Banks v. Norton

346 F. Supp. 917, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13172
CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedJune 19, 1972
DocketCiv. B-476, B-471, B-484, B-477
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 346 F. Supp. 917 (Banks v. Norton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Banks v. Norton, 346 F. Supp. 917, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13172 (D. Conn. 1972).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

ZAMPANO, District Judge.

These habeas corpus applications, brought on behalf of four inmates confined in the Federal Correctional Institution, Danbury, Connecticut, were consolidated for the purpose of the hearings held on May 5, 8, and 11, 1972. In addition to the written stipulations of facts (see Appendix), the Court heard the testimony of each of the petitioners and certain officials of the prison. While the factual circumstances vary somewhat among the petitioners, the gravamen of the actions is a challenge to the administrative procedures by which the prison authorities discipline inmates.

On February 28, 1972, and continuing for several days thereafter, most of the prisoners at the Institution refused to perform their work duties. On the first day of the strike, petitioner Banks was confined in the Intensive Treatment Unit (hereinafter “ITU”) on charges of threatening an officer and having a knife in his cell. Petitioners Stennett, Snyder, and Bach were committed to the ITU for failure to return to their jobs after the strike ended. Presently Banks is still in segregation, awaiting transfer to another federal prison; Stennett and Snyder have been returned to the general prison population; and Bach has been paroled.

Generally the petitioners contend that before they could be placed in segregation they were entitled to certain procedural due process protections:

1. Adequate notice of the charges against them;
2. The right to counsel or counsel substitute;
3. A hearing before an impartial Committee;
4. The right to call witnesses;
5. The right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses;
6. A complete transcript of the proceedings ;
7. A written decision by the Committee; and
8. The right to appellate review.

The petitioners also complain that the prison lacks a written well-defined code of conduct for inmates, and, therefore, the prison officials should be ordered to promulgate a written set of standards to be distributed to all inmates.

Certain general legal principles are applicable. While it has been stated that many rights exercised by ordinary citizens necessarily must be limited in a prison environment, Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948), it also has been emphasized that a court should not *919 be reluctant to interfere with internal prison management if there is a showing of arbitrary and unreasonable action by prison officials. Brooks v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 652, 653 (5 Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2 Cir. 1961). In a proper factual setting, a court should examine a challenged disciplinary ruling by prison authorities with respect to its purpose and the constitutional rights, if any, which may be affected. Cf. Seale v. Manson, 326 F.Supp. 1375, 1379 (D. Conn.1971). The court must recognize the difficulties inherent in the administration of a prison community and must respect the need for punishment when prison rules are violated by inmates ; yet, at the same time it must be solicitous of the civil and personal rights of the prisoner.

Applying these standards to the facts of the instant cases, it seems clear the petitioners are not entitled to habeas relief. At the outset it should be noted that the officials were confronted with a major disruption of prison life; in effect they were faced with an outright mutiny. Cf. Braxton v. Carlson, 340 F.Supp. 999 (M.D.Pa., 1972). Prompt, effective action was required to reduce the tension and restore the prison to normalcy. The immediate segregation of Banks from the general community for threatening an officer and for possession of a weapon was entirely reasonable and necessary under the circumstances. The placement of the other petitioners in ITU for their failure to return to work after the strike was terminated also appears appropriate. In fact, in this Court’s opinion, the severity of the punishment in the light of the magnitude of the petitioners’ breaches was lenient. The main deprivations in the ITU are separation from the other inmates and restrictions on access to other buildings; the ITU cells are ventilated, lighted, heated, and maintained in a sanitary condition. Toilet and washing facilities are available and the ITU inmates enjoy reading privileges, and limited exercise periods. They are provided the usual prison clothing, mattresses, blankets and pillows, and are fed normal institution meals. In sum, the record does not disclose any circumstances which approach the leval of a shocking deprivation of basic humane treatment toward these petitioners. Cf. Breeden v. Jackson, 457 F.2d 578, 580 (4 Cir. 1972); Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 451 F.2d 730 (2 Cir. 1971).

The question still remains, however, whether the petitioners in their disciplinary hearings were accorded the procedural requirements mandated by the due process clause. The principles enunciated in Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2 Cir. 1971), cert. denied, sub nom. Oswald v. Sostre, 405 U.S. 978, 92 S.Ct. 1190, 31 L.Ed.2d 254 (1972); Cloud v. Manson, Civil No. 14,063 (D. Conn. May 3, 1972), and Bach v. Mitchell, Civil No. B-376 (D.Conn. Dec. 28, 1971), are dispositive of the following claims of rights to: counsel or counsel substitute; confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; present witnesses; written notice of charges; a verbatim transcript; a written decision, with appellate review; and a codification of all prison regulations. It is sufficient that the inmates, as in the cases at bar, have notice of the behavior which results in a disciplinary proceeding and are afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard by an impartial board. The remaining contentions of the petitioners will be ruled upon seriatim.

BANKS

1) The proposed transfer of Banks to the Federal Penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana, is a matter within the discretionary power of the Bureau of Prisons. His argument that his actions in the confrontation with Captain Amstutz were reasonable self-defense tactics is insufficient to render the decision to transfer arbitrary and capricious. See Bach v. Mitchell, supra.

*920 2) The Court declines to order Banks released from ITU for the following reasons:

a) The commitment to the ITU was reviewed by the Adjustment Committee on March 1 and March 10, 1972. The Good Time Forfeiture Committee considered the matter on March 13 and 14.

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Bluebook (online)
346 F. Supp. 917, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13172, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/banks-v-norton-ctd-1972.