Bank of America, N.A. v. Dist. Ct. (Estate of Hirata)

Nevada Supreme Court

Bank of America, N.A. v. Dist. Ct. (Estate of Hirata)

DecidedNovember 14, 2014

Docket66074

StatusUnpublished

This text of Bank of America, N.A. v. Dist. Ct. (Estate of Hirata) (Bank of America, N.A. v. Dist. Ct. (Estate of Hirata)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Bank of America, N.A. v. Dist. Ct. (Estate of Hirata), (Neb. 2014).

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Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. F/K/A No. 66074 LASALLE BANK, N.A., Petitioner, vs. FILED THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, NOV 1 4 2014 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE Bc,,Errifarguau DEPUTY CLEM( GLORIA STURMAN, DISTRICT JUDGE, Respondents, and DOTAN MELECH; THE ESTATE OF TOMOHARU HIRATA; THE ESTATE OF JEAN HIRATA; LYLE K. HIRATA, AN INDIVIDUAL; THE JEAN K. HIRATA LIVING TRUST; GARY MIKUNI, TRUSTEE; AND RONALD BRADY, SR., AN INDIVIDUAL, Real Parties in Interest.

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION This original petition for a writ of prohibition challenges a district court order granting a motion to reopen a closed case. "This court may issue a writ of prohibition to arrest the proceedings of a district court exercising its judicial functions, when such proceedings are in excess of the jurisdiction of the district court." Greene v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 115 Nev. 391, 393, 990 P.2d 184, 185 (1999); NRS 34.320. Writ relief is an extraordinary remedy, and it is petitioner's burden to demonstrate that this court's intervention is warranted. Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004).

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

(0) 1947A e Having considered the parties' arguments, we conclude that our intervention is warranted. Id. Specifically, an order granting real party in interest Dotan Melech's Motion to Discharge Receiver and Terminate Receivership was entered in March 2010. This order constituted a final judgment, as it effectively resolved all pending matters associated with the case. Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 996 P.2d 416 (2000); Valley Bank of Nev. v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 445, 874 P.2d 729, 733 (1994). "[O]nce a final judgment is entered, the district court lacks jurisdiction to reopen it, absent a proper and timely motion under the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure." SFPP, L.P. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 123 Nev. 608, 612, 173 P.3d 715, 717 (2007). Thus, if Melech wanted to reopen the finally adjudicated case, such a request needed to be made in conformity with the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure.' Because Melech's May 2014 Motion to Reopen Case failed in this regard, the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant the motion. Id.; see NRCP 60(b) (providing generally that a party must file a motion for relief from judgment within six months from when written notice of entry of the order is served on that party).

'Contrary to Melech's apparent argument, Emerson v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 127 Nev. , 263 P.3d 224 (2011), does not stand for the proposition that a district court indefinitely retains jurisdiction over any and all matters that might be characterized as "collateral." Rather, in Emerson, we addressed the discrete issue of whether a district court retained jurisdiction to grant a motion for sanctions that had been pending at the time the case was voluntarily dismissed. Id. at , 263 P.3d at 226-27. Here, even accepting Melech's argument that his ultimate purpose in reopening the case was to seek a ruling on a collateral matter, he did not take steps to seek such a ruling until over four years after the case had been finally adjudicated. Thus, Melech's reliance on Emerson is misplaced.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A e• As any further proceedings before the district court in this matter would be in excess of the district court's jurisdiction, our intervention is warranted. SFPP, L.P., 123 Nev. at 612, 173 P.3d at 718; Greene, 115 Nev. at 396, 990 P.2d at 187. Accordingly, we ORDER the petition GRANTED AND DIRECT THE CLERK OF THIS COURT TO ISSUE A WRIT OF PROHIBITION directing the district court to vacate its July 10, 2014, order and precluding the district court from conducting any further proceedings in District Court Case No. A581037.

