Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Adair

90 F.2d 750
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJune 7, 1937
DocketNo. 8350
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 90 F.2d 750 (Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Adair) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Adair, 90 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1937).

Opinion

MATHEWS, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is from an order settling and allowing an account rendered by appellee in a proceeding1 under section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C.A. § 203).2

Appellee is a conciliation commissioner for San Bernardino county, Cal., appointed under and pursuant to subsection (a) of section 75, supra.3 Plis powers and duties are, in general, those of a referee in bankruptcy, General Orders in Bankruptcy, Rule L, par. 11, 288 U.S. 644 (11 U.S.C.A. following section 53).4 These powers and duties are specified in sections 38 and 39 of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 555 (11 U.S. [751]*751C.A. §§ 66, 67) 5 and in Rule XII of the General Orders in Bankruptcy, 288 U.S. 623 (11 U.S.C.A. following section 53).6

On August 4, 1934, Andrea Cuccia, a farmer residing in San Bernardino county, Cal., proceeding under subsection (c) 7 of section 75, filed his petition stating that he was insolvent or unable to meet his debts as they matured, and that he desired to effect a composition or extension of time to pay his debts. Thereupon, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Rule L,8 the District Judge approved the petition and referred the matter to appellee.

Cuccia did not surrender his property to appellee, but continued in possession thereof. His property consisted of a tract of land in San Bernardino county and a crop of grapes growing thereon. Appellant held a deed of trust, with power of sale, covering' the land, and a crop mortgage9 covering the crop, both of which were given to secure Cuccia’s promissory note, held by appellant, for $11,850, with interest. Both had been duly recorded in San Bernardino county and were referred to in the schedules accompanying Cuccia’s petition. Appellee, at the time this matter was referred to him and at all times thereafter, had actual as well as constructive knowledge of the deed and mortgage.

The mortgage obligated Cuccia to cultivate and harvest the crop, prepare it for market and, when so prepared, to deliver it to appellant, who, by the mortgage, was empowered to sell and dispose of the crop at the then market price and apply the proceeds to'the payment of the indebtedness secured thereby. The mortgage provided that if Cuccia failed to perform any act which the mortgage obligated him to perform, appellant might perform such act and, in so doing, might expend such sums as it deemed necessary, and that all sums so expended should be immediately due and payable by Cuccia to appellant, and should be secured by the mortgage.

Prior to the filing of Cuccia’s petition, his note had fallen due and had not been paid. Appellant had filed the notice required by section 2924 of the California Civil Code (as amended by St. 1933, p. 1669),10 and the trustee named in the [752]*752deed of trust had advertised the land for sale on October 3, 1934, but was prevented from making such sale by the filing of Cuccia’s petition, which, under subsection (o) 11 of section 75, precluded any such sale and precluded appellant from instituting or maintaining any action on Cuccia’s note or any proceeding for the foreclosure or enforcement of its crop mortgage, except upon leave granted by the District Judge. No such leave appears to have been granted or applied for.

After filing his petition and after reference of this matter to appellee, Cuccia harvested the mortgaged crop above referred to and prepared it for market, but instead of being delivered to appellant, as required by the mortgage, the crop was marketed by appellee or by Cuccia under appellee’s direction, and the proceeds, amounting to $1,437.37, were deposited in a bank in the name of Cuccia and appellee.

Having failed to obtain acceptance of his composition or extension proposal, Cuccia on January 7, 1935, filed an amended petition praying to be adjudged a bankrupt, pursuant to subsection (s) 12 of section 75 (Frazier-Lemke Act of June 28, 1934, c. 869, 48 Stat. 1289-1291), and, on the same day, the District Judge made such adjudication and referred the matter to D. W. Richards, referee in bankruptcy. Thereafter, on October 14, 1935, this proceeding was dismissed. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n v. Cuccia (C.C.A.9) 90 F.(2d) 100, decided May 4, 1937. With its subsequent reinstatement, we are not here concerned.

On October 17, 1935, the trustee named in the trust deed sold the land therein described and credited the proceeds on Cuccia’s note. After this was done, there still remained an unpaid balance of $4,934.68. On February 6, 1936, appellant obtained an order requiring appellee to account for the proceeds of the mortgaged crop harvested by Cuccia1 in 1934. On February 17, 1936, appellee filed his account, showing receipt by him of $1,437.37 as proceeds of the mortgaged crop, disbursements therefrom amounting to $1,401.68, and a balance of $35.69 remaining in the bank.

Amounts shown to have been disbursed by appellee were $1,290.33 to Cuccia for labor performed and expenses incurred by Cuccia in cultivating and harvesting the mortgaged crop; $20 to Cuccia for payment of a “filing fee under section 75(s)”; $18.-25 to D. W. Richards, referee, as an “indemnity fee under section 75(s)”; $22.50 to Joseph E. Rich, court reporter, for taking testimony at a meeting of Cuccia’s creditors held before the referee on February 14, 1935; $50 to Cuccia’s attorney, Ralph W. Eckhardt, for services rendered to Cuccia in this proceeding; and 60 cents for “taxes, etc.,” this item being otherwise unexplained. Appellant had no notice or knowledge of these disbursements.

Appellant objected to appellee’s account, on the ground that appellant was entitled to the entire proceeds of the mortgaged crop, and that the disbursements made by appellee were made without appellant’s knowledge or consent and were unauthorized and improper. The District Court, after hear[753]*753ttig, overruled appellant’s objections and ordered that appellee’s account be settled and allowed.

This order must be reversed. The entire proceeds of the mortgaged crop belonged to appellant. Appellant was under no obligation to cultivate or harvest the crop or to pay Cuccia for doing so. Cuccia was expressly obligated to do these things himself, at his own expense. No conciliation commissioner, trustee, referee, judge, or court could impose this obligation on appellant. Appellee, therefore, could not be and was not authorized or empowered to pay Cuccia, with appellant’s money, for performing this obligation. What appellee could or should have done had Cuccia failed to perform this obligation, it is unnecessary to decide, since there was, in fact, no such failure.

There was, if possible, even less excuse for disbursing appellant’s money in payment of fees and costs said to have been expended or incurred in this proceeding. Cuccia and his creditors, including appellant, were, by subsection (b) 13 of section 75, expressly exempted from paying any such fees or costs. Since these fees and costs were not chargeable to appellant, appellee could not be and was not authorized or empowered to pay them with appellant’s money.

Subsections (e) 14 and (n) 15

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Bluebook (online)
90 F.2d 750, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bank-of-america-nat-trust-sav-assn-v-adair-ca9-1937.