Bank of America v. MacDougall

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedAugust 6, 2013
DocketCUMre-13-266
StatusUnpublished

This text of Bank of America v. MacDougall (Bank of America v. MacDougall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bank of America v. MacDougall, (Me. Super. Ct. 2013).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION Docket No. RE-1?,-'!fi!>: -rvw. . cum- ~/ll'fm'3 BANK OF AMERICA N.A.,

Plaintiff

v. ORDER

DUNCAN MacDOUGALL, et al,

Defendants

Plaintiff Bank of America has filed a motion to dismiss defendant Duncan

MacDougall's counterclaim.

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the material allegations of a counterclaim

must be taken as admitted. The counterclaim must be read in the light most favorable

to the defendant to determine if it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts

that would entitle defendant to relief pursuant to some legal theory. A claim shall only

be dismissed when it appears beyond doubt that the claimant is not entitled to relief

under any set of facts that he might prove in support of his claim. See In re Wage

Payment Litigation, 2000 ME 162 9[ 3, 759 A.2d 217.

1. MacDougall's breach of contract claim (counterclaim count I) is not subject to

dismissal on the face of the pleadings. The counterclaim can fairly be read to allege that

the Bank agreed to allow the apartment building to be rebuilt with the use of the

insurance funds and subsequently breached that agreement. See, ~ Counterclaim 9[9[

19, 22. MacDougall is not alleging that the Bank has breached the mortgage contract (which MacDougall acknowledges was previously breached by his non-payment) but

rather that the Bank breached a separate agreement of the parties with respect to the use

of insurance proceeds to rebuild the property.

2. If it is a financial institution authorized to do business in Maine, the Bank is

exempt from the provisions of Maine's Unfair Trade Practices Act pursuant to 9-B

M.R.S. § 244. As far as the court can tell, MacDougall agrees that the Bank is a financial

institution authorized to do business in Maine. See Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's

Motion to Dismiss dated June 24, 2013 at 3. While MacDougall apparently suggests that

more must be shown to demonstrate that the Bank is subject to the exemption in § 244,

see ~ the court disagrees. The motion to dismiss is granted as to count II of the

counterclaim.

3. While the Bank argues that MacDougall's averments of fraud (counterclaim

count III) have not been stated with sufficient particularity, the court concludes that the

Bank has been fairly apprised of the elements of MacDougall's fraud claim- that the

Bank made representations with respect to the use of insurance proceeds that were .

fraudulent or that were made with reckless disregard of the truth and that MacDougall

reasonably relied on those representations to his financial detriment. Under M.R.Civ.P.

9(b) the test is not whether a claim, sets out a textbook definition of fraud but whether

the party against whom the claim is made is "fairly apprised of the elements of the

claim." 2 C. Harvey, Maine Civil Practice§ 9:2 at 384 (3d ed. 2011). The Bank can obtain

additional details as to the alleged false representations through discovery.

2 4. MacDougall's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (counterclaim

count IV) fails to state a claim. In order to recover on a free-standing claim for negligent

infliction of emotional distress, a claimant must demonstrate that a special relationship

existed between the parties that created a duty to avoid the negligent infliction of

emotional harm. Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158

relationship between MacDougall and the Bank that can be discerned from the

pleadings is a relationship between borrower and lender. There is no authority for the

proposition that a borrower-lender relationship constitutes the kind of special

relationship that could give rise to a negligent infliction claim.

5. Count V of the counterclaim alleges that the Bank intentionally inflicted

emotional distress upon MacDougall, that the Bank acted intentionally or recklessly,

that the Bank's conduct was extreme and outrageous, and that as a result of the Bank's

conduct MacDougall suffered severe emotional distress. The court has some doubt that

MacDougall's allegations would, if proven, demonstrate that the Bank's conduct was so

extreme and outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as

atrocious and intolerable in a civilized community. See Staples v. Bangor Hydro-Electric

Co., 561 A.2d 499, 501 (Me. 1989). Nevertheless, this cannot be determined at the

pleading stage.

6. Count VI of the counterclaim seeks punitive damages. This is not a separate

cause of action but a form of relief that may be available if the Bank is held liable on

MacDougall's claims of fraud and/ or intentional infliction of emotional distress and if

MacDougall also proves entitlement to punitive damages by clear and convincing

3 evidence. Given the survival of MacDougall's fraud and intentional infliction claims,

MacDougall's claim for punitive damages cannot be resolved on the pleadings.

In sum, the court cannot determine from the face of the counterclaim that it is

beyond doubt that MacDougall is not entitled to relief under any set of facts that he

might prove in supp.ort of his claims for breach of contract, fraud, or intentional

infliction. At this juncture it is also entirely premature to predict whether those claims

would be able to survive a pretrial motion for summary judgment or a Rule 50 motion

at trial.

The entry shall be:

Plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant MacDougall's counterclaim is granted with respect to counts II and IV of MacDougall's counterclaim (unfair trade practices and negligent infliction of emotional distress) and is denied with respect to the remaining counts of the counterclaim. The Clerk is directed to incorporate this order in the docket by reference pursuant to Rule 79(a).

Dated: August s-, 2013 Thomas D. Warren Justice, Superior Court

4 BANK OF AMERICA NA VS DUNCAN S MACDOUGALL ET AL UTN:AOCSsr -2012-0067645 CASE #:PORSC-RE-2013-00266

01 0000001596 ~D~AN~YL~IK~-T~H~O~MA~S~--------------------------------------- PO BOX 468 BIDDEFORD ME 04005-0468 F ~D~U~N~CA~N~~S~MA~C~D~O~U~G~AL~L~------------------- ~D~E~F________~R~T~N~D~~0~4~/~2~9~/~2~0~1~3

02 0000008588 CONDON BRIAN D JR 126 MAIN STREET PO BOX 169 WINTHROP ME 04364 F JOHN HARVEY PII RTND 08/30/2012

03 0000009876 HARDIMAN, JEFFREY J 1080 MAIN STREET PAWTUCKET RI 02860 F BANK OF AMERICA NA PL RTND 07/16/2012

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Related

In Re Wage Payment Litigation
2000 ME 162 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2000)
Staples v. Bangor Hydro-Electric Co.
561 A.2d 499 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1989)
Curtis v. Porter
2001 ME 158 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2001)

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Bank of America v. MacDougall, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bank-of-america-v-macdougall-mesuperct-2013.