/ J. Hardesty

#11 ).74 J. Douglas

On9AL Cherry

cc: Hon. Gloria Sturman, District Judge Snell & Wilmer, LLP/Las Vegas Bailus Cook & Kelesis Meier & Fine, LLC Michael H. Schwarz Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (01 1947A

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. F/K/A No. 66074 LASALLE BANK, N.A., Petitioner, vs. FILED THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, NOV 1 4 2014 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE Bc,,Errifarguau DEPUTY CLEM( GLORIA STURMAN, DISTRICT JUDGE, Respondents, and DOTAN MELECH; THE ESTATE OF TOMOHARU HIRATA; THE ESTATE OF JEAN HIRATA; LYLE K. HIRATA, AN INDIVIDUAL; THE JEAN K. HIRATA LIVING TRUST; GARY MIKUNI, TRUSTEE; AND RONALD BRADY, SR., AN INDIVIDUAL, Real Parties in Interest.

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION This original petition for a writ of prohibition challenges a district court order granting a motion to reopen a closed case. "This court may issue a writ of prohibition to arrest the proceedings of a district court exercising its judicial functions, when such proceedings are in excess of the jurisdiction of the district court." Greene v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 115 Nev. 391, 393, 990 P.2d 184, 185 (1999); NRS 34.320. Writ relief is an extraordinary remedy, and it is petitioner's burden to demonstrate that this court's intervention is warranted. Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004).

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

(0) 1947A e Having considered the parties' arguments, we conclude that our intervention is warranted. Id. Specifically, an order granting real party in interest Dotan Melech's Motion to Discharge Receiver and Terminate Receivership was entered in March 2010. This order constituted a final judgment, as it effectively resolved all pending matters associated with the case. Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 996 P.2d 416 (2000); Valley Bank of Nev. v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 445, 874 P.2d 729, 733 (1994). "[O]nce a final judgment is entered, the district court lacks jurisdiction to reopen it, absent a proper and timely motion under the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure." SFPP, L.P. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 123 Nev. 608, 612, 173 P.3d 715, 717 (2007). Thus, if Melech wanted to reopen the finally adjudicated case, such a request needed to be made in conformity with the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure.' Because Melech's May 2014 Motion to Reopen Case failed in this regard, the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant the motion. Id.; see NRCP 60(b) (providing generally that a party must file a motion for relief from judgment within six months from when written notice of entry of the order is served on that party).

'Contrary to Melech's apparent argument, Emerson v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 127 Nev. , 263 P.3d 224 (2011), does not stand for the proposition that a district court indefinitely retains jurisdiction over any and all matters that might be characterized as "collateral." Rather, in Emerson, we addressed the discrete issue of whether a district court retained jurisdiction to grant a motion for sanctions that had been pending at the time the case was voluntarily dismissed. Id. at , 263 P.3d at 226-27. Here, even accepting Melech's argument that his ultimate purpose in reopening the case was to seek a ruling on a collateral matter, he did not take steps to seek such a ruling until over four years after the case had been finally adjudicated. Thus, Melech's reliance on Emerson is misplaced.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A e• As any further proceedings before the district court in this matter would be in excess of the district court's jurisdiction, our intervention is warranted. SFPP, L.P., 123 Nev. at 612, 173 P.3d at 718; Greene, 115 Nev. at 396, 990 P.2d at 187. Accordingly, we ORDER the petition GRANTED AND DIRECT THE CLERK OF THIS COURT TO ISSUE A WRIT OF PROHIBITION directing the district court to vacate its July 10, 2014, order and precluding the district court from conducting any further proceedings in District Court Case No. A581037.

/ J. Hardesty

#11 ).74 J. Douglas

On9AL Cherry

cc: Hon. Gloria Sturman, District Judge Snell & Wilmer, LLP/Las Vegas Bailus Cook & Kelesis Meier & Fine, LLC Michael H. Schwarz Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (01 1947A

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