Bank of America, N.A. v. Pacific Legends Green Valley Owners' Association

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *

7 BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al., Case No. 2:16-CV-1612 JCM (CWH)

8 Plaintiff(s), ORDER

9 v.

10 PACIFIC LEGENDS GREEN VALLEY OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, et al., 11 Defendant(s). 12

13 Presently before the court is plaintiff Bank of America, N.A.’s (“BANA”) motion for 14 summary judgment. (ECF No. 60). Defendants BFP Investments 3, LLC (“BFP”) filed a response 15 (ECF No. 65), to which BANA replied (ECF No. 70). 16 Also before the court is BFP’s motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 61). BANA filed 17 a response (ECF No. 63), to which BFP replied (ECF No. 67). 18 Also before the court is BANA’s motion for leave to file supplemental authority. (ECF 19 No. 74). BFP filed a response (ECF No. 75), to which BANA replied (ECF No. 76). 20 I. Facts 21 This action arises from a dispute over real property located at 75 N. Valle Verde Dr. #1025, 22 Henderson, Nevada 89074 (“the property”). (ECF No. 1). 23 Sven Steffen purchased the property on March 12, 2002. (ECF No. 61-4). On July 7, 2009, 24 Steffen refinanced the property with a loan in the amount of $207,994.00 from Security National 25 Mortgage Company (“Security National”). (ECF No. 60-1). Security National secured the loan 26 with a deed of trust, which names Security National as the lender, North American Title as the 27 trustee, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as the beneficiary as 28 1 nominee for the lender and lender’s successors and assigns. Id. The Federal Housing Authority 2 (“FHA”) insured the deed of trust at origination. See id. BANA currently holds all beneficial 3 interest in the deed of trust. (ECF No. 60-3). 4 On January 3, 2012, defendant Pacific Legends Green Valley Owners’ Association 5 (“Pacific Legends”), through its agent defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc. (“NAS”), 6 recorded a notice of delinquent assessment lien (“the lien”) against the property for Steffen’s 7 failure to pay Pacific Legends in the amount of $1,863.63. (ECF No. 60-4). On February 24, 8 2012, Pacific Legends recorded a notice of default and election to sell pursuant to the lien, stating 9 that the amount due was $3,042.18 as of February 21, 2012. (ECF No. 60-5). 10 On March 13, 2012, BANA requested a ledger from Pacific Legends so that BANA could 11 determine the superpriority portion of the lien and tender payment of that amount. (ECF No. 60- 12 6). Pacific Legends did not respond to BANA or otherwise provide information that would allow 13 BANA to calculate the superpriority portion of the lien. See id. As a result, BANA never sent a 14 check to Pacific Legends. See id. 15 On June 4, 2014, Pacific Legends recorded a notice of trustee’s sale against the property. 16 (ECF No. 60-9). On August 22, 2014, Pacific Legends sold the property in a nonjudicial 17 foreclosure sale to BFP in exchange for $19,000.00. See (ECF No. 60-10). On August 25, 2014, 18 Pacific Legends recorded the foreclosure deed with the Clark County recorder’s office. Id. 19 On July 8, 2016, BANA initiated this action, asserting four causes of action: (1) quiet 20 title/declaratory judgment against all defendants; (2) breach of NRS 116.1113 against Pacific 21 Legends and NAS; (3) wrongful foreclosure against Pacific Legends and NAS; and (4) injunctive 22 relief against BFP. (ECF No. 1). On December 16, 2016, BFP filed an answer and 23 cross/counterclaims, asserting two causes of action: (1) quiet title/declaratory relief against BANA 24 and Steffen; and (2) injunctive relief against BANA and Steffen. (ECF No. 25). 25 Now, BANA and BFP have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 60, 26 61). 27 . . . 28 . . . 1 II. Legal Standard 2 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when the pleadings, 3 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 4 show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a 5 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A principal purpose of summary judgment is 6 “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 7 323–24 (1986). 8 For purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should be construed in favor 9 of the non-moving party. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). However, to be 10 entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts 11 showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. 12 In determining summary judgment, a court applies a burden-shifting analysis. The moving 13 party must first satisfy its initial burden. “When the party moving for summary judgment would 14 bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a 15 directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party has 16 the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to 17 its case.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) 18 (citations omitted). 19 By contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, 20 the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential 21 element of the non-moving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed 22 to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party’s case on which that 23 party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323–24. If the moving 24 party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not 25 consider the nonmoving party’s evidence. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159– 26 60 (1970). 27 If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party 28 to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 1 Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the 2 opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient 3 that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing 4 versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 5 631 (9th Cir. 1987). 6 In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on 7 conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 8 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of the 9 pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine issue 10 for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. 11 At summary judgment, a court’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the 12 truth, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 13 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed, and all 14 justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the 15 nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be 16 granted. See id. at 249–50. 17 III. Discussion 18 As a preliminary matter, the court will grant BANA’s motion for leave to file supplemental 19 points and authorities (ECF No. 74) pursuant to Local Rule 7-2(g) as the points and authorities 20 include new case law relevant to BANA’s tender argument in its motion for summary judgment. 21 The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, disputing whether the 22 foreclosure sale extinguished the deed of trust. (ECF Nos. 60, 61). Because BANA has shown 23 that Pacific Legends’ conduct cured the default with respect to the superpriority portion of the lien, 24 the court will grant BANA’s motion for summary judgment and declare that the deed of trust 25 encumbers the property. 26 Under Nevada law, “[a]n action may be brought by any person against another who claims 27 an estate or interest in real property, adverse to the person bringing the action for the purpose of 28 determining such adverse claim.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.010. “A plea to quiet title does not require 1 any particular elements, but each party must plead and prove his or her own claim to the property 2 in question and a plaintiff’s right to relief therefore depends on superiority of title.” Chapman v. 3 Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Nev. 2013) (citations and internal quotation 4 marks omitted). Therefore, a party must show that its claim to the property is superior to all others 5 in order to succeed on a quiet title action. See also Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp., 918 P.2d 6 314, 318 (Nev. 1996) (“In a quiet title action, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to prove 7 good title in himself.”). 8 Section 116.3116(1) of the Nevada Revised Statutes1 allows an HOA to place a lien on its 9 homeowners’ residences for unpaid assessments and fines. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3116(1). 10 Moreover, NRS 116.3116(2) gives priority to that HOA lien over all other encumbrances with 11 limited exceptions—such as “[a] first security interest on the unit recorded before the date on 12 which the assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 13 116.3116(2)(b). 14 The statute then carves out a partial exception to the subparagraph (2)(b) exception for first 15 security interests. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3116(2). In SFR Investments Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, the 16 Nevada Supreme Court provided the following explanation:

