NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4597-19
BARBARA B. KNOPF,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BARRY A. KNOPF,
Defendant-Respondent. _________________________
Submitted May 18, 2021 – Decided June 7, 2021
Before Judges Haas and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County, Docket No. FM-16-1451-96.
Hellring Lindeman Goldstein & Siegal, LLP, attorneys for appellant (Sheryl E. Koomer, of counsel and on the briefs).
Cohn Lifland Pearlman Herrmann & Knopf, LLP, attorneys for respondent (Julie L. Kim and Christina N. Stripp, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM In this post-judgment matrimonial matter, plaintiff Barbara Knopf appeals
from the Family Part's July 17, 2020 order granting defendant Barry Knopf's
motion that he be relieved of his obligation to maintain a life insurance poli cy
naming plaintiff as the irrevocable beneficiary. Plaintiff also challenges the
provisions of that order that denied her cross-motion to require defendant to pay
her $24,914.88 in alimony after she failed to deposit defendant's prior checks
for this sum in a timely manner, as well as her request for counsel fees. We are
constrained to reverse and remand because the trial court did not: (1) require
defendant to submit a Case Information Statement or any other financial
information before terminating the life insurance policy; (2) make any findings
of fact or conclusions of law on the issues raised in plaintiff's cross-motion; or
(3) conduct oral argument on the parties' competing motions.
The parties were married in June 1969. They have two children, both of
whom are emancipated. Following a multi-day trial, they were divorced in May
1998.
Pursuant to the Dual Judgment of Divorce (DJOD), defendant was
required to pay plaintiff $625 per week in permanent alimony. The DJOD
provided that if defendant retired at or after age 62 from his position as a partner
in a law firm, he could seek a modification of his alimony obligation.
A-4597-19 2 With specific reference to the parties' present dispute, the DJOD stated
that "[d]efendant shall continue to maintain the Attorneys Group Insurance Trust
Life Insurance policy" in the amount of $275,000 "of which he shall continue to
name . . . [p]laintiff as the sole beneficiary, irrevocably." About a year after the
parties' divorce, they agreed defendant could obtain a less costly policy from a
different company in the same face amount of $275,000. Defendant's annual
premium for this policy was approximately $1650.
In 2014, plaintiff failed to deposit nine of defendant's monthly alimony
checks, totaling $24,914.88. 1 After six months, the checks were no longer valid.
In 2015, when plaintiff was again able to attend to her banking tasks, she asked
defendant to reissue the checks to her. Defendant refused to pay the amount due
all at once, but stated he would pay her $1000 per month until plaintiff received
full payment on the condition plaintiff returned the uncashed checks to him. The
parties were unable to agree on a resolution of this dispute.
In 2019, defendant advised plaintiff that his annual premium for the
$275,000 life insurance policy had been raised from $1650 to $7339. As a result,
defendant asked plaintiff if she would agree to end his obligation to provide her
1 Plaintiff asserts she was unable to deposit the checks due to a health issue. A-4597-19 3 with life insurance coverage. When plaintiff refused, defendant filed a motion
for permission to terminate the policy.
In support of this motion, defendant asserted he was now 74 years old and
suffered from cardiac issues that had first surfaced during the parties' marriage.
He stated his insurance broker had attempted to find a less costly policy, but was
unable to do so. Defendant did not submit a Case Information Statement (CIS)
with his motion or any other financial information. Defendant was still a partner
at his law firm and did not assert that he could not afford to pay the additional
premium either from his annual income, savings, or other assets. Defendant's
motion asked that the court conduct oral argument in the event plaintiff opposed
his motion.
Plaintiff contested defendant's motion and filed a cross-motion seeking an
order requiring defendant to pay her the $24,914.88 still due for the alimony
checks she failed to deposit in a timely manner in 2014. Plaintiff also asked for
counsel fees.
The motion judge did not conduct oral argument on the parties' motions.
