Banks v. City of Virginia Beach

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedOctober 8, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-00149
StatusUnknown

This text of Banks v. City of Virginia Beach (Banks v. City of Virginia Beach) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Banks v. City of Virginia Beach, (E.D. Va. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Norfolk Division

MICHAEL BANKS, Plaintiff, v. CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:24-cv-149 CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court is Plaintiff's request for equitable relief resulting from a jury verdict in the above-styled matter to resolve a retaliation claim brought under Title VII. For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs request for equitable relief is GRANTED in part. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On March 6, 2024, Michael Banks (“Plaintiff”) filed an Amended Complaint against the City of Virginia Beach (“Defendant”) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seg. ECF No. 6. On September 26, 2025, a jury found that the City of Virginia Beach retaliated against Banks. ECF No. 69. The jury awarded Banks $137,000 in damages, and the Court entered a judgment in that amount. ECF Nos. 69, 77. Still remaining for the Court to

determine is the question of the equitable relief Banks has requested. II. LEGAL STANDARD Title VII’s philosophical purpose is to provide remedies to make victims of discrimination

_ whole. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (recognizing damages alone often do not account for other harms sustained by discriminatory acts). Title VII provides that if a court finds that a defendant has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice, “the

court may ... order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not

. . limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer . . .), or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000¢e- 5(g)(1).

The Fourth Circuit has recognized awards of equitable relief to be a matter for the judge, not the jury. Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d 1413 (4th Cir. 1991). When a party exercises their right to a jury trial on an issue, courts must resolve any equitable claim in light of the jury’s determination of the legal claim. Med-Therapy Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Diversicare Corp. of Am., 16 F.3d 410, at *3 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928, 934 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826 (1983) (holding that the district court’s judgment in that case was not Inconsistent with the jury’s verdict)). “The facts on which the judge bases his equitable relief must not contravene the facts as found by the jury.” Med-Therapy Rehab. Servs., Inc., 16 F.3d 410, at *3 (4" Cir. 1994) (citing In re Lewis, 845 F.2d 624, 629 (6th Cir. 1988) (“It is well-settled that the “court may not make findings’ contrary to or inconsistent with the jury’s resolution . . . of that same issue as implicitly reflected in its general verdict.”)). III. DISCUSSION Banks requests equitable relief in the form ofa declaratory judgment, back pay, front pay, interest, lost benefits, reinstatement, promotion, and injunctive relief. ECF No. 6. The Court finds the following to be appropriate. Back Pay Banks seeks back pay for the time he was demoted. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that back pay should presumptively be awarded to prevailing plaintiffs in Title VII Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 421 (1975) (finding back pay should only be denied for reasons which “would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination

throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination.”). In calculating a back pay award, the back pay amount is calculated by determining “the difference between what the employee would have earned had the wrongful conduct not occurred . . . and the actual earnings during that period.” Crump v. United States Dep’t

of Navy, 205 F. Supp. 3d 730, 760 (E.D. Va. 2016) (quoting Ford v. Rigidply Rafters, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 386, 389 (D. Md. 1997)). Courts should also include other kinds of employment compensation and benefits, such as reasonably anticipated salary increases, when possible. See Crump, 205 F. Supp. at 760 (E.D. Va. 2016) (citing Long v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 9 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 1993)). The Court would begin calculating the back pay award by determining the difference

between Banks’ salary as a Sergeant and his actual earnings while demoted. Ford, 984 F. Supp. at 389 (D. Md. 1997). During trial, Banks’s testimony reflected that he suffered a $10,000 salary reduction—from $101,000 to $91,000—as a result of his demotion and that he had been demoted

for three years. See Jury Trial Tr. Excerpt, Sept. 23 Banks Trial Test., at 100:2-10, ECF No. 79. However, the Court finds Banks’s back pay award should include consideration of his annual raises—both those he actually received as a Master Police Officer and those he would have

_ received as Sergeant had he not been demoted. Although not admitted into evidence at trial, Banks provided his comprehensive salary breakdown over the years as an exhibit in his Memorandum in Opposition to the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 54, Ex. 16. According to the exhibit, Banks’s salary was $100,922.37 per year at the time of his demotion on August 4, 2022. Jd. After his demotion from Sergeant to Master Police Officer in 2022, Banks’s salary was reduced to $91,539.76. Jd. Banks received raises in 2023 and 2024, bringing his salary to $95,689.10, and $98.497.36,

respectively. id. Banks did not enter into evidence the relevant information to calculate the yearly raises he would have received as Sergeant. Crump, 205 F. Supp. at 760 (E.D. Va. 2016) (“[T]Jhe burden is on Plaintiff to present evidence to establish the amount of back pay and lost benefits to which she is entitled.”).' However, in the interest of justice, the Court will not penalize Banks for failing to prove the negative or provide information to which he did not have access as a result of being demoted. Therefore, in light of the testimony and the annual raises demonstrated in the exhibit at the summary judgment stage, the Court will exercise its discretion and award a blanket $10,000 per year in lost salary earnings to estimate the raises Banks would have received. Because Banks was demoted in August 2022 and the judgment was entered in October 2025, the Court intends to award back pay for three years and two months. Accordingly, the Court calculates Banks’s back pay for 38 months as $31,667.00. Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest Banks also requests the Court award prejudgment interest on his back pay award. Whether

to award prejudgment interest, and its rate, is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court. Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1031 (4th Cir. 1993) (en banc); Hylind v. Xerox Corp., 481 Fed. App’x 819, 822 (4th Cir. 2012). Prejudgment interest furthers Title □□□□□

aim to make victims whole. United States v. Gregory, 818 F.2d 1114, 1118 (4th Cir. 1987).

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