Banta, E. v. Banta, S.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 14, 2026
• Docket: 710 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Dubow

Opinion

J-A07029-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

ERIN M. BANTA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : SIMOAN L. BANTA : No. 710 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Decree Entered May 6, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Civil Division at No(s): 08605-2023

BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and NEUMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: MAY 14, 2026

Erin M. Banta (“Wife”) appeals from the May 6, 2025 divorce decree

entered in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas. Wife challenges the

trial court’s legal authority to enter the divorce decree on the grounds that

economic claims were still pending. Wife, however, ignores the fact that she

and Simoan L. Banta (“Husband”) had executed a property settlement

agreement (“PSA”) and she failed to challenge its enforceability until she

appealed the trial court’s order. Thus, we affirm.

The relevant procedural and factual history is as follows. Husband and

Wife were married in 2014 and have 3 children. On August 21, 2023, Wife

filed a divorce complaint under Section 3301(d) of the Divorce Code, asserting

that the marriage was irretrievably broken and the parties had been living

separate and apart for more than one year. In the complaint, Wife included

a count for equitable distribution. Of most importance to our analysis, on J-A07029-26

September 12, 2023, the parties executed a notarized PSA, which resolved

the equitable distribution claims raised in the divorce complaint.

On December 12, 2024, Husband filed an Affidavit of Consent Under

Section 3301(d) of the Divorce Code. On January 14, 2025, Wife filed a

Counter-Affidavit opposing the divorce. In the Counter-Affidavit, Wife did not

deny that the marriage was irretrievably broken or that the parties had been

separated for one year. Rather, she asserted that economic claims were

pending.

On January 14, 2025, Wife filed a document entitled “Economic Claims.”

In the “Economic Claims” filing, Wife “makes a claim” for equitable distribution

of marital property including: various real estate holdings, four businesses,

unspecified marital personal property, any and all martial pensions and

retirement accounts, any life insurance policies, and marital motor vehicles.

Economic Claims, 1/14/25, at ¶¶ 1-7. Notably, Wife’s “Economic Claims” filing

did not mention the PSA or challenge its enforceability. On February 19, 2025,

Husband served upon Wife a Notice of Intention to File a Praecipe to Transmit

the Record indicating that no ancillary claims were pending. Wife failed to

respond. On March 27, 2025, 36 days later, Husband filed: 1) a Praecipe to

Transmit the Record indicating that no ancillary claims were pending; 2) a

proposed divorce decree; and 3) the September 2023 PSA. Wife failed to

respond.

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On May 5, 2025, 39 days later, the court granted the divorce decree and

incorporated the PSA. Notably, Wife did not file a motion to vacate or open

the divorce decree.

On June 2, 2025, Wife timely appealed. Both Wife and the trial court

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Wife raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion in granting the [d]ecree in [d]ivorce, even though Wife had previously filed of record, on January 14, 2025, a counter-affidavit under Section 3301(d) of the Divorce Code opposing the entry of a [d]ivorce [d]ecree because there were economic claims pending?

2. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion in the granting of [Wife]’s petition seeking enforcement of the PSA on the basis of unstated credibility determinations of the parties?

3. Was the trial court, in consideration of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this PSA[,] bound by special equitable principles to ensure a fair and just determination and settlement of property rights in divorces, in addition to applying regular contract principles?

4. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion or commit an error of law as it appears from a review of the record that there is inadequate evidence to support the lower court’s order?

Wife’s Br. at 4-5 (reordered for ease of disposition).1

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1 Wife failed to raise issues 3 and 4 in her Rule 1925(b) statement and likewise

fails to provide argument regarding issues 3 and 4 in her brief to this court. Accordingly, they are waived and we decline to address them. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii), 302(a), 2119(a); see also Commonwealth v. Wright, 314 A.3d 515, 523 (Pa. Super. 2024) (explaining that when an appellant fails to provide any discussion of an issue on appeal this Court will not address the issue).

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“Our standard of review in divorce actions is well settled. It is the

responsibility of this court to make a de novo evaluation of the record of the

proceedings and to decide independently of the lower court whether a legal

cause of action in divorce exists.” Rich v. Acrivos, 815 A.2d 1106, 1107 (Pa.

Super. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The crux of Wife’s argument is that the trial court lacked the authority

to enter the divorce decree pursuant to Section 3301(d) of the Divorce Code

because there were economic claims pending. In particular, Wife argues that

she asserted that economic claims were pending in her Counter-Affidavit,

which opposed the entry of the divorce decree, as well as her filing entitled

“Economic Claims,” which set forth her specific claims for equitable

distribution. Wife’s Br. at 14-15. Wife argues that Rule 1920.42 requires

ancillary claims to be resolved prior to the entry of the divorce decree. Id.

Finally, Wife argues for the first time on appeal, that Husband coerced her into

signing the 2023 PSA and threatened to stop paying the bills for her and their

children if she did not sign it. Id. at 8.

