Bank of Dearborn v. Matney

132 F. 75, 1904 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedApril 16, 1904
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 132 F. 75 (Bank of Dearborn v. Matney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bank of Dearborn v. Matney, 132 F. 75, 1904 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101 (W.D. Mo. 1904).

Opinion

PHILIPS, District Judge.

This is a petition in involuntary bankruptcy. There is no question made, if the defendant is subject to the operation of the bankrupt act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 1, 30 Stat. 544 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3419]), that he had not committed acts of bankruptcy at, the time of the filing of the petition against him. The question of fact and law raised by his answer is as to whether he was chiefly engaged in farming or the tillage of the soil. By stipulation of the parties the case was referred to A. L. Vories to hear the testimony and report his findings thereon, with the evidence. As he was not directed to report his conclusions on the-facts and the law, he has reported merely a summary of the facts found by him. The petitioning creditors made special requests for other and different findings of fact, and took exceptions to the action of the special master, and the whole matter has been submitted-to the court for consideration.

After hearing the case discussed by respective counsel and an ex-animation of the evidence, I could not escape the impression that the findings of fact by the special master are too meager, indefinite, and wanting in fullness, to warrant the court in determining the case-alone upon his findings. Without re-referring the matter to the master with directions for a fuller analysis of the evidence and more specific findings, I have examined the essential evidence for myself», and the controlling facts will appear in the following discussion:

It is not every person engaged in farming or the tillage of the soil who is exempt from the operation of the bankrupt act, but it is a person “engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage of the soil.”. The-courts are generally agreed that the term “farming” is not synonymous with a tiller of the soil. To constitute one a farmer it is not essential that he in person should till the soil, or that his operations should be limited to agricultural planting, sowing, and cultivation of the soil. Yet the context indicates that the terms “farming” and “tilling of the soil” are more or less closely allied. The word “farming” was doubtless employed in the act as a generic term, in a comprehensive sense. The lawmakers, coming from the wide extent of the Republic, with its diversified agricultural adaptability, are to be presumed to have had in mind their knowledge of the methods in different localities of conducting the business of farming. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the term was not limited merely to-the production of grains and grasses and the like. The farmer may. cultivate all or a part of his lands. He may be general or special. He may devote his cultivation to the production of corn, or wheat». [77]*77oats, or rye, or grasses, whichever, in his judgment, may be the more useful and profitable. He may include also with these breeding, feeding, and rearing of live stock, embracing cattle, horses, mules, sheep, and hogs, for domestic use and for market. If he find it more profitable to feed his agricultural products or his grasses to live stock than to rely upon marketing the surplus, he may not be limited to the quantity of live stock for such purpose to what he may breed or rear on his farm. For this purpose he may rely entirely upon the purchase of such live stock from his neighbors or on the market, and utilize his farm products in feeding and fattening such “feeders” for market. Neither, in my opinion, should the act be so construed as to restrict the farmer entirely, under all circumstances and conditions, to the corn and hay and grasses he may produce for rearing such feeders and preparing them for market. In other words, where he relies largely upon his pasture lands for gracing his cattle, and his crops of corn may not be sufficient to carry them through the particular winter and the feeding season, he may supplement these by purchasing from without sufficient corn, and the like, to meet the requirement. But certainly there should be apparent such relation between his method of farming and the buying and feeding of cattle, hogs, and the like, for market, as to reasonably indicate that his farming is not made principally subsidiary to the business of buying and selling cattle. So that, if his chief business is that of thus trading in cattle, using his lands as a mere feeding station, relying upon the purchased feed from the market for preparing them for sale much more than on his agricultural products, he may cross the dividing line between farming as his chief business and trading in cattle as his chief source of livelihood. No hard and fast rule can safely be Said down by the courts indifferently applicable to all cases. Each must depend more or less upon its own particular facts.

The case of In re Thompson (D. C.) 102 Fed. 287, principally relied upon by the defendant, is in accord with the views entertained by this court of the limit of indulgence to be accorded to the farmer. It is observable that the learned judge made the case turn upon the fact that, taking into consideration the quantity of land in cultivation and its product, and the quantity of stock raised and bought, there was not such disproportion between the defendant’s farming and cattle trading operations as to exclude him from the protection of the bankrupt act.

In Re Mackey (D. C.) 110 Fed. 355, the court has furnished a most sensible and just rule for determining whether the person be engaged chiefly in farming or other business run in connection therewith. The court said:

“A person engaged chiefly in farming is one whose chief occupation or business is farming. The chief occupation or business of one, so far as worldly pursuits are concerned, is that which is of principal concern to him, of some permanency in its nature, and on which he chiefly relies for his livelihood, or as the means of acquiring wealth, great or small. That one may principally devote his physical exertions or his time to a given pursuit, while one of the factors entitled to consideration, is not in all cases determinative of the question whether that pursuit is his chief occupation or business. * * * If such dealing is of principal concern to him, and chiefly relied on by him for Ms [78]*78subsistence and financial advancement, and if he treats it as of. paramount importance to his welfare, he would not be within the category of persons chiefly engaged in farming, even were his farm to yield him some profit. * * * It is evident that it is impracticable, if not impossible, to define with precision the facts which will in all cases determine whether one is engaged chiefly in farming, and that each ease must be decided on its own circumstances. It may, however, legitimately be stated, generally, that, if it appears in a given case that one’s occupation or business which is of principal concern to him, not ephemeral, but of some degree of permanency, and on which he mainly relies for his livelihood and financial welfare, be other than farming, he is not ‘a person engaged chiefly in farming:’ No one should be held exempt from the provisions of the bankrupt act on this ground unless it satisfactorily appears that he comes within the exception.”

The same test is applied by the court in Wulbern et al. v. Drake, 120 Fed. 495, 56 C. C. A. 645, as follows:

“It does not matter if the person may have other business or other interests, if his principal occupation is that of an agriculturalist — if that is the business to which he devotes more largely his time and attention — which he relies upon as a source of income for the support of himself and family, or for the accumulation of wealth.”

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Bluebook (online)
132 F. 75, 1904 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bank-of-dearborn-v-matney-mowd-1904.