Bantes v. Blanche

Opinion

25-842 Del Cid-Bantes v. Blanche BIA

Dodd, IJ

A203 500 805/806

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 9th day of September, two thousand twenty-six.

PRESENT:

RICHARD C. WESLEY,

GERARD E. LYNCH,

MYRNA PÉREZ,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

WENDY LISSETH DEL CID-BANTES, J.A.M.-D.C.*, Petitioners,

v. 25-842 NAC

TODD BLANCHE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.

* We have abbreviated the minor’s name, in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2.

_____________________________________

FOR PETITIONERS: Joshua Bardavid, Esq., New York, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General;

Sheri R. Glaser, Acting Assistant Director;

Kristen H. Blosser, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

Petitioners Wendy Lisseth Del Cid-Bantes and her minor son, natives and citizens of Guatemala, seek review of a BIA decision affirming a decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Del Cid-Bantes’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Del Cid-Bantes, et al., Nos. A 203 500 805/806 (B.I.A. Mar. 24, 2025), aff’g Nos. A 203 500 805/806 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Feb. 10, 2020). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review pure questions of law de novo and factual findings, including a nexus determination, for substantial

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evidence. See Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 114-15 (2d. Cir. 2022) (reviewing nexus determination for substantial evidence); Garcia-Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752, 758 (2d Cir. 2022) (same); Edimo-Doualla v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 276, 282 (2d Cir. 2006) (same). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

An applicant for asylum and withholding of removal must show past persecution or a fear of future persecution, and that “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see id. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b), 1208.16(b); Quituizaca, 52 F.4th at 109–14 (holding that the “one central reason” standard applies to both asylum and withholding of removal). Under the “one central reason” standard, “a protected ground cannot be incidental or tangential to another reason for harm.” Quituizaca, 52 F.4th at 114–15 (quotation marks omitted). “In cases where there is more than one motive for mistreatment (also known as mixed-motive cases) . . . an applicant’s status as a member of a particular social group still must be at least one

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of the central reasons, rather than a minor reason, for why that individual is being targeted.” Garcia-Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752, 757 (2d Cir. 2022).

We disagree with Del Cid-Bantes that the IJ failed to apply the mixed-

motives standard here. See Pet.’s Br. 39–41. The IJ explicitly found that Del Cid- Bantes was not targeted because of her membership in any of the proposed particular social groups. Thus, the IJ necessarily concluded that membership in a particular social group was not “one of the central reasons” for why she was targeted. Garcia-Aranda, 53 F.4th at 757.

Substantial evidence supports that determination. The IJ’s finding that Del Cid-Bantes was targeted because she was perceived by the gang as having income is supported by her testimony that the gang began demanding payment after a member observed her home renovation and possessions. See Garcia-Aranda, 53 F.4th at 758 (holding that extortion based on “perceived ability to pay” is not a protected ground). She also testified, and country conditions evidence demonstrates, that gangs extort a broad swath of Guatemalan society, including men, and women with husbands. Thus, a reasonable adjudicator would not be compelled to find that her membership in any of her proposed particular social groups—based on gender, education, parenthood, and the absence of her

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husband—was a central reason for the extortion, as opposed to being incidental or tangential to the gang’s financial motive. Id.; Quituizaca, 52 F.4th at 114–15.

Moreover, Del Cid-Bantes does not address the IJ’s conclusion that her anti-

gang opinion was not political, and thus abandons any claim based on that ground. See Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023) (“We consider abandoned any claims not adequately presented in an appellant’s brief, and an appellant’s failure to make legal or factual arguments constitutes abandonment.” (quotation marks omitted)); see also Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 190, 200– 01 (2d Cir. 2021) (holding that disapproving of gangs, without more, does not amount to a political opinion, i.e., “opposition to criminal elements such as gangs, even when such opposition incurs the enmity of these elements, does not thereby become political opposition simply by virtue of the gang’s reaction” (emphasis omitted)).

The IJ’s nexus determination is dispositive of asylum and withholding of removal, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A), and Del Cid-Bantes does not challenge the agency’s denial of CAT relief, see Debique, 58 F.4th at 684. For these reasons, we find it unnecessary to reach other grounds for the agency’s decision. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts

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and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”). But we note, for clarity’s sake, that “[u]nder the unwilling-or-unable standard, . . . [f]ailure to report harm is not necessarily fatal to a claim of persecution if the applicant can demonstrate that reporting private abuse to government authorities would have been futile or dangerous.” Castellanos-Ventura v. Garland, 118 F.4th 250, 254 (2d Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). The agency incorrectly applies the legal standard when it “fail[s] to consider whether it would have been futile” for the applicant to seek government protection. Id. at 252–54.

For the reasons stated above, the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioners’ motion for a stay of removal and Respondent’s motion to expedite are DENIED as moot.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

Clerk of Court