ENTERED AUG n 6 20 tl
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT YORK, SS. DOCKET NO. RE-14-35
BAt'JK OF NEW ENGLAND, ) JON-'YOR-00-~3-14- ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S ) MOTION TO DISMISS HOWARD PATTEN a/k/a HOWARD ) L. PATTEN and MARTHA J. PATTEN,) ) Defendants. )
I. Background
Defendant Howard Patten was an owner of two development companies: Sanders Point,
LLC, and P & S Associates, LLC. On July 25, 2007, P & S executed and delivered to BNE a
Demand Note. Defendant Howard Patten also executed a separate individual guaranty of the P &
S Note which he secured by granting Plaintiff a mortgage on his residence at 6 Spencer Way
Property. Defendant Howard Patten further personally guaranteed the obligations of a separate
loan from Plaintiff to Sanders Point, LLC, again securing the guarantee with a mortgage to
Plaintiff on his residence at 6 Spencer Way.
Plaintiff asserts that both Sanders Point, LLC and P & S Associates, LLC have defaulted on
the terms of their notes. Plaintiff has foreclosed on both companies, and applied the proceeds to
their debts. Plaintiff contends that a deficiency remains. Plaintiff is now seeking a judgment of
foreclosure on the 6 Spencer Way Property. Defendant contests the defaults and brings
counterclaims for accounting, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional misrepresentation, negligent
misrepresentation, and claims under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. Plaintiff moves the
court from an exemption from the foreclosure mediation process.
IT. Discussion
A. Foreclosure Mediation
1 Plaintiff moves the court for an exemption from the foreclosure mediation process on the
basis that the mortgage was issued as collateral to secure a commercial loan. Defendants object,
arguing that they are owner-occupiers of the property, and therefore entitled to mediation
pursuant to 14 M.R.S § 6321-A(3) and M.R. Civ. P. 93.
According to 14 M.R.S § 6321-A(3), "the court shall adopt rules to establish a foreclosure
mediation program to provide mediation in actions for foreclosure of mortgages on owner-
occupied residential property with no more than 4 units that is the primary residence of the
owner-occupant." 14 M.R.S § 6321-A(3) (2013). Rule 93 defines "owner-occupied" as: "an
individual who is the mortgagor of a residential property that is that individual's primary
residence. The term may include two or more individuals who are joint mortgagors of that
residential property." M.R. Civ. P. 93(a)(3). There is an exemption to the mediation program and
any delays associated with required mediation of foreclosure matters for commercial loans. M.R.
Civ. P. 93(d)(2). "Commercial Loan" is defined as: "a loan made to a borrower in which the
proceeds of the loan are not used, in whole or in part, for personal, family or household purposes,
and/or are not used to refinance a loan made in whole or in part for personal, family or household
purposes." M.R. Civ. P. 93(a)(l). Moreover, M.R. Civ. P. 93(d))(2) states: "In any actions where
the mortgage acts as collateral given solely to secure a commercial loan, counsel for the plaintiff,
... may file and serve with the complaint a motion requesting exemption from the deferral."
M.R. Civ. P. 93(d)(2). However, the court may still require mediation and the associated delays
in court proceedings where the court finds that "its application is in the best interests of justice."
In the case before the court, Plaintiff is correct that the loan in question fits the definition of a
commercial loan. Therefore, it is likely that M.R. Civ. P. 93(d)(2) applies. However, regardless
of the commercial nature of the loan at its origination, in this case in which Defendant meets the
2 definition of an "owner-occupier" and has requested mediation, it is in the best interest of justice
to require mediation.
B. Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims
a. Statute ofLimitations
Plaintiff claims that any counterclaim that Defendant could bring would have accrued at the
time of the closing of the commercial loan in July 2007, and therefore Defendant's counterclaims
are barred by the statute of limitations. Where a plaintiff asserts that the cause of action was
fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff or where a plaintiff asserts a cause of action of fraud,
the statute of limitations is tolled until the plaintiff discovers the fraud or would have discovered
the fraud had the plaintiff exercised due diligence and ordinary prudence. 14 M.R.S 859 (2014)
("If a person, liable to any action mentioned, fraudulently conceals the cause thereoffrom the
person entitled thereto, or if a fraud is committed which entitles any person to an action, the
action may be commenced at any time within 6 years after the person entitled thereto discovers
that he has just cause of action, except as provided in section 3580. ); Westman v. Armitage, 215
A.2d 919, 921-22 (Me. 1966). In this case, Defendant (or Counterclaim-Plaintiff) alleges that
Plaintiff fraudulently concealed information about Defendant's business partner from Defendant,
thereby breaching a fiduciary duty owed to Defendant. The court accepts the facts as pled by
Defendant to be true. For the purpose of this motion, the statute oflimitations is tolled until the
fraud would reasonably have been discovered.
