Bank of New York Mellon v. Jaafar

Michigan Supreme Court

Bank of New York Mellon v. Jaafar

865 N.W.2d 39, 498 Mich. 860

CourtMichigan Supreme Court

DecidedJuly 2, 2015

Docket150957; Court of Appeals 316521

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 865 N.W.2d 39 (Bank of New York Mellon v. Jaafar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bank of New York Mellon v. Jaafar, 865 N.W.2d 39, 498 Mich. 860 (Mich. 2015).

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Opinion

Pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

An offer “is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.” See Eerdmans v Maki, 226 Mich App 360, 364 (1997). Here, and contrary to the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the January 20, 2012 e-mail from plaintiffs counsel to defendants’ counsel did not constitute an offer to settle this case. Instead, this e-mail inquired whether defendants would present an offer at some point in the future, which they did, through a subsequent e-mail by their counsel. Defendants’ counsel confirmed that this subsequent e-mail was an offer by later inquiring whether plaintiff had accepted their offer. For these reasons, and for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals’ dissenting opinion, no enforceable settlement agreement existed to bind the parties in this case. We remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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Pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

An offer “is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.” See Eerdmans v Maki, 226 Mich App 360, 364 (1997). Here, and contrary to the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the January 20, 2012 e-mail from plaintiffs counsel to defendants’ counsel did not constitute an offer to settle this case. Instead, this e-mail inquired whether defendants would present an offer at some point in the future, which they did, through a subsequent e-mail by their counsel. Defendants’ counsel confirmed that this subsequent e-mail was an offer by later inquiring whether plaintiff had accepted their offer. For these reasons, and for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals’ dissenting opinion, no enforceable settlement agreement existed to bind the parties in this case. We remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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Bluebook (online)

865 N.W.2d 39, 498 Mich. 860, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bank-of-new-york-mellon-v-jaafar-mich-2015.

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