Callahan, J.
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether an executor’s characterization of a right to withdraw trust principal in his calculation of the succession tax is a “valuation” or “concession of taxability” to which the commissioner of revenue services is required to object under General Statutes § 12-359 (b).1 [635]*635The Probate Court held that since the plaintiff, the commissioner of revenue services for the state of Connecticut (commissioner), had not filed an objection to the succession tax return of the defendant executor, the commissioner was required to accept the defendant’s treatment of the right to invade the trust principal as nontaxable in calculating the succession tax. On appeal to the Superior Court, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that as a matter of law the commissioner had failed to comply with the provisions of § 12-359 (b). The commissioner appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the matter to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023. Because we conclude that the commissioner was not required to comply with § 12-359 (b) under the circumstances of this case, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.
[636]*636The facts are not in dispute. The decedent, Anna G. Schwartz, a resident of Trumbull, died on February 18, 1987. The Probate Court for the district of Trumbull appointed the defendant, Samuel Schwartz, the decedent’s husband, to serve as the executor of her will. The defendant executor filed a succession tax return with the Probate Court, which received a certified copy of the return on April 11, 1988. Upon filing the return, the defendant paid the commissioner $28,733.38, the amount of the succession tax and related interest due according to the defendant’s calculations. On October 12,1988, the commissioner computed and assessed the succession tax in accordance with General Statutes § 12-367 (a)2 and mailed the computation and assessment to the defendant. The commissioner’s assessment reported a balance due of $12,597.21.3
[637]*637Article four of the decedent’s will provided for the creation of a trust under which net income was to be paid to her husband on a monthly basis. Her husband was also given the right to withdraw $5000 from the trust principal each year, provided that he request such a withdrawal within the first three months of the calendar year. Upon the death of her husband, the trust corpus was to pass to the decedent’s son.
In a cover letter accompanying the succession tax return, the defendant outlined his calculation of the succession tax. Since the succession tax rates vary based on the relationship of the beneficiary to the decedent and the amount of property transferred,4 the executor had to allocate the value of the trust ($500,000) between the Class AA lifetime beneficiary (the husband) and the Class A residuary beneficiary (the son) in order to calculate the succession tax.
The commissioner and the defendant agree that the value of the husband’s life interest in the net income of the trust is taxable at Class AA rates applicable to spouses of decedents. They disagree, however, over the proper treatment of the defendant’s right to invade the trust principal in calculating the succession tax. In his calculation of the succession tax for the husband, the defendant did not include any amount related to the right to invade the trust principal because the defendant did not consider that right to be taxable to the husband. In the commissioner’s calculation of the succession tax, however, the value of the husband’s interest in the trust includes both the value of his life interest in the net income of the trust and the value of his right to invade the trust principal.
[638]*638The defendant applied for a hearing before the Probate Court pursuant to § 12-359 (b) in order to settle the question of the treatment to be accorded the right to invade the trust principal. The Probate Court concluded that because the commissioner had failed to file an objection to the defendant’s succession tax return pursuant to § 12-359 (b), he could not contest the defendant’s position that the right to 'withdraw trust principal was not taxable to the husband.* ***5 On appeal to the Superior Court, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because it likewise concluded that the commissioner had forfeited his right to challenge the defendant’s treatment of the right to invade trust principal by failing to make a timely objection under § 12-359 (b).
Before reviewing the parties’ arguments concerning the proper interpretation of § 12-359 (b), we must provide a brief background on the Connecticut succession tax. “An inheritance or succession tax is a tax imposed on the privilege of receiving property from a decedent at death.” Tax Commissioner v. Estate of Bissell, 173 Conn. 232, 238, 377 A.2d 305 (1977). General Statutes § 12-359 (a)6 outlines the information that the taxpayer [639]*639must provide on the succession tax return. “Section 12-359 (b) delineates the method of objecting to valuations and concessions of taxability of individual items set forth in the succession tax return and sets out the scope of the Probate Court hearing and determination on the objections. Section 12-359 (b) further provides the method of determining the gross taxable estate [640]*640upon which the tax computation shall be based.” Heffernan v. Slapin, 182 Conn. 40, 44, 438 A.2d 1 (1980). If the commissioner fails to file an objection under § 12-359 (b) to “valuations” or “concessions of taxability” in the taxpayer’s succession tax return, he forfeits the right to challenge the taxpayer’s treatment of the “valuation” or “taxability” issue in calculating the succession tax. Id., 47. Section 12-367 (a) requires the commissioner of revenue services to compute and assess the succession tax, while § 12-367 (b)7 provides [641]*641the taxpayer with the right to a hearing before the Probate Court to challenge the commissioner’s computation of the succession tax.
