing that removal is proper.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (noting the “longstanding, near- canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the removing defendant”). Moreover, if there is any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must resolve those doubts in favor of remanding the action to state court. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”). DISCUSSION Title 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) requires a defendant to file a notice of removal “within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based[.]” However, “if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). While the 30-day time limit is procedural rather than jurisdictional, “the time limit is mandatory and a timely objection to a late petition will defeat removal[.]” Smith v. Mylan, Inc., 761 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant may not “ignore pleadings or other documents from which removability may be ascertained and seek removal only when it becomes strategically advantageous for it to do so.” Roth v. CHA Hollywood Medical Center, L.P., 720 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013). Once a defendant receives a pleading or other documentthat contains information from which removability may be ascertained, defendant has an obligation “to apply a reasonable amount of intelligence in ascertaining removability.”, Kuxhausen v. BMW Financial Services NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, although Nusil was served with the summons and Complaint on February 14, 2020 — making the instant removal clearly untimely — and consented to the first removal of the action by Praxair, Nusil contends that its subsequent removal is timely because it was “filed within thirty days of receipt of ‘other paper’ which establishe[d] that the case [was] now removable.” (Dkt. 1, NOR at ¥ 4; see id. at J] 16-20). In other words, NuSil relies on is its own determination that it was not a citizen of California, (see Dkt. 1, NOR at ff] 16-20), as the “other paper” justifying the removal. (See id. at 4). Specifically, Nusil alleges that after its citizenship was challenged, its corporate officer, Stacy Broad (“Broad”) “researched the facts and history underlying the residence of NuSil and its members, and the information she obtained established that there is complete diversity between Plaintiff and the Defendants[.]” (Id.). According to NuSil, its research into its

? An “antiremoval presumption” does not exist in cases removed pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 20-3329 FMO (ASx) Date June 30, 2020 Title Barbara Sanchez v. Does 1 through 100, et al. own citizenship was not completed until April 7, 2020. (Id. at ] 20; Dkt. 1-1, Exh. A, Declaration of Stacy Broad at J 17). Nusil’s contentions are unpersuasive. As an initial matter, the court finds it incredible that any business or corporate entity is not aware of its own citizenship for purposes of suing and being sued. Moreover, it appears that there is a serious question as to whether the instant NOR was filed in good faith. For example, while NuSil contends that it needed time to research the citizenship of its members, (see Dkt. 1, NOR at J 4; Dkt. 1-1, Broad Decl.

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