17 As to first deeds of trust, NRS 116.3116(2) thus splits an HOA lien into two pieces, a superpriority piece and a subpriority piece. The superpriority piece, consisting of 18 the last nine months of unpaid HOA dues and maintenance and nuisance-abatement charges, is “prior to” a first deed of trust. The subpriority piece, consisting of all 19 other HOA fees or assessments, is subordinate to a first deed of trust. 20 334 P.3d 408, 411 (Nev. 2014) (“SFR Investments”). 21 NRS 116.3116 et seq. (“Chapter 116”) permits an HOA to enforce its superpriority lien 22 with a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Id. at 415. Thus, “NRS 116.3116(2) provides an HOA a true 23 superpriority lien, proper foreclosure of which will extinguish a first deed of trust.” Id. at 419; see 24 also Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.31162(1) (providing that “the association may foreclose its lien by sale” 25 upon compliance with the statutory notice and timing rules). 26 27 1 The 2015 Legislature revised Chapter 116 substantially. 2015 Nev. Stat., ch. 266. Except where otherwise indicated, the references in this order to statutes codified in NRS Chapter 116 are 28 to the version of the statutes in effect in 2011–13, when the events giving rise to this litigation occurred. 1 NRS 116.31166(1) provides that when an HOA forecloses on a property pursuant to NRS 2 116.31164, the following recitals in the deed are conclusive proof of the matters recited:

3 (a) Default, the mailing of the notice of delinquent assessment, and the recording of the notice of default and election to sell; 4 (b) The elapsing of the 90 days; and (c) The giving of notice of sale[.] 5 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.31166(1)(a)–(c).2 “The ‘conclusive’ recitals concern . . . all statutory 6 prerequisites to a valid HOA lien foreclosure sale.” See Shadow Wood Homeowners Assoc. v. N.Y. 7 Cmty. Bancorp., Inc., 366 P.3d 1105 (Nev. 2016). Nevertheless, courts retain the equitable 8 authority to consider quiet title actions even when an HOA’s foreclosure deed contains statutorily 9 conclusive recitals. See id. at 1112. 10 Here, the parties have provided the recorded notice of delinquent assessment, the recorded 11 notice of default and election to sell, the recorded notice of trustee’s sale, and the recorded trustee’s 12 deed upon sale. See (ECF Nos. 60-4, 60-5, 60-9, 60-10). Further, the recorded trustee’s deed upon 13 sale contains the necessary recitals to establish compliance with NRS 116.31162 through NRS 14 116.31164. (ECF No. 60-10); see Shadow Wood, 466 P.3d at 1112. Therefore, pursuant to NRS 15 116.31166 and the recorded foreclosure deed, the foreclosure sale was valid to the extent that it 16 complied with NRS 116.31162 through NRS 116.31164. 17 While NRS 116.3116 accords certain deed recitals conclusive effect, it does not 18 conclusively entitle the buyer at the HOA foreclosure sale to success on a quiet title claim. See 19 20 2 The statute further provides as follows: 21 22 2. Such a deed containing those recitals is conclusive against the unit's former owner, his or her heirs and assigns, and all other persons. The receipt for the 23 purchase money contained in such a deed is sufficient to discharge the purchaser from obligation to see to the proper application of the purchase money. 24