The defendant argues that his characterization of the right to invade trust principal as nontaxable in calculating the succession tax is a claim of nontaxability to which the commissioner was required to object under the “concessions of taxability” language of § 12-359 (b).8 The commissioner claims, to the contrary, that the defendant’s treatment of the right to invade trust principal as nontaxable for succession tax purposes is neither a “valuation” nor a “concession of tax-ability” within the meaning of these terms in § 12-359 (b), and that the commissioner therefore was not required to file an objection under § 12-359 (b) in order to challenge the defendant’s treatment of this right as nontaxable. The commissioner argues that the terms “valuations” and “concessions of taxability” apply only to valuation or taxability issues that affect the determination of the amount of the net taxable estate,9 and do not apply to issues that affect only the rate of taxation of property which the taxpayer has included in the gross taxable estate at a value that is
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Callahan, J.
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether an executor’s characterization of a right to withdraw trust principal in his calculation of the succession tax is a “valuation” or “concession of taxability” to which the commissioner of revenue services is required to object under General Statutes § 12-359 (b).1 [635]*635The Probate Court held that since the plaintiff, the commissioner of revenue services for the state of Connecticut (commissioner), had not filed an objection to the succession tax return of the defendant executor, the commissioner was required to accept the defendant’s treatment of the right to invade the trust principal as nontaxable in calculating the succession tax. On appeal to the Superior Court, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that as a matter of law the commissioner had failed to comply with the provisions of § 12-359 (b). The commissioner appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the matter to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023. Because we conclude that the commissioner was not required to comply with § 12-359 (b) under the circumstances of this case, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.
[636]*636The facts are not in dispute. The decedent, Anna G. Schwartz, a resident of Trumbull, died on February 18, 1987. The Probate Court for the district of Trumbull appointed the defendant, Samuel Schwartz, the decedent’s husband, to serve as the executor of her will. The defendant executor filed a succession tax return with the Probate Court, which received a certified copy of the return on April 11, 1988. Upon filing the return, the defendant paid the commissioner $28,733.38, the amount of the succession tax and related interest due according to the defendant’s calculations. On October 12,1988, the commissioner computed and assessed the succession tax in accordance with General Statutes § 12-367 (a)2 and mailed the computation and assessment to the defendant. The commissioner’s assessment reported a balance due of $12,597.21.3
[637]*637Article four of the decedent’s will provided for the creation of a trust under which net income was to be paid to her husband on a monthly basis. Her husband was also given the right to withdraw $5000 from the trust principal each year, provided that he request such a withdrawal within the first three months of the calendar year. Upon the death of her husband, the trust corpus was to pass to the decedent’s son.
In a cover letter accompanying the succession tax return, the defendant outlined his calculation of the succession tax. Since the succession tax rates vary based on the relationship of the beneficiary to the decedent and the amount of property transferred,4 the executor had to allocate the value of the trust ($500,000) between the Class AA lifetime beneficiary (the husband) and the Class A residuary beneficiary (the son) in order to calculate the succession tax.
The commissioner and the defendant agree that the value of the husband’s life interest in the net income of the trust is taxable at Class AA rates applicable to spouses of decedents. They disagree, however, over the proper treatment of the defendant’s right to invade the trust principal in calculating the succession tax. In his calculation of the succession tax for the husband, the defendant did not include any amount related to the right to invade the trust principal because the defendant did not consider that right to be taxable to the husband. In the commissioner’s calculation of the succession tax, however, the value of the husband’s interest in the trust includes both the value of his life interest in the net income of the trust and the value of his right to invade the trust principal.
[638]*638The defendant applied for a hearing before the Probate Court pursuant to § 12-359 (b) in order to settle the question of the treatment to be accorded the right to invade the trust principal. The Probate Court concluded that because the commissioner had failed to file an objection to the defendant’s succession tax return pursuant to § 12-359 (b), he could not contest the defendant’s position that the right to 'withdraw trust principal was not taxable to the husband.* ***5 On appeal to the Superior Court, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because it likewise concluded that the commissioner had forfeited his right to challenge the defendant’s treatment of the right to invade trust principal by failing to make a timely objection under § 12-359 (b).
