Bank of Steele v. Lang
Opinion
Ernest R. Lang appealed from an order denying his motion to set aside both the assignment of a judgment of eviction and the Special Execution issued to enforce that judgment against him. We affirm.
In 1984, Ernest Lang gave a second mortgage on his farm to the Bank of Steele, subordinate to a first mortgage to the Bank of North Dakota. The Bank of *505 North Dakota foreclosed its mortgage and purchased the land at the sheriffs sale. Shortly before the time for redemption ended, the Bank of North Dakota sold and assigned its sheriffs certificate of sale to the Bank of Steele. Lang did not redeem, the sheriffs deed was issued to the Bank of Steele, and the foreclosure became final. Lang has been unsuccessful in challenging this foreclosure. See Lang v. Bank of North Dakota, 377 N.W.2d 575 (N.D.1985), Bank of Steele v. Lang, 399 N.W.2d 293 (N.D.1987), and Lang v. Bank of Steele, 415 N.W.2d 787 (N.D.1987). See also Lang v. Bank of North Dakota, 423 N.W.2d 501 (N.D.1988).
Lang remained on the land past the time for redemption, forcing the Bank of Steele to sue to evict him. The Bank obtained a judgment of eviction on May 15, 1986, but took no steps to enforce it until May 5, 1987. Then, the Bank assigned the eviction judgment to Anton Binstock in connection with leasing the land to him. A Special Execution was issued on May 6, 1987, directing the sheriff to evict Lang from the farm. Lang moved to set aside both the assignment and the Special Execution. The trial court denied the motion. Lang appealed.
Lang argued that assignment of the judgment to Binstock was improper, that the judgment could not be enforced so long after its entry, and that the Special Execution did not intelligibly refer to the judgment, making the Special Execution unenforceable.
Generally, a judgment is assignable. See 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 883 (1969). In keeping with this principle, NDCC 28-20-20 provides for the docketing of an assignment “of any judgment rendered or docketed in the court.” 1 Lang presented neither precedent nor persuasive explanation for his contrary contention that a judgment of eviction should not be assignable.
Lang further argued that Binstock did not file or record a separate written document showing an interest in the property, thus nullifying his assignment. Although Binstock was then in the process of leasing the land from the Bank of Steele, we see no reason to make filing or recording of a separate written document, apart from filing the assignment itself, prerequisite to enforcing an eviction judgment through assignment.
The right to oust a stubborn trespasser is one twig in the bundle of property rights. See NDCC 33-06-01. 2 Except for *506 certain future interests, our law encourages free transfer of property interests “of any kind.” See NDCC 47-09-02. 3 We conclude that, assignment of this eviction judgment was effective.
Lang argued that the Special Execution to enforce this eviction judgment was invalid because it was issued nearly a year after the judgment. We agree with the trial court that we have "not been presented with any tenable argument to the effect that the failure to execute immediately after the entry of judgment operates to defeat the judgment itself.”
We also conclude that this Special Execution satisfactorily complied with NDCC 28-21-06, requiring that an execution “refer intelligibly to the judgment, ...” 4
Therefore, we affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to set aside the assignment of the eviction judgment and the Special Execution issued to enforce it.
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423 N.W.2d 504 (Bank of Steele v. Lang) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.