Banque Franco-Egyptienne v. Brown

34 F. 162, 1888 U.S. App. LEXIS 2267
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York
DecidedMarch 19, 1888
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 34 F. 162 (Banque Franco-Egyptienne v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Banque Franco-Egyptienne v. Brown, 34 F. 162, 1888 U.S. App. LEXIS 2267 (circtsdny 1888).

Opinion

Wallace, J.

Although the pleadings and proofs in this case present a formidable record, the real controversy is a comparatively narrow one when limited, as it must bo upon the bill of complaint and by the controlling facts, to its real proportions. The complainants sue on behalf of themselves and of all other persons similarly situated. They are the members of several banking firms, aliens and citizens of France, who, together with other persons not named in the bill, wore acting in concert in March, 1873, as a syndicate to market $6,250,000 bonds of the New York, Boston & Montreal Railway Company, then offered to the public for subscription in London, and who became purchasers by subscription of two-thirds of the bonds. The bonds were part of an issue of $12,-250,000 first mortgage bonds created by the railway company pursuant to a consolidation agreement by which several constituent companies were united and merged together as a new corporation under the laws of the state of New York. That agreement, among other things, provided for the creation by the new company of first and second mortgage bonds, [164]*164to be used proportionately and upon trusts enumerated, in part for railway construction and equipment and in part to extinguish existing obligations of the constituent companies, which bonds were to be delivered to and negotiated by “disbursement trustees” to be thereafter nominated by the new corporation, and were to constitute a fund in their hands to be distributed and applied pursuant to the specified trusts. Before the disbursement trustees accepted the trusts, the provisions of the consolidation agreement were modified by the concurrence of the immediate parties to it, and a disbursement trust agreement ” was executed, by the terms of which the disbursement trustees were relieved of the duty of negotiating the bonds, the persons who were to act as such trustees were named, and the fund to arise from the negotiation of the bonds was*to be appropriated and applied upon somewhat different trusts from those originally enumerated. The persons named in this agreement as disbursement trustees formally accepted the trusts created by it. Shortly afterwards the bonds purchased by the complainants were offered to the public in London by Messrs. Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt, who had undertaken with the consolidated company to market the bonds. The principal defendants in the suit are the trustees named in the disbursement trust agreement, to-wit., John Crosby Brown, Jesse Seligman, William Watts Sherman, to whose hands came the greater part of the proceeds of the bonds, together with William B. Duncan and the executors of James Brown, deceased, and of Treanor W. Park, deceased. The trustees assumed to distribute the proceeds of the bonds according to the terms of the disbursement trust agreement, and Duncan, Brown, and Park were beneficiaries under the terms of that agreement, and respectively received part of the proceeds.

The argument has taken a wide range, and it has been contended for the complainants — (1) That the trustees and the other original defendants were parties to a scheme of deceit and fraud b3r which unprofitable railroad properties were to be merged together and mortgaged, the mortgage securities marketed, and the proceeds captured by the promoters; that the complainants were induced by deceit and fraud to purchase the bonds, and thus to supply the proceeds which were to be appropriated, and -were kept, as plunder by the promoters; and that they are entitled to resort to a court of equity, charge the defendants as trustees ex maleficio, and follow the proceeds. (2) That the complainants were induced to purchase the bonds, relying upon the truth of certain false and fraudulent representations contained in the prospectus issued in behalf of the consolidated corporation when the bonds were offered for sale upon the ‘London market; that the defendants knew this when the proceeds came to their hands respectively; and, that, having received the proceeds under such circumstances, the defendants are trustees ex maleficio even though they -were innocent and honest otherwise in their participation in the transactions complained of. And (3) that the proceeds of the bonds were a trust fund in the hands of the trustees, impressed, both by express contract and constructively, with the equitable rights of the complainants to have them applied for specified purposes; that the trustees have disré-[165]*165garden and subverted these equities by applying the proceeds to foreign objects; and consequently that they and tho recipients from them with notice must account.

The theory of a contract trust rests on the propositions — (!) That the complainants wore entitled to avail themselves of 1he Irusls created by the consolidation agreement; that this agroemeni was the charter of the company, and could not he materially changed without legislative sanction; thaf the trustees and the recipients of the fund arising from tho proceeds of the bonds were bound to know that any disposition of the fund contrary to the provisions of that agreement was unauthorized; that the disbursement trust agreement, so far as it permitted a different disposition, was consequently invalid; and that it was the duty of the trustees to return the proceeds to the complainants unless they were willing and able to conform to tlie directions of tho consolidated agreement. (2) That the prospectus, upon the faith of which the complainants bought the bonds, contained an express promise that the proceeds should be applied by the trustees in a specified manner, to-wit, should be held and applied by them for completing the construction of railroad property, while the remaining first and second mortgage bonds should not in tho mean time be offered for sale, but should bo held by them for the extinction of all outstanding bonds and stock of the constituent companies; and that, if tho trustees were not parties to this promise, so that it is not to bo treated as a promise by them, nevertheless they knew of it when they received the proceeds, — knew that the railroad company had pledged itself accordingly, and were bound either to repudiate it and return the moneys or apply them conformably to the promise.

11 will bo found that If the bill of complaint asserts more than two distinct causes of action or grounds of recovery against the defendants, there are but two which the evidence justifies in any view that can reasonably be taken of it.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
34 F. 162, 1888 U.S. App. LEXIS 2267, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/banque-franco-egyptienne-v-brown-circtsdny-1888.