Relevant to this appeal, Section 3301(d) provides that: “[t]he court may

grant a divorce where a complaint has been filed alleging that the marriage is

irretrievably broken and an affidavit has been filed alleging that the parties

have lived separate and apart for a period of at least one year and that the

marriage is irretrievably broken[.]” 23 Pa.C.S. § 3301(d)(1). The court may

grant a divorce under Section 3301(d) without a hearing if the defendant

“[d]oes not deny the allegations set forth in the affidavit.” Id. at §

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3301(d)(1)(i). Or, if the defendant does deny “one or more of the allegations

set forth in the affidavit[,]” the court may grant a divorce after notice, a

hearing, and determining that the marriage is irretrievably broken and that

the parties have lived apart for a period of at least one year. Id. at §

3301(d)(1)(ii).

“Rule 1920.42 authorizes entry of a divorce decree under Section

3301(d), without further proceedings, when the parties have satisfied certain

filing and notice requirements[.]” McWilliams v. McWilliams, 324 A.3d 602,

606 (Pa. Super. 2024). Relevant to this appeal, Rule 1920.42 provides that

the court shall enter a divorce decree pursuant to Section 3301(d) after:

(1) complainant files proof of service of the complaint;

(2) a party has signed and filed an affidavit pursuant to Section 3301(d)(1) (“Affidavit”);

(3) complainant serves the affidavit and a blank counter-affidavit on the other party and the other party has admitted or failed to deny the averments in the Affidavit;

(4) ancillary claims, including economic claims, have been withdrawn, resolved by agreement, have not been raised in the pleadings, or the court has retained jurisdiction of the ancillary claims;

(5) the party requesting the divorce decree has served a Notice of Intention to File the Praecipe to Transmit record a minimum of 20 days from the date of service of the Affidavit and blank counter- affidavit; and

(6) the party requesting the divorce decree has completed and filed a Praecipe to Transmit Record more than 20 days after serving the notice.

See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1920.42(c)(1)(i)-(vi).

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Upon review, Husband followed the procedural requirements for a

divorce under Section 3301(d) and Rule 1920.42. After Wife filed a divorce

complaint, Husband filed an affidavit averring that the marriage is irretrievably

broken and the parties have lived separate and apart for a period of at least

one year as well as a blank counter-affidavit. Wife responded by filing a

counter-affidavit opposing the divorce based only on the fact that economic

claims were pending. Accordingly, the parties satisfied the first three prongs

of Rule 1920.42. The fourth prong of Rule 1920.42 allows the parties to

resolve ancillary claims by agreement, and Husband filed the PSA to satisfy

this prong. Husband satisfied the fifth prong of Rule 1920.42 when he served

upon Wife a Notice of Intention to File the Praecipe to Transmit Record

(“Notice”) more than 20 days after serving the Affidavit and blank counter-

affidavit. Husband then filed a Praecipe to Transmit the Record 36 days after

serving notice (“Praecipe”), which satisfied the sixth prong of Rule 1920.42

and, thus, compelled the court to issue a divorce decree pursuant to Section

3301(d).

While Wife asserted that economic claims were pending in her counter-

affidavit, she failed to recognize that she had executed a PSA and/or challenge

its enforceability. Moreover, Wife failed to respond when Husband filed the

Notice or the Praecipe with attached PSA. Upon review of the PSA, the court

deemed the economic claims, or ancillary claims, to be resolved. Trial Ct. Op.,

9/9/25, at 10. Since Husband fulfilled the procedural requirements for a

divorce under Section 3301(d), including filing a PSA to indicate that ancillary

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claims were resolved, we discern no error in the trial court’s issuing a divorce

decree.

The trial court opined:

To put it simply, there was a complaint in divorce and the parties agreed to the irretrievable breakdown and separation in excess of one year. [Wife] properly asserted her economic claims in her complaint. 3301(d) affidavits and counter-affidavits were filed and properly served in accordance with the rules. The only issue pending was the economic claims. The Notice of Praecipe to Transmit the Record and actual filing of the Praecipe to Transmit the Record contained the [PSA]. Wife had the documents and did not contest the documents. The trial court was provided with a [PSA] executed by the parties resolving all issues.

Id. at 10. The court further found, “the filing of a document called Economic

Claims post[-PSA] does not change that an agreement was entered, and the

economic matters settled.” Id. The trial court emphasized that 75 days

passed from Husband’s filing the Notice to the trial court’s issuing a divorce

decree, and during that time, Wife never asserted that any information in the

PSA was “invalid, fraudulent or unenforceable” and never contested the

jurisdiction of the court to enter the divorce decree with a petition to vacate

or similar filing. Id.

We, too, find Wife’s failure to challenge the enforceability of the PSA

before the trial court to be dispositive. Wife’s argument that the parties had

not resolved the economic issues fails when it is undisputed that she executed

a PSA.

Moreover, Wife did not challenge the enforceability of the PSA until she

appealed the trial court’s order. Wife had an opportunity to do so at the trial

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court level after Husband filed the Praecipe with attached PSA, or at any time,

but Wife remained silent and thus, lost the opportunity to argue that the PSA

is unenforceable because Husband “coerced” her to sign it. See Pa.R.A.P.

302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised

for the first time on appeal.”).

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 05/14/2026

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