Instead, he issued an order granting defendant's motion to terminate his
obligation to provide life insurance and denying plaintiff's cross-motion for the
alimony payments and counsel fees. With regard to the life insurance, the judge
A-4597-19 4 stated in the order that defendant had "made a showing of changed
circumstances based on [his] age, health, and the substantial increase of monthly
payments to maintain the life insurance policy. Accordingly, [d]efendant's life
insurance policy obligation is hereby terminated." In so ruling, the ju dge made
no finding that defendant could not afford the increased premium and, as noted
above, the judge did not require defendant to submit any financial information
in support of his motion.
The judge denied the requests plaintiff made in her cross-motion without
making any findings of fact or conclusions of law explaining the basis for his
decision. This appeal followed.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the judge should not have considered
defendant's motion to terminate his obligation to pay for the life insurance policy
because defendant failed to supply a CIS to demonstrate he lacked the financial
ability to continue to maintain the policy. She also contends that because the
judge made no findings of fact or conclusions of law concerning her cross -
motion, the matter must be remanded so that he may do so. Finally, plaintiff
asserts that the judge should entertain oral argument before resolving the parties'
motions and should hold a plenary hearing if there are factual disputes between
them. We agree.
A-4597-19 5 Established precedents guide our task on appeal. We owe substantial
deference to the Family Part's findings of fact because of that court's special
expertise in family matters. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998).
Thus, "[a] reviewing court should uphold the factual findings undergirding the
trial court's decision if they are supported by adequate, substantial and credible
evidence on the record." MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 253-54
(2007) (alteration in original) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)).
We will only reverse the judge's decision when it is necessary to "ensure
that there is not a denial of justice because the family court's conclusions are []
clearly mistaken or wide of the mark." Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 48
(App. Div.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4597-19
BARBARA B. KNOPF,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BARRY A. KNOPF,
Defendant-Respondent. _________________________
Submitted May 18, 2021 – Decided June 7, 2021
Before Judges Haas and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County, Docket No. FM-16-1451-96.
Hellring Lindeman Goldstein & Siegal, LLP, attorneys for appellant (Sheryl E. Koomer, of counsel and on the briefs).
Cohn Lifland Pearlman Herrmann & Knopf, LLP, attorneys for respondent (Julie L. Kim and Christina N. Stripp, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM In this post-judgment matrimonial matter, plaintiff Barbara Knopf appeals
from the Family Part's July 17, 2020 order granting defendant Barry Knopf's
motion that he be relieved of his obligation to maintain a life insurance poli cy
naming plaintiff as the irrevocable beneficiary. Plaintiff also challenges the
provisions of that order that denied her cross-motion to require defendant to pay
her $24,914.88 in alimony after she failed to deposit defendant's prior checks
for this sum in a timely manner, as well as her request for counsel fees. We are
constrained to reverse and remand because the trial court did not: (1) require
defendant to submit a Case Information Statement or any other financial
information before terminating the life insurance policy; (2) make any findings
of fact or conclusions of law on the issues raised in plaintiff's cross-motion; or
(3) conduct oral argument on the parties' competing motions.
The parties were married in June 1969. They have two children, both of
whom are emancipated. Following a multi-day trial, they were divorced in May
1998.
Pursuant to the Dual Judgment of Divorce (DJOD), defendant was
required to pay plaintiff $625 per week in permanent alimony. The DJOD
provided that if defendant retired at or after age 62 from his position as a partner
in a law firm, he could seek a modification of his alimony obligation.
A-4597-19 2 With specific reference to the parties' present dispute, the DJOD stated
that "[d]efendant shall continue to maintain the Attorneys Group Insurance Trust
Life Insurance policy" in the amount of $275,000 "of which he shall continue to
name . . . [p]laintiff as the sole beneficiary, irrevocably." About a year after the
parties' divorce, they agreed defendant could obtain a less costly policy from a
different company in the same face amount of $275,000. Defendant's annual
premium for this policy was approximately $1650.
In 2014, plaintiff failed to deposit nine of defendant's monthly alimony
checks, totaling $24,914.88. 1 After six months, the checks were no longer valid.
