Banner Mach. Co. v. Routzahn

107 F.2d 147, 23 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 864, 1939 U.S. App. LEXIS 2702
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedNovember 9, 1939
DocketNo. 7526
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 107 F.2d 147 (Banner Mach. Co. v. Routzahn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Banner Mach. Co. v. Routzahn, 107 F.2d 147, 23 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 864, 1939 U.S. App. LEXIS 2702 (6th Cir. 1939).

Opinion

ALLEN, Circuit Judge.

Appeal from a judgment dismissing appellant’s petition for refund of income taxes paid for the period from January 1, 1928, to July 12, 1928. Jury trial was waived, and the facts are stipulated. The sole question' is whether disposition of appellant’s assets and business on July 12, 1928, was made pursuant to a plan of reorganization, merger, or consolidation, to which appellant was a party, as contended by appellant, or whether, as urged by appellee, it was an outright sale. If appellant’s contention is correct, no gain is recognized in the transaction under Section 112(b) (4) of the Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 791, 816, 26 U.S.C.A. § 112(b) (4).

Appellant, a manufacturer of rubber machinery and equipment, was an Ohio corporation with stock outstanding of 104 shares preferred and 15,000 shares common. The majority stockholders of the corporation agreed with one Francis Quinn, a promoter, that Quinn should purchase appellant’s assets and business for $500,000 cash and 4,000 shares of common stock of the National Rubber Machinery Company, a corporation to be organized to take over the business and assets of appellant and three other corporations.

The new corporation was to be organized with an issue of 152,000 shares of common stock and $1,300,000 first mortgage bonds. Certain of the common stock was to be used for the conversion of the bonds and to be sold to the underwriters and promoter, and 50,000 shares were to be distributed among the four corporations transferring their assets to the new corporation. The liabilities of appellant, totalling $42,230.97, were to be assumed by the new corporation. Under the transfer agreement, appellant could not sell the shares of the National Rubber Machinery Company to any other than holders of shares in the new corporation for a year and a half from the date of issue.

The new corporation was organized in accordance with the plan outlined above. Quinn assigned his contracts with the four corporations to the new corporation, and all instruments of conveyance and transfer were executed by appellant in accordance with the contract. The transfer was completed, and appellant received $500,000 in cash and 4,000 shares in the new corporation. It distributed the cash among its stockholders on July 18th. On July 12th the 4,000 shares had been delivered to a bank in escrow to be sold under a sixty-day option agreement with the underwriter, which was accepted on behalf of appellant on July 5th. The consideration paid for the option was $2,000. On September 10, 1928, the underwriter paid the escrow agent an additional $94,000 under the terms of the option, and this amount was delivered to appellant, which at once distributed the money among the stockholders. The legal dissolution of appellant corporation followed on October 1, 1928.

The case arises under the Revenue Act of 1928, the material sections of which are printed in the margin.1

[149]*149If, as contended by appellant, the transaction was made pursuant to a plan of reorganization, merger or consolidation, no gain is recognized in the transaction under Section 112(b) (4). The District Court held upon the authority of Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378, 56 S.Ct. 269, 80 L.Ed. 284, that no such substantial interest in the acquiring corporation was received by appellant as would bring it within the meaning of consolidation or merger as defined in Section 112(i), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112 note, and that Section 112(b) (4) therefore did not apply.

We agree with the District Court that this transaction was not a consolidation or merger within the definition of the statute. In the Minnesota Tea Company case, while the Supreme Court states that the statute covers situations outside of strict merger or consolidation, it reaffirms the limitation laid down in Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 470, 53 S.Ct. 257, 260, 77 L.Ed. 428, that “the mere purchase for money of the assets of one company by another is beyond the evident purpose of the provision, and has no real semblance to a merger or consolidation.”

In substance, the instant case presents nothing but the purchase of appellant’s assets. It is true that in addition to cash, stock was received; but the purpose to reduce that stock to cash was clearly shown by the giving of the option to the underwriter for the sale of the stock prior to the receipt thereof. Appellant in effect discounted the stock for cash. The two corporations in fact did not contemplate a reorganization, merger or consolidation. Appellant, in the letter sent to the stockholders for the purpose of explaining the transaction, stated “Your Company having sold all of its assets and business on July 12, 1928, is now in process of final liquidation and dissolution.” In the petition for refund appellant points out that it is in process of liquidation. Appellant did not wish to retain any interest whatever in the new corporation.

Appellant relies upon Miller v. Commissioner, 6 Cir., 84 F.2d 415, but this case is not controlling here. As interpreted in the Minnesota Tea Company and the Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Company cases, supra, the statute embraces circumstances “difficult to delimit.” It follows that cases arising under this statute will necessarily be decided upon their peculiar facts. The Supreme Court, in the Minnesota Tea Company case [296 U.S. 378, 56 S.Ct. 272, 80 L.Ed. 284], went on to say that the interest which would permit a taxpayer to claim exemption under this statute “must be definite and material; it must represent a substantial part of the value of the thing transferred. This much is necessary in order that the result accomplished many genuinely partake of the nature of merger or consolidation.” Here the interest in the new corporation was of the value of $96,-000 as compared with $500,000 cash received. We do not consider that this interest, of which the corporation immediately desired to divest itself, was so substantial a part of the value of the new corporation that any genuine merger or consolidation existed in the transaction.

The Commissioner did not err in taking into consideration the entire selling price in taxing the profits.

The judgment is affirmed.

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Related

National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Commissioner
20 T.C. 636 (U.S. Tax Court, 1953)
Republic Steel Corporation v. United States
40 F. Supp. 1017 (Court of Claims, 1941)
National Rubber Machinery Co. v. United States
38 F. Supp. 260 (Court of Claims, 1941)
Fisher v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
108 F.2d 707 (Sixth Circuit, 1939)

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Bluebook (online)
107 F.2d 147, 23 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 864, 1939 U.S. App. LEXIS 2702, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/banner-mach-co-v-routzahn-ca6-1939.