Bank of New England v. Patten

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedJune 23, 2014
DocketYORre-14-35
StatusUnpublished

This text of Bank of New England v. Patten (Bank of New England v. Patten) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bank of New England v. Patten, (Me. Super. Ct. 2014).

Opinion

ENTERED AUG n 6 20 tl

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT YORK, SS. DOCKET NO. RE-14-35

BAt'JK OF NEW ENGLAND, ) JON-'YOR-00-~3-14- ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S ) MOTION TO DISMISS HOWARD PATTEN a/k/a HOWARD ) L. PATTEN and MARTHA J. PATTEN,) ) Defendants. )

I. Background

Defendant Howard Patten was an owner of two development companies: Sanders Point,

LLC, and P & S Associates, LLC. On July 25, 2007, P & S executed and delivered to BNE a

Demand Note. Defendant Howard Patten also executed a separate individual guaranty of the P &

S Note which he secured by granting Plaintiff a mortgage on his residence at 6 Spencer Way

Property. Defendant Howard Patten further personally guaranteed the obligations of a separate

loan from Plaintiff to Sanders Point, LLC, again securing the guarantee with a mortgage to

Plaintiff on his residence at 6 Spencer Way.

Plaintiff asserts that both Sanders Point, LLC and P & S Associates, LLC have defaulted on

the terms of their notes. Plaintiff has foreclosed on both companies, and applied the proceeds to

their debts. Plaintiff contends that a deficiency remains. Plaintiff is now seeking a judgment of

foreclosure on the 6 Spencer Way Property. Defendant contests the defaults and brings

counterclaims for accounting, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional misrepresentation, negligent

misrepresentation, and claims under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. Plaintiff moves the

court from an exemption from the foreclosure mediation process.

IT. Discussion

A. Foreclosure Mediation

1 Plaintiff moves the court for an exemption from the foreclosure mediation process on the

basis that the mortgage was issued as collateral to secure a commercial loan. Defendants object,

arguing that they are owner-occupiers of the property, and therefore entitled to mediation

pursuant to 14 M.R.S § 6321-A(3) and M.R. Civ. P. 93.

According to 14 M.R.S § 6321-A(3), "the court shall adopt rules to establish a foreclosure

mediation program to provide mediation in actions for foreclosure of mortgages on owner-

occupied residential property with no more than 4 units that is the primary residence of the

owner-occupant." 14 M.R.S § 6321-A(3) (2013). Rule 93 defines "owner-occupied" as: "an

individual who is the mortgagor of a residential property that is that individual's primary

residence. The term may include two or more individuals who are joint mortgagors of that

residential property." M.R. Civ. P. 93(a)(3). There is an exemption to the mediation program and

any delays associated with required mediation of foreclosure matters for commercial loans. M.R.

Civ. P. 93(d)(2). "Commercial Loan" is defined as: "a loan made to a borrower in which the

proceeds of the loan are not used, in whole or in part, for personal, family or household purposes,

and/or are not used to refinance a loan made in whole or in part for personal, family or household

purposes." M.R. Civ. P. 93(a)(l). Moreover, M.R. Civ. P. 93(d))(2) states: "In any actions where

the mortgage acts as collateral given solely to secure a commercial loan, counsel for the plaintiff,

... may file and serve with the complaint a motion requesting exemption from the deferral."

M.R. Civ. P. 93(d)(2). However, the court may still require mediation and the associated delays

in court proceedings where the court finds that "its application is in the best interests of justice."

In the case before the court, Plaintiff is correct that the loan in question fits the definition of a

commercial loan. Therefore, it is likely that M.R. Civ. P. 93(d)(2) applies. However, regardless

of the commercial nature of the loan at its origination, in this case in which Defendant meets the

2 definition of an "owner-occupier" and has requested mediation, it is in the best interest of justice

to require mediation.

B. Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims

a. Statute ofLimitations

Plaintiff claims that any counterclaim that Defendant could bring would have accrued at the

time of the closing of the commercial loan in July 2007, and therefore Defendant's counterclaims

are barred by the statute of limitations. Where a plaintiff asserts that the cause of action was

fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff or where a plaintiff asserts a cause of action of fraud,

the statute of limitations is tolled until the plaintiff discovers the fraud or would have discovered

the fraud had the plaintiff exercised due diligence and ordinary prudence. 14 M.R.S 859 (2014)

("If a person, liable to any action mentioned, fraudulently conceals the cause thereoffrom the

person entitled thereto, or if a fraud is committed which entitles any person to an action, the

action may be commenced at any time within 6 years after the person entitled thereto discovers

that he has just cause of action, except as provided in section 3580. ); Westman v. Armitage, 215

A.2d 919, 921-22 (Me. 1966). In this case, Defendant (or Counterclaim-Plaintiff) alleges that

Plaintiff fraudulently concealed information about Defendant's business partner from Defendant,

thereby breaching a fiduciary duty owed to Defendant. The court accepts the facts as pled by

Defendant to be true. For the purpose of this motion, the statute oflimitations is tolled until the

fraud would reasonably have been discovered.

b. Forbearance Agreement

The Forbearance Agreement was entered into by the parties on April 11, 2013. In the

Forbearance Agreement, Defendant agreed to forbear on collection of the loans and to restructure

of the loans. The Forbearance Agreement states that Defendant releases Plaintiff from any and

3 all claims in law and equity in any way relating to the Loans or the Forbearance Agreement Pl.'s

Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A~ 14. The court considers the Forbearance Agreement as a part of the

Motion to Dismiss as it is integrated into the original loan agreements, which merge into the

pleadings. Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm'n, 2004 ME 20, ~~ 7-11, 843 A.2d 43.

Plaintiff argues that this action must be dismissed because Defendant has released Plaintiff

from liability on all matters related to the loans and the Forbearance Agreement. Defendant

argues that the Forbearance Agreement is invalid because he was fraudulently induced to sign

the agreement at risk of losing his home. Defendant contends that Plaintiff's fraud of failure to

inform Defendant of his business partner's poor finances forced Plaintiff into an unenforceable

loan and the subsequent necessary restructure in which the bank required forfeiture of his

defenses, therefore making the Forbearance Agreement unenforceable. See Cote v. Dep't of

Human Servs., 2003 ME 146, 837 A.2d 140, 142. For purposes of a motion to dismiss,

Defendant has sufficiently pled fraud. Defendant has stated a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

c. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Plaintiff moves the court to dismiss Defendant's counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty

claiming that Defendant has failed to plead all elements of the claim and therefore did not state a

claim on which relief may be granted. Plaintiff contends that Defendant failed to plead a

fiduciary relationship. "The salient elements of a [fiduciary relationship] are the actual placing of

trust and confidence in fact by one party in another and a great disparity of position and

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Related

Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Commission
2004 ME 20 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2004)
Cote v. Department of Human Services
2003 ME 146 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2003)
Morris v. Resolution Trust Corp.
622 A.2d 708 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1993)
Westman v. Armitage
215 A.2d 919 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1966)
Seacoast RV, Inc. v. Sawdran, LLC
2013 ME 6 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2013)
Gallagher v. Aroostook Federation of Farmers
197 A. 554 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1938)

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