"WalKer, J.,
after stating tbe case: The decision of this appeal turns upon the question whether the sawmill with its fixtures and appurtenances was real or personal property. If it was real property, the deed of trust to Mr. Whedbee was properly registered in Perquimans County, and the defendants would be entitled to the judgment; but if it was personal property, the registration should have been in Bertie County, where the mortgagor resided, and where plaintiff had its mortgage registered, and the judgment below was correct. Our statute, Revisal of 1905, sec. 982, provides that, “No deed of trust or mortgage for real or personal estate shall be valid at law to pass any property as against creditors or purchasers for a valuable consideration but from the registration of such deed of trust or mortgage in the county where the land lieth, or, in case of personal estate, where the donor, bar-gainor, or mortgagor resides, or, in the case donor, bargainor, or mortgagor shall reside out of the State, then in the county where the personal estate or some part of the same is situated, or, in case of choses in action, where the donee, bargainee, or mortgagee resides.” This statute was construed in
Weaver v. Chunn,
99 N. C., 431, where it appeared that the mortgagor had personal property in Yancey County and also in Buncombe County where he resided. He executed a deed of trust on his property in Yancey County which was duly registered in that county, and afterwards he executed a deed of trust to another party (appellees) on his property both in Yancey and Buncombe counties, which was recorded in the latter county. This Court held that registration in Buncombe County was essential to the validity of the appellant’s mortgage, and
Justice Merrimon
added: “Before it was registered in the last mentioned county the bargainor, by his second deed of trust, conveyed the same and other property to the appellee, and this deed was duly registered on the day of its execution in the county of Buncombe. The appellees, as had been decided in like cases, were purchasers for a valuable consideration, and, as their deed was registered in the proper county before that of the defendant, they got the title to the property in controversy.
Fleming v. Burgin,
37 N. C., 584;
Robinson v. Willoughby,
70 N. C., 358;
Todd v. Outlaw,
79 N. C., 235;
Bank v. Mfg. Co.,
96 N. C., 305. The mere fact that he had personal property there (Yancey County) did not constitute residence. The purpose of the statute is to have the deed of trust or mortgage registered in the county where the donor, bargainor, or mortgagor has actual personal residence; and the-reason is that persons interested to have knowledge in such respect would go to the county where a person resides to see what disposition he had made of his personal property by deeds and other instruments required to be registered; they would not ordinarily look elsewhere. The statutory requirement is too plain to be mistaken.”
Harris v. Allen,
104 N. C., 86.
This brings us to the decisive question, whether the deed of trust to Mr. Whedbee was registered in the proper county, or, in other words, whether the sawmill with its fixtures was personal property. If it was, the registration should have been in Bertie County and not in Perqui-mans. There is nothing in the case to show that the sawmill was annexed to the realty or constituted a fixture, not even a trade fixture.
Discussing the question of fixtures and the character of property as personalty,
Justice Manning
said in
Cox v. Lighting Co.,
151 N. C., 62: “Upon the third point of the contention of Smallwood, to wit, the knowledge of the Empire Company that its apparatus was to be annexed to the gas company’s plant or to become additions thereto or as a substitution for other apparatus then in use. In the case of
Binkley v. Forkner,
117 Ind., 176, the Court, in a well considered opinion upon this point, said: “Accordingly, the imoposition is well sustained that one who purchases machinery with a view that it shall be annexed to or placed in a building, of which he is the owner, and who executes a chattel mortgage on the property so purchased, thereby evinces his intention that the property shall retain its character as personalty, regardless of the manner in which it may be annexed to the freehold.
Eaves v. Estes,
10 Kan., 314;
Ford v. Cobb,
20 N. Y., 344;
Sisson v. Hubbard,
75 N. Y., 542;
Tift v. Horton,
53 N. Y., 377;
Campbell v. Roddy,
44 N. J. Eq., 244. But it will not be understood that parties may, by their convention and at their will, convert chattels real into chattels personal. If at the time of the agreement the chattels personal have been annexed to and become affixed to the realty, their character as a part of the real estate cannot be subsequently changed by a convention of the owner of the real estate with a stranger so as to conclude the rights of prior mortgagees or creditors or subsequent purchasers for value.” And to the same effect is
Lancaster v. Ins. Co.,
153 N. C., 285, which cites and approves
Cox v. Lighting Co.
In
Lancaster’’s case
the Court construed a clause of the policy upon which the suit was brought, which provides against encumbrances on personal property, which was, in that case, “a steam engine, the engine and boiler inclosed in brick, and the same was being used for farm ginning.”
Justice HoTce
said for the Court: “Under our decisions, where a vendor, as here, has sold goods, taking notes for the purchase money, and delivered possession, retaining title as security, and the contract has been properly registered according to the statute, Revisal, 983, the property, the subject-matter of the contract, retains its character as personalty, both as between the piarties and others claiming adversely to the lien.