In 2015, when plaintiff was again able to attend to her banking tasks, she asked
defendant to reissue the checks to her. Defendant refused to pay the amount due
all at once, but stated he would pay her $1000 per month until plaintiff received
full payment on the condition plaintiff returned the uncashed checks to him. The
parties were unable to agree on a resolution of this dispute.
In 2019, defendant advised plaintiff that his annual premium for the
$275,000 life insurance policy had been raised from $1650 to $7339. As a result,
defendant asked plaintiff if she would agree to end his obligation to provide her
1 Plaintiff asserts she was unable to deposit the checks due to a health issue. A-4597-19 3 with life insurance coverage. When plaintiff refused, defendant filed a motion
for permission to terminate the policy.
In support of this motion, defendant asserted he was now 74 years old and
suffered from cardiac issues that had first surfaced during the parties' marriage.
He stated his insurance broker had attempted to find a less costly policy, but was
unable to do so. Defendant did not submit a Case Information Statement (CIS)
with his motion or any other financial information. Defendant was still a partner
at his law firm and did not assert that he could not afford to pay the additional
premium either from his annual income, savings, or other assets. Defendant's
motion asked that the court conduct oral argument in the event plaintiff opposed
his motion.
Plaintiff contested defendant's motion and filed a cross-motion seeking an
order requiring defendant to pay her the $24,914.88 still due for the alimony
checks she failed to deposit in a timely manner in 2014. Plaintiff also asked for
counsel fees.
The motion judge did not conduct oral argument on the parties' motions.
Instead, he issued an order granting defendant's motion to terminate his
obligation to provide life insurance and denying plaintiff's cross-motion for the
alimony payments and counsel fees. With regard to the life insurance, the judge
A-4597-19 4 stated in the order that defendant had "made a showing of changed
circumstances based on [his] age, health, and the substantial increase of monthly
payments to maintain the life insurance policy. Accordingly, [d]efendant's life
insurance policy obligation is hereby terminated." In so ruling, the ju dge made
no finding that defendant could not afford the increased premium and, as noted
above, the judge did not require defendant to submit any financial information
in support of his motion.
The judge denied the requests plaintiff made in her cross-motion without
making any findings of fact or conclusions of law explaining the basis for his
decision. This appeal followed.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the judge should not have considered
defendant's motion to terminate his obligation to pay for the life insurance policy
because defendant failed to supply a CIS to demonstrate he lacked the financial
ability to continue to maintain the policy. She also contends that because the
judge made no findings of fact or conclusions of law concerning her cross -
motion, the matter must be remanded so that he may do so. Finally, plaintiff
asserts that the judge should entertain oral argument before resolving the parties'
motions and should hold a plenary hearing if there are factual disputes between
them. We agree.
A-4597-19 5 Established precedents guide our task on appeal. We owe substantial
deference to the Family Part's findings of fact because of that court's special
expertise in family matters. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998).
Thus, "[a] reviewing court should uphold the factual findings undergirding the
trial court's decision if they are supported by adequate, substantial and credible
evidence on the record." MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 253-54
(2007) (alteration in original) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)).
We will only reverse the judge's decision when it is necessary to "ensure
that there is not a denial of justice because the family court's conclusions are []
clearly mistaken or wide of the mark." Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 48
(App. Div. 2010) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)).
Unfortunately, this is such a case.
Here, the primary issue on defendant's motion to terminate his obligation
to provide life insurance protection for plaintiff was whether the cost of
maintaining the policy had become prohibitive. The only way that the motion
judge could properly address that issue was to examine defendant's complete
financial picture.
A-4597-19 6 In this regard, Rule 5:5-4(a)(4) requires a party seeking modification or
termination of a support order to submit his or her current CIS, together with the
statements used in the issuance of the order for which modification is sought.
Zazzo v. Zazzo, 245 N.J. Super. 124, 129 (App. Div. 1990). The financial
information submitted to the court must be current and updated prior to any
modification order. Gulya v. Gulya, 251 N.J. Super. 250, 253-54 (App. Div.
1991).2 The requirement that a party file a current financial disclosure statement
is "not just window dressing. It is, on the contrary, a way for the trial judge to
get a complete picture of the movant[] in a modification case." Id. at 253.