b. Forbearance Agreement
The Forbearance Agreement was entered into by the parties on April 11, 2013. In the
Forbearance Agreement, Defendant agreed to forbear on collection of the loans and to restructure
of the loans. The Forbearance Agreement states that Defendant releases Plaintiff from any and
3 all claims in law and equity in any way relating to the Loans or the Forbearance Agreement Pl.'s
Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A~ 14. The court considers the Forbearance Agreement as a part of the
Motion to Dismiss as it is integrated into the original loan agreements, which merge into the
pleadings. Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm'n, 2004 ME 20, ~~ 7-11, 843 A.2d 43.
Plaintiff argues that this action must be dismissed because Defendant has released Plaintiff
from liability on all matters related to the loans and the Forbearance Agreement. Defendant
argues that the Forbearance Agreement is invalid because he was fraudulently induced to sign
the agreement at risk of losing his home. Defendant contends that Plaintiff's fraud of failure to
inform Defendant of his business partner's poor finances forced Plaintiff into an unenforceable
loan and the subsequent necessary restructure in which the bank required forfeiture of his
defenses, therefore making the Forbearance Agreement unenforceable. See Cote v. Dep't of
Human Servs., 2003 ME 146, 837 A.2d 140, 142. For purposes of a motion to dismiss,
Defendant has sufficiently pled fraud. Defendant has stated a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
c. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Plaintiff moves the court to dismiss Defendant's counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty
claiming that Defendant has failed to plead all elements of the claim and therefore did not state a
claim on which relief may be granted. Plaintiff contends that Defendant failed to plead a
fiduciary relationship. "The salient elements of a [fiduciary relationship] are the actual placing of
trust and confidence in fact by one party in another and a great disparity of position and
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ENTERED AUG n 6 20 tl
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT YORK, SS. DOCKET NO. RE-14-35
BAt'JK OF NEW ENGLAND, ) JON-'YOR-00-~3-14- ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S ) MOTION TO DISMISS HOWARD PATTEN a/k/a HOWARD ) L. PATTEN and MARTHA J. PATTEN,) ) Defendants. )
I. Background
Defendant Howard Patten was an owner of two development companies: Sanders Point,
LLC, and P & S Associates, LLC. On July 25, 2007, P & S executed and delivered to BNE a
Demand Note. Defendant Howard Patten also executed a separate individual guaranty of the P &
S Note which he secured by granting Plaintiff a mortgage on his residence at 6 Spencer Way
Property. Defendant Howard Patten further personally guaranteed the obligations of a separate
loan from Plaintiff to Sanders Point, LLC, again securing the guarantee with a mortgage to
Plaintiff on his residence at 6 Spencer Way.
Plaintiff asserts that both Sanders Point, LLC and P & S Associates, LLC have defaulted on
the terms of their notes. Plaintiff has foreclosed on both companies, and applied the proceeds to
their debts. Plaintiff contends that a deficiency remains. Plaintiff is now seeking a judgment of
foreclosure on the 6 Spencer Way Property. Defendant contests the defaults and brings
counterclaims for accounting, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional misrepresentation, negligent
misrepresentation, and claims under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. Plaintiff moves the
court from an exemption from the foreclosure mediation process.
IT. Discussion
A. Foreclosure Mediation
1 Plaintiff moves the court for an exemption from the foreclosure mediation process on the
basis that the mortgage was issued as collateral to secure a commercial loan. Defendants object,
arguing that they are owner-occupiers of the property, and therefore entitled to mediation
pursuant to 14 M.R.S § 6321-A(3) and M.R. Civ. P. 93.