Before reviewing the parties’ arguments concerning the proper interpretation of § 12-359 (b), we must provide a brief background on the Connecticut succession tax. “An inheritance or succession tax is a tax imposed on the privilege of receiving property from a decedent at death.” Tax Commissioner v. Estate of Bissell, 173 Conn. 232, 238, 377 A.2d 305 (1977). General Statutes § 12-359 (a)6 outlines the information that the taxpayer [639]*639must provide on the succession tax return. “Section 12-359 (b) delineates the method of objecting to valuations and concessions of taxability of individual items set forth in the succession tax return and sets out the scope of the Probate Court hearing and determination on the objections. Section 12-359 (b) further provides the method of determining the gross taxable estate [640]*640upon which the tax computation shall be based.” Heffernan v. Slapin, 182 Conn. 40, 44, 438 A.2d 1 (1980). If the commissioner fails to file an objection under § 12-359 (b) to “valuations” or “concessions of taxability” in the taxpayer’s succession tax return, he forfeits the right to challenge the taxpayer’s treatment of the “valuation” or “taxability” issue in calculating the succession tax. Id., 47. Section 12-367 (a) requires the commissioner of revenue services to compute and assess the succession tax, while § 12-367 (b)7 provides [641]*641the taxpayer with the right to a hearing before the Probate Court to challenge the commissioner’s computation of the succession tax.
The defendant argues that his characterization of the right to invade trust principal as nontaxable in calculating the succession tax is a claim of nontaxability to which the commissioner was required to object under the “concessions of taxability” language of § 12-359 (b).8 The commissioner claims, to the contrary, that the defendant’s treatment of the right to invade trust principal as nontaxable for succession tax purposes is neither a “valuation” nor a “concession of tax-ability” within the meaning of these terms in § 12-359 (b), and that the commissioner therefore was not required to file an objection under § 12-359 (b) in order to challenge the defendant’s treatment of this right as nontaxable. The commissioner argues that the terms “valuations” and “concessions of taxability” apply only to valuation or taxability issues that affect the determination of the amount of the net taxable estate,9 and do not apply to issues that affect only the rate of taxation of property which the taxpayer has included in the gross taxable estate at a value that is [642]*642not challenged by the commissioner. Because he had no objection to the amount the defendant reported as the net taxable estate, the commissioner asserts that he had no objection to any “valuations” or “concessions of taxability” as those terms are used in § 12-359 (b).
The basic goal of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. Ruskewich v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 213 Conn. 19, 23-24, 566 A.2d 658 (1989); Texaco Refining & Marketing Co. v. Commissioner, 202 Conn. 583, 589, 522 A.2d 771 (1987). “ Tn seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment [and] to the legislative policy it was designed to implement . . . .’ [Texaco Refining & Marketing Co. v. Commissioner, supra]; Phelps Dodge Copper Products Co. v. Groppo, 204 Conn. 122, 128, 527 A.2d 672 (1987); Kellems v. Brown, 163 Conn. 478, 502-503, 313 A.2d 53 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099, 93 S. Ct. 911, 34 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1973).” Ruskewich v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, supra, 24. “A succession tax statute must be construed as a whole; its various provisions are in pari materia and must be construed together so as to carry out the intent of the legislature.” Tax Commissioner v. Estate of Bissell, supra, 245-46; see Ruskewich v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, supra, 25.
Section 12-359 (a) requires that “an appraisal by the fiduciary or transferee, at its fair market value on the date of decedent’s death, of each item of property, the transfer of which may be taxable . . . [and] a statement as to whether, or to what extent, the reported transfers are conceded taxable” be included in the succession tax return. Pursuant to § 12-359 (b) the commissioner is required to file within one hundred twenty days of receiving the succession tax return “a statement in writing setting forth in detail such objections [643]*643as he may have to the valuations or concessions of tax-ability appearing [on the succession tax return].” (Emphasis added.) Section 12-359 (b) further provides that “[t]he value of the gross taxable estate as set forth in the tax return or any amendment thereof, or as altered by written agreement between the commissioner of revenue services and such fiduciary or transferee or as set by the probate court upon a hearing under this subsection or under subsection (b) of section 12-367 shall be the basis for computing the succession tax.” (Emphasis added.)
