Bank of Murphy v. Murphy Furniture Co.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Bank of Murphy v. Murphy Furniture Co.

85 S.E. 381, 169 N.C. 180, 1915 N.C. LEXIS 168

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedMay 24, 1915

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 85 S.E. 381 (Bank of Murphy v. Murphy Furniture Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bank of Murphy v. Murphy Furniture Co., 85 S.E. 381, 169 N.C. 180, 1915 N.C. LEXIS 168 (N.C. 1915).

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Opinion

Hoke, J.

In R. R. v. R. R., 147 N. C., 382, tbe Court, in speaking of tbe interpretation of written contracts which are sufficiently ambiguous to permit of construction, said: “It is well recognized that the object of all rules of interpretation is to arrive at the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract, and, in written contracts which permit of construction, tbis intent is to be gathered from the entire instrument”; and, *182 after citing Page on Contracts, sees. 1105, 1106 and 1112, and Merriam v. U. S., 107 U. S., 441, the opinion further quotes with approval from Beach on the Modern Law of Contracts, as follows: “To ascertain the intention, regard must be had to the nature of the instrument itself, the condition of the parties executing it, and the objects they had in view, and the words employed, if capable of more than one meaning, are to be given that meaning which it is apparent the parties intended them to have.”

Applying these principles, we concur in his Honor’s view, that plaintiffs are not.entitled to recover of the individual defendants.

The 'evident purpose of these parties was to strengthen the credit of their company in its dealings with the bank, to the extent of the amount stipulated, and to save themselves the “necessity and inconvenience of indorsing*specifically every indebtedness which said bank might hold against the company,” and from' a consideration of this purpose and the language of the instrument and the facts in evidence we think it clear that it was the intention of these parties, as expressed in the contract, to confine the obligation of the individual defendants to indebtedness aris--rag out of transactions directly between the bank and their company, and that it did not and was not intended to include any and every indebtedness which the bank might acquire from third parties.

While the position insisted on by plaintiff, that in contracts of guaranty words of ambiguous and doubtful import are construed most strongly against the guarantor, will be recognized, in proper instances, it may not be extended to enlarge the obligations of such parties beyond the scope and purpose of their agreement and of the terms in which the same has been expressed. Shoe Co. v. Peacock, 150 N. C., 545.

There is no error in the charge of the court, and the judgment for defendants is affirmed.

No error.

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Hoke, J.

In R. R. v. R. R., 147 N. C., 382, tbe Court, in speaking of tbe interpretation of written contracts which are sufficiently ambiguous to permit of construction, said: “It is well recognized that the object of all rules of interpretation is to arrive at the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract, and, in written contracts which permit of construction, tbis intent is to be gathered from the entire instrument”; and, *182 after citing Page on Contracts, sees. 1105, 1106 and 1112, and Merriam v. U. S., 107 U. S., 441, the opinion further quotes with approval from Beach on the Modern Law of Contracts, as follows: “To ascertain the intention, regard must be had to the nature of the instrument itself, the condition of the parties executing it, and the objects they had in view, and the words employed, if capable of more than one meaning, are to be given that meaning which it is apparent the parties intended them to have.”

Applying these principles, we concur in his Honor’s view, that plaintiffs are not.entitled to recover of the individual defendants.

The 'evident purpose of these parties was to strengthen the credit of their company in its dealings with the bank, to the extent of the amount stipulated, and to save themselves the “necessity and inconvenience of indorsing*specifically every indebtedness which said bank might hold against the company,” and from' a consideration of this purpose and the language of the instrument and the facts in evidence we think it clear that it was the intention of these parties, as expressed in the contract, to confine the obligation of the individual defendants to indebtedness aris--rag out of transactions directly between the bank and their company, and that it did not and was not intended to include any and every indebtedness which the bank might acquire from third parties.

While the position insisted on by plaintiff, that in contracts of guaranty words of ambiguous and doubtful import are construed most strongly against the guarantor, will be recognized, in proper instances, it may not be extended to enlarge the obligations of such parties beyond the scope and purpose of their agreement and of the terms in which the same has been expressed. Shoe Co. v. Peacock, 150 N. C., 545.

There is no error in the charge of the court, and the judgment for defendants is affirmed.

No error.

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85 S.E. 381, 169 N.C. 180, 1915 N.C. LEXIS 168, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bank-of-murphy-v-murphy-furniture-co-nc-1915.

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