According to 14 M.R.S § 6321-A(3), "the court shall adopt rules to establish a foreclosure
mediation program to provide mediation in actions for foreclosure of mortgages on owner-
occupied residential property with no more than 4 units that is the primary residence of the
owner-occupant." 14 M.R.S § 6321-A(3) (2013). Rule 93 defines "owner-occupied" as: "an
individual who is the mortgagor of a residential property that is that individual's primary
residence. The term may include two or more individuals who are joint mortgagors of that
residential property." M.R. Civ. P. 93(a)(3). There is an exemption to the mediation program and
any delays associated with required mediation of foreclosure matters for commercial loans. M.R.
Civ. P. 93(d)(2). "Commercial Loan" is defined as: "a loan made to a borrower in which the
proceeds of the loan are not used, in whole or in part, for personal, family or household purposes,
and/or are not used to refinance a loan made in whole or in part for personal, family or household
purposes." M.R. Civ. P. 93(a)(l). Moreover, M.R. Civ. P. 93(d))(2) states: "In any actions where
the mortgage acts as collateral given solely to secure a commercial loan, counsel for the plaintiff,
... may file and serve with the complaint a motion requesting exemption from the deferral."
M.R. Civ. P. 93(d)(2). However, the court may still require mediation and the associated delays
in court proceedings where the court finds that "its application is in the best interests of justice."
In the case before the court, Plaintiff is correct that the loan in question fits the definition of a
commercial loan. Therefore, it is likely that M.R. Civ. P. 93(d)(2) applies. However, regardless
of the commercial nature of the loan at its origination, in this case in which Defendant meets the
2 definition of an "owner-occupier" and has requested mediation, it is in the best interest of justice
to require mediation.
B. Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims
a. Statute ofLimitations
Plaintiff claims that any counterclaim that Defendant could bring would have accrued at the
time of the closing of the commercial loan in July 2007, and therefore Defendant's counterclaims
are barred by the statute of limitations. Where a plaintiff asserts that the cause of action was
fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff or where a plaintiff asserts a cause of action of fraud,
the statute of limitations is tolled until the plaintiff discovers the fraud or would have discovered
the fraud had the plaintiff exercised due diligence and ordinary prudence. 14 M.R.S 859 (2014)
("If a person, liable to any action mentioned, fraudulently conceals the cause thereoffrom the
person entitled thereto, or if a fraud is committed which entitles any person to an action, the
action may be commenced at any time within 6 years after the person entitled thereto discovers
that he has just cause of action, except as provided in section 3580. ); Westman v. Armitage, 215
A.2d 919, 921-22 (Me. 1966). In this case, Defendant (or Counterclaim-Plaintiff) alleges that
Plaintiff fraudulently concealed information about Defendant's business partner from Defendant,
thereby breaching a fiduciary duty owed to Defendant. The court accepts the facts as pled by
Defendant to be true. For the purpose of this motion, the statute oflimitations is tolled until the
fraud would reasonably have been discovered.
b. Forbearance Agreement
The Forbearance Agreement was entered into by the parties on April 11, 2013. In the
Forbearance Agreement, Defendant agreed to forbear on collection of the loans and to restructure
of the loans. The Forbearance Agreement states that Defendant releases Plaintiff from any and
3 all claims in law and equity in any way relating to the Loans or the Forbearance Agreement Pl.'s
Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A~ 14. The court considers the Forbearance Agreement as a part of the
Motion to Dismiss as it is integrated into the original loan agreements, which merge into the
pleadings. Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm'n, 2004 ME 20, ~~ 7-11, 843 A.2d 43.
Plaintiff argues that this action must be dismissed because Defendant has released Plaintiff
from liability on all matters related to the loans and the Forbearance Agreement. Defendant
argues that the Forbearance Agreement is invalid because he was fraudulently induced to sign
the agreement at risk of losing his home. Defendant contends that Plaintiff's fraud of failure to
inform Defendant of his business partner's poor finances forced Plaintiff into an unenforceable
loan and the subsequent necessary restructure in which the bank required forfeiture of his
defenses, therefore making the Forbearance Agreement unenforceable. See Cote v. Dep't of
Human Servs., 2003 ME 146, 837 A.2d 140, 142. For purposes of a motion to dismiss,
Defendant has sufficiently pled fraud. Defendant has stated a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
c. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Plaintiff moves the court to dismiss Defendant's counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty
claiming that Defendant has failed to plead all elements of the claim and therefore did not state a
claim on which relief may be granted. Plaintiff contends that Defendant failed to plead a
fiduciary relationship. "The salient elements of a [fiduciary relationship] are the actual placing of
trust and confidence in fact by one party in another and a great disparity of position and
influence between the parties to the action." Morris v. Resolution Trust Corp., 622 A.2d 708, 712
(Me. 1993).
