Banks v. Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedSeptember 16, 2019
Docket1:18-cv-00151
StatusUnknown

This text of Banks v. Commissioner of Social Security (Banks v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Banks v. Commissioner of Social Security, (S.D. Ohio 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION SHERRY A. BANKS, Case No, 1:18-cv-151 Plaintiff, Litkovitz, M.J. VS. COMMISSIONER OF ORDER SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

Plaintiff Sherry A. Banks brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) denying plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits (DIB). This matter is before the Court on the Commissioner’s memorandum in support of a remand for further proceedings (Doc. 23) and plaintiff's memorandum seeking a reversal for an immediate award of benefits (Doc. 24), I. Procedural Background of Administrative Proceedings Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits (DIB) in September 2011, alleging disability beginning on July 29, 2011. Administrative Law J udge (ALJ) Elizabeth A. Motta originally held a hearing on plaintiff's claim on J uly 3, 2013, and issued a decision denying plaintiff's claim for benefits on July 19, 2013. (Tr. 19-30). Plaintiff appealed ALJ Motta’s decision to this Court on August 28, 2014. See Case No. 1:14-cv-00691. On September 8, 2015, this Court reversed the ALJ’s decision and remanded the matter pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings “with instructions to the ALJ to re-weigh the medical opinion evidence regarding plaintiff's physical impairments in accordance with [the] decision, reconsider plaintiff's credibility and RFC, and further develop the medical and vocational evidence as warranted.” (Tr. 522-554),

On remand, ALJ Motta held a second administrative hearing on June 29, 2016 and issued a decision denying plaintiff's claim for benefits on October 26, 2016. (Tr. 369-84). Plaintiff appealed the decision to this Court and filed her statement of errors on July 30, 2018. (Doc. 8). The Commissioner filed a unilateral motion for voluntary remand under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), requesting that the Court enter an order and judgment reversing the ALJ’s decision and remanding this matter to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings and a new decision. The Commissioner conceded that the matter was “improperly decided” by the ALJ and that the ALJ’s analysis of plaintiff's fibromyalgia suffers from “fatal errors that require remand.” (Doc. 16 at 1). The Commissioner requested a remand so the ALJ could correct her errors and re-evaluate plaintiff's fibromyalgia pursuant to SSR 12-2p; re-evaluate the medical opinions and functional assessments in light of SSR 12-2p; and re-evaluate plaintiff □□ RFC taking into account all of her impairments. (Doc. 14). Plaintiff opposed the motion for voluntary remand and requested a determination on the merits of her appeal. (Doc. 15). On May 2, 2019, the Court denied the Commissioner’s motion to remand this matter. (Doc. 22). Because the Commissioner concedes that the ALJ’s decision was “improperly decided,” the only issue in this appeal is whether this matter should be reversed and remanded for rehearing or reversed for an immediate award of benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 100 (1991). Accordingly, the Court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs on this remaining issue. This matter is now ripe for resolution. II. Legal Framework for Disability Determinations To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must suffer from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).

The impairment must render the claimant unable to engage in the work previously performed or in any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). Regulations promulgated by the Commissioner establish a five-step sequential evaluation process for disability determinations: 1) If the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity, the claimant is not disabled. 2) If the claimant does not have a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment — i.e., an impairment that significantly limits his or her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities — the claimant is not disabled. 3) If the claimant has a severe impairment(s) that meets or equals one of the listings in Appendix | to Subpart P of the regulations and meets the duration requirement, the claimant is disabled. 4) If the claimant’s impairment does not prevent him or her from doing his or her past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled. 5) If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work, the claimant is not disabled. If the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, the claimant is disabled. Rabbers v. Comm r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 652 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 404.1520(b)-(g)). The claimant has the burden of proof at the first four steps of the sequential evaluation process. Jd.; Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 548 (6th Cir. 2004). Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case by showing an inability to perform the relevant previous employment, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful employment and that such employment exists in the national economy. Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 652; Harmon vy. Apfel, 168 F.3d 289, 291 (6th Cir. 1999),

Ill. The Administrative Law Judge’s Findings The ALJ applied the sequential evaluation process and made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 1. The [plaintiff] meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2016. 2. The [plaintiff] has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 29, 2011, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.). 3. The [plaintiff] has the following severe impairments: degenerative changes of the cervical spine; inflammatory arthritis; fibromyalgia; and mild depression (20 CFR 404.1520(c)). 4. The [plaintiff] does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix | (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526). 5.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Robert M. Wilson v. Commissioner of Social Security
378 F.3d 541 (Sixth Circuit, 2004)
Debra Rogers v. Commissioner of Social Security
486 F.3d 234 (Sixth Circuit, 2007)
Cheryl Minor v. Commissioner of Social Security
513 F. App'x 417 (Sixth Circuit, 2013)
Charles Gayheart v. Commissioner of Social Security
710 F.3d 365 (Sixth Circuit, 2013)
Melkonyan v. Sullivan
501 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Germany-Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Security
313 F. App'x 771 (Sixth Circuit, 2008)
Terri Kalmbach v. Commissioner of Social Security
409 F. App'x 852 (Sixth Circuit, 2011)
Wyatt v. Secretary of Health & Human Services
974 F.2d 680 (Sixth Circuit, 1992)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Banks v. Commissioner of Social Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/banks-v-commissioner-of-social-security-ohsd-2019.