Bank of Columbia Ex Rel. Bank of United States v. Lawrence

26 U.S. 578, 7 L. Ed. 269, 1 Pet. 578, 1828 U.S. LEXIS 428
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedFebruary 28, 1828
StatusPublished
Cited by71 cases

This text of 26 U.S. 578 (Bank of Columbia Ex Rel. Bank of United States v. Lawrence) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bank of Columbia Ex Rel. Bank of United States v. Lawrence, 26 U.S. 578, 7 L. Ed. 269, 1 Pet. 578, 1828 U.S. LEXIS 428 (1828).

Opinion

Mr.. Justice Thompson

delivered the opinion of the Court,—

- This case conics before the Court upoti a writ of-error-to the Circuit Court of the District’of. Columbia,

*581 . o.Thfe defendant was sued as endorser of a promissory note for $50.00, made by Joseph Mulligan, bearing date the 15th of July 1819, and payable sixty days' after date, at the Bank of Columbia. The making and endorsing the note, and the demandof payment, were-duly proved.; and the only question upon- the trial was touching the manner'in which notice of non-payment Was given to the endorser; ho objection'being made to the sufficiency of the notice in -point of time. •

. -The' material facts-before the Court upon this part of the case,- as shown by the bill of-exceptions were; ■ that the banking-house of the plaintiffs was in Georgetown, at which place the note appears ,to be-dated. That some time before the hote fell due, the defendant had lived' in .the city of Washington, and carried on the business of á m&rocco leather dresser, keeping a shop'and’ living in a house of. his own, in the said city. That about the year 1818-, he sold his shop and,.stock- in trade and’ relinquished' his business, and removed with' his family to a farm, in Alexandria county, within the District of Columbia, and about two or three miles from Georgetown. ! That the Georgetown post-office, was the nearest .post-office to his place of, residence,.' and the one at which he usually received his letters.

The notice of non-payment was put into the post-office, at -, Georgetown, addressed to the defendant at that place, It was proved., on t}ie part of the defendant, that at the time of hi's removal into.the country, and from-that time until after the-note in question fell due, he continued to be. the owner of the house in-Washington where he formerly lived; and which was occupied by his sister-in-law Mrs. Harbaugh. -That he came frequently and regularly every week, and as often as two or three-times. a week, to this'house; where he was employed .in winding up his former business and settling his accounts, and where he kept his books of account, and where his bank notices, such as were usually served by the rurtner of the bank on parties who were to -pay notes, were sometimes left, and sometimes at a shop opposite to his house; and where also his newspapers and foreign letters were left. That his coming -to town and so employing himself,- whs generally-known to persons having business with him. That his residence -in-, the country was- known to the-cashier of the bank. That'therp -was a regular daily mail from Georgetown to the city-of Washington, and that the defendant’s house was situated in-Washington, less tlian.a quarter of a mile from Georgetown. 1.

There was also some evidence given, on the part of the plaintiffs, tending to-sh'ow that the usage of the bank in serving.notices in similar cases, -was conformably to .the one here pursued, and that the defendant was apprized of such usage. But *582 that testimony may be laid out of view; as this Court does not found its opinion in any measure upon that part of the case. Upon this evidence the plaintiffs prayed the Court to instruct the-jury, that it'was-not incumbent on them to have left the notice of the nonpayment of the note at the house occupied by Mrs. Harbaugh, as stated in the evidence; but chát it was sufficient, under the circumstances stated, to leave.the notice at the post-office in Georgetown; which instructions the Court refused td give, but instructed the jurythat their verdict must be governed according to their opinion and- finding on the subject of usage which.had been given in evidence. .

The jury, found a verdict for the defendant.

ÍYorn this statement of the case it appears that the note was made at Georgetown, payable at the Bank of Columbia, in that town. That the defendant, when he endorsed the note, lived in the county of Alexandria, within the-District of Columbia, and having what is alleged to haye been a place of business in the city of Washington; and the notice of non-payment was put into the Georgetown, post-office addressed to the defendant at that place, by which it is understood,' that, the notice was either enclosed in a letter, or the notice its,elf sealed'and .superscribed with the name of the defendant, with the direction 41 Georgetown” upon it; and whether thi& notice is sufficient •is the question, to b.e decided;

■If it should be admitted, that the defendant had what is usually balled a place of business in the city of Washington, and that notice served there would haye been good; it by no means follows, that service at his place of residéftee, in a-different place, would not be equally good.. Parties may be and frequently. are so. situated, that notice may well be given at either of’several places. But the evidence does not show that the defendant had a place'of business in the city of Washington, according -to the usual commercial understanding-of a place of business. There was no public notoriety of any description given to it as such. .No open- or public business of any kind carried on, but merely occasional employment there; two or three time's a week, in a house occupied by. another person; and the defendant only engaged.in settling up hi's old'business. in this view of the case the inquiry is narrowed down to the single point, whether notice through-tffi post-office at Georgetown .was good; the' defendant residing in the country two or three miles, distant from that place, in-the county of Alexandria.

The general rule is,-that the party whose duty it is to give notice'in such cases, is bound to use due diligence in communicating such notice. But it is not required of him to see that the notice is.brought home to-the party. Hé may employ the *583 nsual and ordinary mode of conveyance, and whether the notice reaches the party or not, the holder has done all that the law requires of him.

It seems at this day to be well settled, that when the facts’ are ascertained arid undisputed, what shall constitute due diligence is a question of law. This is certainly best calculated to have fixed on uniform rules on the subject, and is highly important for the safety of holders of commercial paper.’

And these rules ought to be reasonable and founded in general convenience, and with a view; to’clog, as little as possible,’ consistently with the safety of parties, the circulation of paper of this description; and. the rules which’have been settled ok this subject, haye had in view these objects. Thus,>?heri a par-’ ty entitled to notice, has in the same city or town-a dwelling- ’ house and counting-house or place of business, within the compact’ part of such- city or town, a notice delivered at either place Is sufficient, and if his dwelling and place of business be" within the district of a letter carrier, a letter containing such notice addressed to the party and left at the pfost-office, would also be sufficient. All these' are usual and ordinary modes of communication, and such-as' afford reasonable ground for presuming that the notice will be brought’home to the. party without’unreasonable delay. So when the holder and endorser live in different post .towns, notice sent -by the mail is 'sufficient, ’ whether it reaches the endorser' o„r not.

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26 U.S. 578, 7 L. Ed. 269, 1 Pet. 578, 1828 U.S. LEXIS 428, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bank-of-columbia-ex-rel-bank-of-united-states-v-lawrence-scotus-1828.