Cox v. Lighting Co.,
151 N. C., 62. The goods, therefore, retained their character as personalty, and, in that aspect, the claim of the vendor, in this instance, was only an encumbrance in the nature of a chattel 'mortgage to secure the purchase
money, and, on tbe facts, tbe stipulation as to tbe nonexistence of sucb an encumbrance bas been violated.”
But aside from any authority upon tbe question, there is nothing to show that this sawmill was annexed to tbe realty so as to become a part of it as a fixture, but, on tbe contrary, tbe parties bad described and treated it in their conveyances as personal property. With this declaration on their part, and in tbe absence of countervailing proof, we must take it tbat their description of tbe sawmill was correct. There is not enough in the use of the words “located” on the land or “occupying” the yard for us to justly or legally infer that the parties intended thereby to regard it as realty, or a fixture, when they bad expressly stated to tbe contrary. There must be some more definite and satisfactory proof than we find in this record to show tbat the sawmill was other than personalty. This being so, the deed of trust to Mr.
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"WalKer, J.,
after stating tbe case: The decision of this appeal turns upon the question whether the sawmill with its fixtures and appurtenances was real or personal property. If it was real property, the deed of trust to Mr. Whedbee was properly registered in Perquimans County, and the defendants would be entitled to the judgment; but if it was personal property, the registration should have been in Bertie County, where the mortgagor resided, and where plaintiff had its mortgage registered, and the judgment below was correct. Our statute, Revisal of 1905, sec. 982, provides that, “No deed of trust or mortgage for real or personal estate shall be valid at law to pass any property as against creditors or purchasers for a valuable consideration but from the registration of such deed of trust or mortgage in the county where the land lieth, or, in case of personal estate, where the donor, bar-gainor, or mortgagor resides, or, in the case donor, bargainor, or mortgagor shall reside out of the State, then in the county where the personal estate or some part of the same is situated, or, in case of choses in action, where the donee, bargainee, or mortgagee resides.” This statute was construed in
Weaver v. Chunn,
99 N. C., 431, where it appeared that the mortgagor had personal property in Yancey County and also in Buncombe County where he resided. He executed a deed of trust on his property in Yancey County which was duly registered in that county, and afterwards he executed a deed of trust to another party (appellees) on his property both in Yancey and Buncombe counties, which was recorded in the latter county. This Court held that registration in Buncombe County was essential to the validity of the appellant’s mortgage, and
Justice Merrimon
added: “Before it was registered in the last mentioned county the bargainor, by his second deed of trust, conveyed the same and other property to the appellee, and this deed was duly registered on the day of its execution in the county of Buncombe. The appellees, as had been decided in like cases, were purchasers for a valuable consideration, and, as their deed was registered in the proper county before that of the defendant, they got the title to the property in controversy.
Fleming v. Burgin,
37 N. C., 584;
Robinson v. Willoughby,
70 N. C., 358;
Todd v. Outlaw,
79 N. C., 235;
Bank v. Mfg. Co.,
96 N. C., 305. The mere fact that he had personal property there (Yancey County) did not constitute residence. The purpose of the statute is to have the deed of trust or mortgage registered in the county where the donor, bargainor, or mortgagor has actual personal residence; and the-reason is that persons interested to have knowledge in such respect would go to the county where a person resides to see what disposition he had made of his personal property by deeds and other instruments required to be registered; they would not ordinarily look elsewhere. The statutory requirement is too plain to be mistaken.”
Harris v. Allen,
104 N. C., 86.
This brings us to the decisive question, whether the deed of trust to Mr. Whedbee was registered in the proper county, or, in other words, whether the sawmill with its fixtures was personal property. If it was, the registration should have been in Bertie County and not in Perqui-mans. There is nothing in the case to show that the sawmill was annexed to the realty or constituted a fixture, not even a trade fixture.
Discussing the question of fixtures and the character of property as personalty,
Justice Manning
said in
Cox v. Lighting Co.,
151 N. C., 62: “Upon the third point of the contention of Smallwood, to wit, the knowledge of the Empire Company that its apparatus was to be annexed to the gas company’s plant or to become additions thereto or as a substitution for other apparatus then in use. In the case of
Binkley v. Forkner,
117 Ind., 176, the Court, in a well considered opinion upon this point, said: “Accordingly, the imoposition is well sustained that one who purchases machinery with a view that it shall be annexed to or placed in a building, of which he is the owner, and who executes a chattel mortgage on the property so purchased, thereby evinces his intention that the property shall retain its character as personalty, regardless of the manner in which it may be annexed to the freehold.