25 3. The sale of a unit pursuant to NRS 116.31162, 116.31163 and 116.31164 26 vests in the purchaser the title of the unit’s owner without equity or right of redemption. 27

28 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.31166(2)–(3). 1 Shadow Wood, 366 P.3d at 1112 (rejecting that NRS 116.31166 defeats, as a matter of law, actions 2 to quiet title). Thus, the question remains whether plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient grounds 3 to justify setting aside the foreclosure sale. See id. 4 “When sitting in equity . . . courts must consider the entirety of the circumstances that bear 5 upon the equities. This includes considering the status and actions of all parties involved, including 6 whether an innocent party may be harmed by granting the desired relief.” Id. 7 BANA argues that the foreclosure sale did not extinguish the deed of trust because Pacific 8 Legends rejected BANA’s offer to tender the superpriority portion of the lien. (ECF Nos. 60, 74- 9 1). In light of the Nevada Supreme Court’s holdings in Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 10 1, LLC, 427 P.3d 113 (Nev. 2018) (“SFR III”) and Bank of America, N.A. v. Thomas Jessup, LLC 11 Series VII, 435 P.3d 1217 (Nev. 2019) (“Jessup”), the court agrees. 12 Under NRS 116.31166(1), the holder of a first deed of trust may pay off the superpriority 13 portion of an HOA lien to prevent the foreclosure sale from extinguishing the deed of trust. See 14 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.31166(1); see also SFR Investments, 334 P.3d at 414 (“But as a junior 15 lienholder, BOA could have paid off the SHHOA lien to avert loss of its security . . .”). The 16 superpriority portion of the lien consists of “the last nine months of unpaid HOA dues and 17 maintenance and nuisance-abatement charges,” while the subpriority piece consists of “all other 18 HOA fees or assessments.” SFR Investments, 334 P.3d at 411; Horizons at Seven Hills 19 Homeowners Association v. Ikon Holdings, LLC, 373 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2016) (“NRS 116.3116(2) . . 20 . is limited to an amount equal to the common expenses assessments due during the nine months 21 before foreclosure”) (emphasis added). 22 In SFR III, the Nevada Supreme Court held that an HOA foreclosure sale does not 23 extinguish a first deed of trust if the holder of the deed of trust tenders the superpriority portion of 24 the HOA lien. SFR III, 427 P.3d at 121. The Nevada Supreme Court also held in Jessup that an 25 offer to make payment at a later date does not constitute valid tender. Jessup, 435 P.3d at 1219– 26 20. However, an HOA’s rejection of such an offer cures the default as it pertains to the 27 superpriority portion of the lien and prevents the foreclosure sale from extinguishing the deed of 28 trust. Id. at 1220. 1 Here, BANA sent a letter to Pacific Legends’ agent stating that it would pay the 2 | superpriority portion of the lien after Pacific Legends presents adequate proof of the superpriority amount. (ECF No. 60-6). Because BANA’s letter was an offer to pay at a later date, it did not constitute tender of the superpriority portion of the lien. See Jessup, 435 P.3d at 1219-20. 5 | However, Pacific Legends’ agent engaged in conduct that amounted to a rejection of BANA’s 6 | offer when it refused to respond to the letter. See id. at 1220 (citing 74 Am. Jur. 2d Tender § 4 (2012) (‘A tender of an amount due is waived when the party entitled to payment, by declaration 8 | or by conduct, proclaims that, if tender of the amount due is made, it will not be □□□□□□□□□□□□□□ Pacific Legends’ rejection cured the default of the superpriority portion of the lien and prevented 10 | the foreclosure sale from extinguishing BANA’s deed of trust. See id. 11| IV. Conclusion 12 The foreclosure sale did not extinguish the deed of trust because Pacific Legends rejected 13 | BANA’s offer to pay the superpriority portion of the lien at a later date. Thus, BANA’s deed of 14 | trust encumbers the property. As there are no pertinent issues left in this litigation, the court will 15 | dismiss as moot all remaining causes of action. 16 Accordingly, 17 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that BANA’s motion for 18 | summary judgment (ECF No. 60) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED, consistent with the 19 | foregoing. 20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BFP’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 61) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BANA’s motion for leave to file supplemental points 23 | and authorities (ECF No. 74) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 24 The clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case. 25 DATED July 26, 2019. 26 Me 0. Atala UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28

es C. Mahan District Judge -8-