As noted above, defendant was, and remains, a partner in a law firm.
While the annual premium for his policy increased from $1650 to $7339,
defendant's failure to disclose his finances made it impossible for the judge to
determine whether the cost of maintaining the policy was beyond defendant's
reach. Because the motion judge did not address or evaluate defendant's current
financial situation in his decision, we reverse the order terminating defendant's
2 Contrary to defendant's contention on appeal, a CIS is necessary whenever a modification of an order is sought under N.J.S.A. 5:5-4(a), regardless of whether that order is for alimony or child support, or for enforcement or modification of orders and judgments. Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1.3 on R. 5:5-4 (2021). A-4597-19 7 obligation to continue to provide a life insurance policy naming plaint iff as the
irrevocable beneficiary.
We also reverse the judge's denial of the relief requested in plaintiff's
cross-motion because he did not make any findings of fact or conclusions of law
in connection with his ruling. Rule 1:7-4(a) clearly states that in addition to
entering an appropriate written order, a trial judge "shall, by an opinion or
memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its
conclusions of law thereon . . . on every motion decided by a written order that
is appealable as of right . . . ." See Shulas v. Estabrook, 385 N.J. Super. 91, 96
(App. Div. 2006) (requiring an adequate explanation of basis for court's action).
The judge's decision must clearly demonstrate that the litigants have been
heard and their arguments were considered. While a judge need not author a
lengthy written opinion, or deliver an hour-long oral ruling to meet this
requirement in every case, he or she must always state what facts form the basis
of his or her decision, and then weigh and evaluate those facts in light of the
governing law "to reach whatever conclusion may logically flow from" those
facts. Slutsky v. Slutsky, 451 N.J. Super. 332, 357 (App. Div. 2017). Because
justice requires no less, "[a]ll conclusions must be supported." Ibid.
A-4597-19 8 In sum, "[m]eaningful appellate review is inhibited unless the judge sets
forth the reasons for his or her opinion." Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super.
298, 310 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Salch v. Salch, 240 N.J. Super. 441, 443
(App. Div. 1990)). Unfortunately, the motion judge's rulings in this case did not
satisfy these requirements. As a result, we are unable to review the contentions
raised by the parties concerning the denial of plaintiff's cross-motion.
Therefore, we also reverse this portion of the order and remand to the Family
Part for a new consideration of plaintiff's requests for relief.
Given the necessity of a remand, we address two other issues. First, the
motion judge failed to explain why he did not grant defendant's request for oral
argument on the motion. Rule 5:5-4(a)(1) provides:
Motions in family actions shall be governed by R. 1:6- 2(b) except that, in exercising its discretion as to the mode and scheduling of disposition of motions, the court shall ordinarily grant requests for oral argument on substantive and non-routine discovery motions and ordinarily deny requests for oral argument on calendar and routine discovery motions.
The Rule expresses a "strong presumption favoring argument on motions other
than calendar matters and routine discovery applications." Pressler & Verniero,
Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1.1 on R. 5:5-4 (2021). Litigants should be
permitted oral argument on such motions when requested "as a matter of both
A-4597-19 9 due process and the appearance of due process." Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J.
Super. 301, 306 (App. Div. 1997). Here, the motion presented issues that clearly
could have benefited from further elucidation by way of oral argument. We
discern no "special or unusual circumstances here warranting the court's
dispensing with an entirely appropriate request for oral argument of a motion
presumptively entitled to argument on request." Ibid.
Finally, the motion judge did not explain why he did not conduct a plenary
hearing before entering the order. Of course, "[a] hearing is not required or
warranted in every contested proceeding for the modification of a judgment or
order . . . ." Murphy v. Murphy, 313 N.J. Super. 575, 580 (App. Div. 1998).
However, where the papers filed raise issues of fact or require credibility
determinations, relief cannot be granted or denied absent a plenary hearing.
Whitfield v. Whitfield, 315 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 1998). Thus, on
remand, the Family Part shall carefully consider whether a plenary hearing is
required to resolve the factual issues raised by the parties.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-4597-19 10