Bankston v. Davis

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Bankston v. Davis

559 S.W.2d 714, 262 Ark. 635, 1978 Ark. LEXIS 1791

CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas

DecidedJanuary 9, 1978

Docket77-122

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 559 S.W.2d 714 (Bankston v. Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bankston v. Davis, 559 S.W.2d 714, 262 Ark. 635, 1978 Ark. LEXIS 1791 (Ark. 1978).

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Opinion

Frank Holt, Justice.

The trial court dismissed Count Two of appellant’s complaint which alleged that the publication of false and defamatory statements by the appellees was “a wrongful interference with plaintiff’s employment contract and future economic and business expectancies.” The trial court held that the allegation sounded in tort and, therefore, was governed by the three year statute of limitations. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 37-206 (Repl. 1962). Appellant asserts that his cause of action does not clearly fall within the provisions of § 37-206 nor any other statute of limitations except Ark. Stat. Ann. § 37-213 (Repl. 1962) which provides for a five year period of limitation.

It is undisputed that Count Two of the complaint was asserted more than three years after the catise of action arose. In Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 446 S.W. 2d 543 (1969), we said: “Under Arkansas law, a malicious arid wilful interference with contractual rights and relationships of another has been recognized as an actionable tort.” Further, we quoted with approval:

‘Intentional and unjustified third-party interference with valid contractual relations or business expectancies constitutes a tort, with its taproot embedded in early decisions of the court of England, . . . ’

Accordingly, the trial court was correct in holding appellant’s claim was barred by § 37-206, the applicable statute of limitation.

Affirmed.

We agree: Harris, C.J., and Hickman and Howard, JJ.

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Frank Holt, Justice.

The trial court dismissed Count Two of appellant’s complaint which alleged that the publication of false and defamatory statements by the appellees was “a wrongful interference with plaintiff’s employment contract and future economic and business expectancies.” The trial court held that the allegation sounded in tort and, therefore, was governed by the three year statute of limitations. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 37-206 (Repl. 1962). Appellant asserts that his cause of action does not clearly fall within the provisions of § 37-206 nor any other statute of limitations except Ark. Stat. Ann. § 37-213 (Repl. 1962) which provides for a five year period of limitation.

It is undisputed that Count Two of the complaint was asserted more than three years after the catise of action arose. In Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 446 S.W. 2d 543 (1969), we said: “Under Arkansas law, a malicious arid wilful interference with contractual rights and relationships of another has been recognized as an actionable tort.” Further, we quoted with approval:

‘Intentional and unjustified third-party interference with valid contractual relations or business expectancies constitutes a tort, with its taproot embedded in early decisions of the court of England, . . . ’

Accordingly, the trial court was correct in holding appellant’s claim was barred by § 37-206, the applicable statute of limitation.

Affirmed.

We agree: Harris, C.J., and Hickman and Howard, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

559 S.W.2d 714, 262 Ark. 635, 1978 Ark. LEXIS 1791, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bankston-v-davis-ark-1978.

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