Bankers Life Insurance v. County Board

131 N.W. 1034, 89 Neb. 469, 1911 Neb. LEXIS 253
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedJune 13, 1911
DocketNo. 16,688
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 131 N.W. 1034 (Bankers Life Insurance v. County Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bankers Life Insurance v. County Board, 131 N.W. 1034, 89 Neb. 469, 1911 Neb. LEXIS 253 (Neb. 1911).

Opinion

Barnes, J.

The Bankers Life Insurance Company is a domestic corporation, with a paid up capital -stock of $100,000, having its principal place of business and its home office in Lincoln, Lancaster county, Nebraska. It is what is known as an old line or legal reserve life insurance company. It appears that on the 31-st day of May, 1909, the president of that company returned to the deputy county assessor a schedule of its property for taxation in accordance with the provisions of section 10960, Ann.' St. 1909, which schedule contained a statement of the gross amount of the premiums received by the company for its Nebraska business for the year ending December 31, 1908, less the amount of premiums on the same business ceded to other companies as reinsurance during the year 1908, also less premiums returned on account of the cancelation of a part of the business above mentioned, together with its office furniture and other personal property, amounting to the sum of $6,133.82; that thereafter, and on the 14th day of [471]*471June, 1909, tlie county assessor, without notice to the company, indorsed on the schedule above mentioned the following: “Office of County Assessor, Lancaster County, Nebraska. D. R. C. Miller, Assessor,. Lincoln, Neb., June 14, 1909. The Bankers Life Insurance Company having returned premiums on new business for Lancaster county business only and office furniture and fixtures, not accounting for their capital stock, contingent reserves or surplus, cash in office or bank, gross premiums received at the Lincoln office or other forms of property, I have therefore, this 14th day of June, 1909, valued the capital stock, surplus, contingent reserves and other forms of property at $611,000, and added thereto $3,175, their local return on premiums, making a total of $614,175, and assessed it at $122,835. D. R. C. Miller County Assessor.”

After making the foregoing indorsement, the county assessor immediately returned the schedule to the county clerk as provided by law. On the 19th day of June, 1907, the insurance company made written complaint to the county board of equalization of the action of the assessor increasing the valuation of its property for taxation as above set forth, and prayed the board to reduce its schedule to the amount shown by its own return thereon, and for such other relief “as shall be just and equitable in the premises.” After a hearing upon the complaint above mentioned, the board of equalization overruled the same, confirmed the action of the assessor, and valued and assessed the complainant’s property at the sum fixed by that officer in the corrected schedule. The insurance company thereupon appealed to the district court, where the order of the board was reversed and set aside, and the county has appealed from that judgment.

The record presents two questions for our determination : First. Was the action of the assessor and the board of equalization by which there was added the amount of the capital stock and surplus of the complainant to its schedule void for want of jurisdiction? Second. Is a domestic life insurance company required by the present [472]*472revenue law of this state to list its capital stock, surplus and contingent reserves for taxation to the extent and in the manner as determined by the county board of equalization in the instant case?

Concerning the first question, we think it may be said that sections 11012 and 11031, Ann. St. 1909, are sufficient in form and substance to authorize a county assessor to change the schedule of a taxpayer, and add thereto such property as he finds to have been omitted therefrom, to the end that all taxable property in this state shall contribute its just share to the support of the government; but before making such change or addition to the schedule he must give notice to the taxpayer of his intention to do so, and thus afford' him an opportunity for a hearing. It seems clear from the authorities that such change or addition made without notice and without an opportunity for a hearing somewhere along the line of procedure is void, for it amounts to “taking the property of the citizen without due process of law.” Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183; Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127; Horton v. State, 60 Neb. 701; Dixon County v. Halstead, 23 Neb. 697. We are therefore of opinion that the act of the assessor in adding the amount of the capital stock and surplus of the insurance company to its schedule, as returned by the proper officer, was void; and, if the company had filed no complaint and made no appearance before the board of equalization, it could-have successfully resisted the payment of any tax levied upon the increased valuation of which it complains.

It appears, however, that the company in some way became aware of the change in its schedule, filed its complaint before the county board of equalization, and thereby gave the board jurisdiction to determine the matters complained of. It appears that the case of Dixon County v. Halstead, supra, was one where the facts were on all fours with those in the instant case. There the addition made by the assessor to Halstead’s schedule was treated as a complaint made by him to the county board of equali[473]*473zation; and it was stated that, if the board had served notice on the taxpayer and had given him a hearing, it would have had jurisdiction to act thereon. According to the rule there stated, it seems clear that the change of schedule in this case should have been treated as a complaint by the assessor to the board of equalization, and, the insurance company having appeared before that tribunal and obtained a hearing, it should not thereafter hi; permitted to challenge the proceeding for lack of jurisdiction.

This brings us to the consideration of the second, and what seems to us to be the main, question in this case. It is contended by the appellant that the capital stock and surplus of domestic life insurance companies should be listed for taxation in the manner pursued in this, case by the taxing officers. While, on the other hand, it is claimed by the company that by the express provisions of our present revenue law such companies can only be taxed •upon the gross amount of their premiums on Nebraska business for the year preceding the one in which the tax is levied. '

Section 10960, Ann. St. 1909, which provides for the taxation of domestic insurance companies, reads as follows: “Every life, fire, or accident insurance company, or surety company, organized under the laws of this state, except fraternal beneficiary associations, and mutual companies that operate on the assessment plan, have no capital stock, and make no dividends, and whose scheme of insurance does not contemplate the return of any percentage of earnings or profits to policy holders, shall be taxed in the county, town, city, village and school district where the agent conducts the business upon the gross amount of premiums received by it for all Nebraska business done within the state during the preceding calendar year*, less amount of same ceded to other companies as reinsurance through regularly authorized agents in this state and less premiums returned on canceled policies.' Such gross receipts, less reinsurance and cancelations, shall be taken [474]*474as an item of property of that value and. he assessed and taxed on the same percentage of such value as other property. The agent shall render the list and be personally liable for the tax.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
131 N.W. 1034, 89 Neb. 469, 1911 Neb. LEXIS 253, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bankers-life-insurance-v-county-board-neb-1911.