Eaves v. Estes,
10 Kan., 314;
Ford v. Cobb,
20 N. Y., 344;
Sisson v. Hubbard,
75 N. Y., 542;
Tift v. Horton,
53 N. Y., 377;
Campbell v. Roddy,
44 N. J. Eq., 244. But it will not be understood that parties may, by their convention and at their will, convert chattels real into chattels personal. If at the time of the agreement the chattels personal have been annexed to and become affixed to the realty, their character as a part of the real estate cannot be subsequently changed by a convention of the owner of the real estate with a stranger so as to conclude the rights of prior mortgagees or creditors or subsequent purchasers for value.” And to the same effect is
Lancaster v. Ins. Co.,
153 N. C., 285, which cites and approves
Cox v. Lighting Co.
In
Lancaster’’s case
the Court construed a clause of the policy upon which the suit was brought, which provides against encumbrances on personal property, which was, in that case, “a steam engine, the engine and boiler inclosed in brick, and the same was being used for farm ginning.”
Justice HoTce
said for the Court: “Under our decisions, where a vendor, as here, has sold goods, taking notes for the purchase money, and delivered possession, retaining title as security, and the contract has been properly registered according to the statute, Revisal, 983, the property, the subject-matter of the contract, retains its character as personalty, both as between the piarties and others claiming adversely to the lien.
Cox v. Lighting Co.,
151 N. C., 62. The goods, therefore, retained their character as personalty, and, in that aspect, the claim of the vendor, in this instance, was only an encumbrance in the nature of a chattel 'mortgage to secure the purchase
money, and, on tbe facts, tbe stipulation as to tbe nonexistence of sucb an encumbrance bas been violated.”
But aside from any authority upon tbe question, there is nothing to show that this sawmill was annexed to tbe realty so as to become a part of it as a fixture, but, on tbe contrary, tbe parties bad described and treated it in their conveyances as personal property. With this declaration on their part, and in tbe absence of countervailing proof, we must take it tbat their description of tbe sawmill was correct. There is not enough in the use of the words “located” on the land or “occupying” the yard for us to justly or legally infer that the parties intended thereby to regard it as realty, or a fixture, when they bad expressly stated to tbe contrary. There must be some more definite and satisfactory proof than we find in this record to show tbat the sawmill was other than personalty. This being so, the deed of trust to Mr. Whedbee on the sawmill should have been registered in Bertie instead of Perqui-mans County, and the plaintiffs having obtained a subsequent mortgage for its claim, and had it duly registered in Bertie County before the Whedbee deed of trust was recorded there, acquired the title, unless' tbe other objections of the defendants are tenable.
They contend that plaintiff was not a purchaser for value within the meaning of the registration laws, because its mortgage was made to secure an antecedent debt; but we have decided otherwise in numerous cases.
Odom v. Clark,
146 N. C., 544, 552, where it was said tbat “Claimants who now object to the judgment are holders of preexisting debts provided for in these deeds. It bas been held with us tbat such debts are sufficient to constitute the holders purchasers for value, within the meaning of our registration laws.
Brem v. Lockhart,
93 N. C., 191, cited with approval in
Moore v. Sugg,
114 N. C., 292. And under these laws (Revisal, sec. 982) defendants would hold the property, if tbe deeds themselves are good.” See, also,
Potts v. Blackwell,
57 N. C., 58;
Southerland v. Fremont,
107 N. C., 565, 572;
Brown v. Mitchell,
168 N. C., 312. It is next contended tbat plaintiff bad actual knowledge of the Whedbee deed of trust when it took the mortgage from E. L. Grumpier. It is thoroughly well settled that “no notice, however full or formal, will supply the want of registration.”
Robinson v. Willoughby,
70 N. C., 358;
Quinnerly v. Quinnerly,
114 N. C., 145;
Tremaine v. Williams,
144 N. C., 114;
Todd v. Outlaw,
79 N. C., 235;
Wood v. Tinsley,
138 N. C., 507;
Collins v. Davis,
132 N. C., 106; and the numerous cases cited in
Piano Co. v. Spruill,
150 N. C., 168, 169. It was said in
Collins v. Davis, supra,
quoting language of
Justice Reade
in
Robinson v. Willoughby:
“Tbe decisions have been uniform that deeds in trust and mortgages are of no validity whatever as against purchasers for value and creditors, unless they are registered, and
that they take effect only from and after registration, just as if they had been executed then and there .. . . No notice, however full or formal, will supply the want of registration. The same rule as stated in the earlier cases has been uniformly applied since chapter 147, Public laws 1885 (Revisal, secs. 980, 981), was enacted.
We have not discussed the question as to the effect of a mortgage for a preexisting debt upon a prior equity existing against the mortgagor, as the question is not presented. It was considered in
Southerland v. Fremont, supra.
Nor need we advert to the fact that the parties to this suit have no interest in the land where the sawmill was, nor in the lease thereof, but simply have mortgages upon the sawmill and its fixtures or attachments, considered and treated by them and their mortgagor as personal property, wholly detached and separated from the land.
There was no error in rendering judgment upon the facts, as agreed upon by the parties, in favor of the plaintiff.
Affirmed.