4 Defendant analogizes his relationship with Plaintiff with the fiduciary relationship presented
in Morris. In Morris, the Court found that a fiduciary relationship may exist where the defendant
knows the plaintiff is relying upon the information provided and defendant professes to have
superior knowledge of the situation. Id. A plaintiff is not further required to show that he is
incapable of protecting his own interests. Id. Defendant has pled facts suggesting a fiduciary
relationship. Defendant claims that Plaintiff introduced Defendant to both Mr. Moore to create
Sanders Point LLC and Mr. Sabatini to create P & S Associates, LLC. Defendant contends that
when Plaintiff introduced Defendant to Mr. Sabatini as a business partner, Plaintiff informed
Defendant that Mr. Sabatini was financially sound. Defendant contends that Plaintiff was aware
that Defendant would trust Plaintiffs recommendation, as this was the third business opportunity
Plaintiff had brought to Defendant. Defendant contends that Plaintiff was aware ofMr.
Sabatino's financial difficulties prior to the closing of the commercial loan and failed to inform
Defendant. The court views the facts as pled in the light most favorable to Defendant and finds
that Defendant has pled a fiduciary relationship. The court finds that Defendant has stated a
claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty. Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Defendant's counterclaim of
Breach ofFiduciary Duty is Denied.
d. Accounting
Plaintiff moves to dismiss Defendant's counterclaim of accounting for failure to show a
fiduciary relationship.
To warrant a court of equity in assuming jurisdiction where fiduciary relations exist it must appear that an accounting is necessary to determine the amount due, and that defendant has been intrusted with plaintiffs property and is bound to show his dealings therewith.
Gallagher v. Aroostook Fed'n of Farmers, 135 Me. 386, 388, 197 A. 554 (1938). As discussed
above, the court finds, for the purpose of this Motion to Dismiss, that Defendant has pled a
5 fiduciary relationship. Defendant has pled the elements of the equitable claim of accounting.
Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Counterclaim of Accounting is denied.
e. Unfair Trade Practices
Plaintiff moves the court to dismiss Defendant's claim for Unfair Trade Practices brought
pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 213 (2013). The Unfair Trade Practices Act states:
Any person who purchases or leases goods, services or property, real or personal, primarily for personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers any loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by section 207 or by any rule or regulation issued under section 207, subsection 2 may bring an action either in the Superior Court or District Court for actual damages, restitution and for such other equitable relief, including an injunction, as the court determines to be necessary and proper.
5 M.R.S. § 213 (2013). A transaction must be made "primarily for personal, family or household
purposes" in order for an individual to have a UTPA claim. Seacoast RV," Inc. v. Sawdran, LLC,
2013 ME 6, ~ 5, 58 A. 3d 1135, ("The record supports the court's finding that Seacoast did not
purchase the Smart Car primarily for personal purposes, and, therefore, cannot bring a private
cause of action pursuant to the UTPA. ") The court recognizes that the loan in question was
secured by Defendant's residence, however, the purpose of the loan was not personal. All parties
agree that the purpose of the loan was a business venture. As such, Defendant does not have a
private right of action pursuant to the UTP A. The court grants Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss
Defendant's counterclaim ofUnfair Trade Practices.
ill Conclusion
The court Denies Plaintiffs Motion for Exemption from Mediation.
The court Denies Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Counterclaims of Intentional
Misrepresentation, Negligent Misrepresentation, Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Accounting.
6 The court Grants Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Counterclaim of Unfair Trade
Practices.
DATE: John O'Neil, Jr. Justice, Superior Court
7 ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF: JOHN MCVEIGH ADAMJSHUB PRETI FLAHERTY BELIVEAU PACHIOS LLP POBOX9546 PORTLAND ME 04112
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT: MARK E PORADA GAVIN MCCARTHY PIERCE ATWOOD MERRILLS WHARF 254 COMMERCIAL STREET PORTLAND ME 04101