Bank of Jennings v. Jennings

71 So. 31, 71 Fla. 145
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedFebruary 15, 1916
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 71 So. 31 (Bank of Jennings v. Jennings) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bank of Jennings v. Jennings, 71 So. 31, 71 Fla. 145 (Fla. 1916).

Opinion

Whitfield, J.

Suit was brought by the mortgagee bank to correct an errror in the date of a certificate of the acknowledgment of the execution of a mortgage and to foreclose the mortgage upon real estate alleged to have been given by the appellees husband and wife. The defendants filed the following plea: That the property was “at the time of the purported execution of the alleged deed of Mortgage and sometime prior thereto, and is now the homestead of these defendants, and upon which these defendants did then reside, and upon which these defendants does now reside, that these defendants has never conveyed the same to the complainant as is claimed in its bill of complaint herein, that neither of these defendants ever acknowledged the execution of the mortgage herein attempted to be foreclosed, and that the certificate of K. K. Powell thereto attached is false.” This plea was sworn to by each of the defendants. The bill of complaint was amended so as to allege matters of estoppel. The answer filed had reference to the amendment to the bill of complaint. Replications to the plea and answer were filed and testimony taken. The bill of complaint was dismissed on final hearing, but a rehearing was granted, and in a subsequent decree a foreclosure was decreed “except as regards to the inchoate dower rights of the wife.” An appeal was taken by the complainant from both decrees.

The certificate of the officer as to the acknowledgment before him of the execution of the mortgage is as follows:

“State of Florida, Hamilton County.
Before me personally came W. P. Jennings, signer of the foregoing deed of mortgage and acknowledged [148]*148that he executed the same for the purpose therein contained.
And F. M. B. Jennings, wife of the said W. P. Jennings, being separate and apart from her said husband, further acknowledged that she joined her husband in the foregoing' conveyance for the purpose of relinquishing all her dower or right of dower to the lands therein conveyed., and that she did so freely and voluntarily, without compulsion, constraint, apprehension or fear of or from her said husband.
Witness my hand and official seal, this 8th day of March, A. D. 1912.
(Seal.) K. K. Powell,
Notary Public for the State of Florida at Large.
My commission expires June 24th, 1915.”

Sections 1 and 4 of Article X, the “Homestead and Exemptions,” Article of the State Constitution provide that:

“A homestead to the extent of one hundred and sixty acres of land, or the half of one acre within the limits of any incorporated, city or town, owned by the head of a family residing in this'State, together with one thousand dollars’ worth of personal property, and the improvements on the real estate, shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and the real estate shall not be alienable without the joint consent of husband and wife, when that relation exists.”
“Nothing in this article shall be construed to prevent the holder of a homestead from alienating his or her homestead so exempted by deed or mortgage duly executed by himself or herself, and by husband and wife, if such relation exists.”

[149]*149The constitution requires the mortgage to be “duly executed * * * by husband and wife.” A due acknowledgment by the wife of the execution of the mortgage by her is essential tO' the validity of the mortgage. Acknowledgment of execution is under the statute an essential part of the execution of a deed or mortgage by a married woman conveying or relinquishing an interest in real estate.

Section 2462 of the General Statutes provides that “to render such sale, conveyance, mortgage or relinquishment, whether of separate estate or of dower, effectual to pass a married woman’s estate or right, she must acknowledge, before some officer authorized to take acknowledgment of deeds, separately and apart from her husband, that she executed the same freely and voluntarily and without compulsion, constraint, apprehension or fear of or from 'her husband, and the officer’s certificate shall set forth all the foregoing requirements.” Florida Compiled Laws 1914 §2462.

A “mortgage duly executed * * * by husband and wife,” sufficient to create a lien upon homestead real estate of the husband, as between the mortgagors and mortgagee must be duly executed by the husband and wife and the execution by the wife duly acknowledged by her, since under the statute due acknowledgment by the wife of the execution of the deed or mortgage by her is essential to the validity of any conveyance or relinquishment of an interest in real estate by the wife even as between the parties to the instrument. See Adams v. Malloy, 70 Fla. 491, 70 South. Rep. 463. As to the husband, acknowledgment of the execution of the instrument is essential only for purposes of recording and its effects.

[150]*150If the mortgage in this case was duly executed by the husband and duly executed by the wife and the execution of it duly acknowledged by her, it is sufficient in this respect and as between the mortgagors and mortgagee as a mortgage upon homestead real estate.

The law which authorizes designated officers to take the private examination of the wife was designed as a substitution for the proceeding's at common law by fine and recovery, whereby the right of the wife on the one hand might be guarded, and a sure indefeasible and unquestionable transfer of her right secured, on the other. Hart v. Sanderson, 18 Fla. 103, text 109.

The certificate of the officer as to' the acknowledgment of the execution of a deed of conveyance or mortgage made before him, is a quasi-judicial act, and where the person executing the instrument and the instrument are in fact before the officer, and he undertakes to act officially, the certificate of the officer as to the transaction, when made as the law requires, is in the absence of fraud or duress, conclusive as to the facts stated in the official certificates. When fraud is alleged, proof of it must be of the clearest, strongest and most convincing character. See Hart v. Sanderson, supra; McClure v. American Nat. Bank of Pensacola, 67 Fla. 32, 64 South. Rep. 427; 1 R. C. L. §102; Wilkins v. Baker, 77 S. C. 244, 57 S. E. Rep. 851; Young v. Duvall, 109 U. S. 573, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 414; 1 C. J. p. 898; Holland v. Webster, 43 Fla. 85, 29 South. Rep. 625; American Freehold Land Mortgage Co. v. Thornton, 108 Ala. 258, 19 South. Rep. 529, 54 Am. St. Rep. 148; Notes 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1176; 1 Jones on Mort. (7 Ed.) §500; Notes 7 Ann. Cas. 249.

The officer acts officially arid is entitled to a statutory fee for taking acknowledgment.

[151]*151When a married, woman has appeared before a magistrate, having signed a deed and acknowledged it, and he certifies a full compliance with the statute, his certificate, except fraud be shown, must be held conclusive of the facts it asserts. Shear v. Robinson, 18 Fla. 379.

It is admitted that the husband and, wife signed the mortgage and the important controversy is whether the married woman acknowledged “separately and apart from her husband, that she executed the” mortgage as required by the statute and as stated in the certificate.

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Bluebook (online)
71 So. 31, 71 Fla. 145, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bank-of-jennings-v-jennings-fla-1916.