Barbara Carr v. Department of the Army

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided March 20, 2024·No. CH-3443-18-0142-I-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

BARBARA CARR, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, CH-3443-18-0142-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: March 20, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Arthur D. Cox , Vine Grove, Kentucky, for the appellant.

C. Mike Moulton , Esquire, Elizabethtown, Kentucky, for the appellant.

Glenn Houston Parrish , Esquire, Fort Knox, Kentucky, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed the appeal of a reduction-in-force (RIF) action for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. For the reasons set forth below, we VACATE the administrative judge’s findings on the merits of the appeal, and we AFFIRM the initial decision as MODIFIED to clarify the administrative judge’s jurisdictional analysis. Except as expressly indicated in this Final Order, the initial decision of the administrative judge is the Board’s final decision.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW The administrative judge properly found that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s appeal of a RIF action.

The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). An appellant bears the burden of proving the Board’s jurisdiction by preponderant evidence. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). An appellant generally is entitled to a jurisdictional hearing if she makes a nonfrivolous allegation 2 of Board jurisdiction over the appeal. Edwards v. Department of the Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 307, ¶ 6 (2013). RIF actions are not appealable to the Board under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. Smith v. Department of the Air Force, 117 M.S.P.R. 488, ¶ 5 (2012); see 5 U.S.C.

2 A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).

§ 7512(B). However, an employee who has been furloughed for more than 30 days, separated, or demoted by a RIF action may appeal to the Board under 5 C.F.R. § 351.901. Thus, to establish the Board’s jurisdiction over a RIF appeal, an appellant must show that she was furloughed for more than 30 days, separated, or demoted by the RIF action. Adams v. Department of Defense, 96 M.S.P.R. 325, ¶ 9.

Here, the appellant has not alleged, and the record does not suggest, that she was furloughed for more than 30 days or was separated by a RIF action. Instead, the record reflects that she accepted a reassignment from the position of Physician (Emergency Medicine), GP-0602-14, to the position of Physician (Family Practice), GP-0602-14, as part of a RIF. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 12 at 28, 30-31. Therefore, the relevant jurisdictional issue here is whether the appellant was demoted by a RIF action. See Myers v. Department of the Army, 87 M.S.P.R. 77, ¶ 5 (2000) (observing that an employee reassigned during a RIF can only appeal to the Board if the reassignment was a RIF demotion). For purposes of 5 C.F.R. § 351.901, “demotion” means a change of an employee, while serving continuously within the same agency: (i) to a lower grade when both the old and the new positions are under the General Schedule or under the same type graded wage schedule; or (ii) to a position with a lower rate of pay when both the old and the new positions are under the same type ungraded wage schedule, or are in different pay method categories. 5 C.F.R. § 210.102(b)(4); see Smith, 117 M.S.P.R. 488, ¶ 5.

Here, in determining whether the appellant satisfied either prong of the definition of “demotion,” the administrative judge found that the appellant did not suffer an appealable RIF demotion because she was not reassigned to a lower grade and she was not assigned to a position with a lower rate of pay. IAF, Tab 20, Initial Decision (ID) at 4. Although we agree with the administrative judge’s ultimate finding that the appellant did not suffer an appealable RIF

demotion, we modify the initial decision to clarify the administrative judge’s jurisdictional analysis, as follows.

Although the position descriptions for the appellant’s current and former Physician positions use the pay plan code “GP,” both positions are part of the General Schedule pay system. IAF, Tab 12 at 8, 13, 17, 25-26; see Fact Sheet: Pay Plans, U.S. Office of Personnel Management, https://www.opm.gov/policydata -oversight/pay-leave/pay-administration/fact-sheets/pay-plans/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2024); see also Bosco v. Department of the Treasury, 6 M.S.P.R. 471, 474 (1981) (finding that OPM makes the final determination of whether a given position or type of position should be included in the General Schedule). Therefore, the relevant definition of “demotion” is the one set forth at 5 C.F.R. § 210.102(b)(4)(i). It is undisputed that the appellant’s old and new positions are at the same grade level. Therefore, we find that the appellant has failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that she suffered an appealable RIF demotion. See Buckheit v. U.S. Postal Service, 107 M.S.P.R. 52, ¶ 11 (2007) (finding that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s reassignment from one PS-5 position to another under 5 C.F.R. part 351). Moreover, we find that whether the appellant suffered a reduction in pay or a change in pay rate is immaterial to the dispositive jurisdictional issue. See McDonald v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 86 M.S.P.R. 539, ¶ 13 (2000) (finding that, because the appellant occupied a “graded” position before and after his reassignment, the fact that he was receiving “a lower rate of pay” under 5 C.F.R. § 210.102(b)(4)(ii), was irrelevant to the determination of whether an appealable RIF action was effected); Glennon v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 86 M.S.P.R. 340, ¶ 11 (2000) (finding that, although the appellant’s pay would be reduced as a result of a reassignment from one graded position to another, she did not suffer an appealable RIF demotion because she was not reduced in grade).

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Barbara Carr v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2024).

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