This final sentence establishes that the primary purpose of a hearing under § 12-359 (b) is to resolve disagreements between the taxpayer and the commissioner over “valuations” or “concessions of tax-ability” that affect the value of the gross taxable estate. This court has recognized that § 12-359 (b) provides a procedure for determining the value of the gross taxable estate when this amount is in dispute. Heffernan v. Slapin, supra, 44. If, for instance, the commissioner and the taxpayer disagree over the fair market value of real property included in the gross taxable estate; see, e.g., Hunt v. Dubno, 1 Conn. App. 529, 473 A.2d 1235 (1984); or over whether the assets of a trust are subject to the succession tax; see, e.g., Heffernan v. Slapin, supra; the commissioner must then file an objection under § 12-359 (b) in order to challenge the taxpayer’s characterization of these issues of “valuation” and “taxability.”
The defendant argues that the question of how to treat the right to invade the trust principal for succession tax purposes involves a question of the taxability of the invasion power and that § 12-359 (b) required the commissioner to object to his treatment of the power as nontaxable if he wished to impose a tax. This argument fails to recognize that, because the primary purpose of a hearing under § 12-359 (b) is to resolve [644]*644differences as to the value of the gross taxable estate, “valuations” or “concessions of taxability” within the meaning of § 12-359 (b) refer only to those valuations or concessions of taxability that affect the amount a taxpayer reports as the gross taxable estate.10 The parties agree that the entire value ($500,000) of the trust assets is taxable for succession tax purposes. The succession tax treatment of the defendant’s right to invade the trust principal affects only the allocation of the net taxable estate between the Class AA beneficiary (the husband) and the Class A beneficiary (the son).* 11 As a result, it affects only the rate at which the trust assets are taxable, and not the amount of the estate subject to the imposition of a succession tax.
The defendant’s interpretation of § 12-359 (b) is inconsistent with other succession tax provisions embodied in the statutes. “[Statutes are to be interpreted with regard to other relevant statutes because the legislature is presumed to have created a consistent body of law. State v. Murtha, 179 Conn. 463, 466, 427 A.2d 807 [1980]; Doe v. Institute of Living, Inc., 175 Conn. 49, 58, 392 A.2d 491 [1978].” Heffernan v. Slapin, supra, 46.
Section 12-367 (a) provides that “[t]he tax imposed by the provisions of this chapter shall be computed and assessed by the commissioner of revenue services.” The rate of the Connecticut succession tax is based on both the value of property transferred and the identity of the persons receiving the property. General Statutes [645]*645§ 12-344 (a); Tax Commissioner v. Estate of Bissell, supra, 237. Determining the allocation of the net taxable estate between the various classes of beneficiaries is thus a necessary step in the process of computing the succession tax. G. Wilhelm, Connecticut Estates Practice Death Taxes (2d Ed.) § 80, pp. 178-80.
In Tax Commissioner v. Estate of Bissell, supra, 235-36, this court faced the issue of determining the proper allocation for succession tax purposes of a marital deduction trust as between the Class A and Class AA beneficiaries. Noting that the real issue concerned the rate of taxation, the court characterized the issue as involving a question of “the correctness of [the commissioner’s] computation.” Id., 236.
Since the question of the taxability of the right to invade the trust principal affects only the rate of the succession tax, and not the taxability of the trust assets, and since the determination of the appropriate rate is an integral part of the process of computing the succession tax, the defendant’s interpretation of § 12-359 (b) would require the commissioner to file an objection to an issue that arises only at the time of computation of the tax. This interpretation is not consistent with the fact that § 12-367 (a) places the duty of computing the succession tax upon the commissioner, not the taxpayer.12 “[I]t is settled that when two constructions [of a statute] are possible, courts will adopt that construction which makes the statutes effective and workable, and not one which would lead to difficult and unfathomable results. Wiegand v. Heffernan, 170 Conn. 567, 582, 368 A.2d 103 [1976]; Atwood v. [646]*646Regional School District No. 15, 169 Conn. 613, 621, 363 A.2d 1038 [1975].” Heffernan v. Slapin, supra, 48.
Our interpretation of § 12-359 (b) does not leave an executor or administrator in the defendant’s position without a remedy. Section 12-367 (b) gives a fiduciary, transferee, or any other party in interest the right to a hearing in the Probate Court if such person files a timely objection to the commissioner’s computation of the succession tax.
The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to sustain the appeal and remand the case to the Probate Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.