Banc of Am. Leasing & Capital, LLC v. Wooter Apparel, Inc.

Opinion

Banc of Am. Leasing & Capital, LLC v Wooter Apparel, Inc.

2026 NY Slip Op 05069

August 26, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Banc of America Leasing & Capital, LLC, etc., respondent,

v

Wooter Apparel, Inc., appellant.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 26, 2026

2024-04579, (Index No. 151815/21)

Colleen D. Duffy, J.P.

Paul Wooten

Carl J. Landicino

Susan Quirk, JJ.

Garson, Segal, Steinmetz, Fladgate, LLP, New York, NY (Robert D. Garson of counsel), for appellant.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Catherine M. Didomenico, J.), dated February 28, 2024. The judgment, upon an order dated February 1, 2024, granting that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint, is in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the total sum of $102,677.28.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint is denied, and the order dated February 1, 2024, is modified accordingly.

In September 2021, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant alleging, among other things, that the defendant had defaulted under the terms of a payment plan agreement by failing to make the required installment payments. According to the plaintiff, the payment plan agreement was assigned to the plaintiff by Oracle Credit Corporation and arose out of an agreement between Oracle America, Inc. (hereinafter Oracle America), and the defendant, which provided, inter alia, that Oracle America would provide certain software and related professional services to the defendant. In its answer, the defendant asserted various affirmative defenses and a counterclaim to recover damages for breach of contract. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved, inter alia, for summary judgment on the complaint. The defendant opposed the motion. Upon granting that branch of the motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint in an order dated February 1, 2024, the Supreme Court entered a judgment dated February 28, 2024, in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the total sum of $102,677.28. The defendant appeals from the judgment.

In New York, to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on a cause of action alleging breach of contract, a plaintiff is required to demonstrate the existence of a contract, the party's performance under the contract, the other party's breach of the contract, and harm suffered by the party as a result (see U.S. Bank N.A. v Reddy, 220 AD3d 967, 972). "'To establish the existence of an enforceable agreement,' there must be 'an offer, acceptance of the offer, consideration, mutual assent, and an intent to be bound'" (Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc. v Baldwin Union Free School Dist., 84 AD3d 1232, 1233-1234, quoting Kowalchuk v Stroup, 61 AD3d 118, 121). Similarly, under California law, a plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on a cause of action alleging breach of contract when the plaintiff demonstrates, prima facie, the existence [*2]of a contract, the plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, the defendant's breach, and damages (see Professional Collection Consultants v Lauron, 8 Cal App 5th 958, 968, 214 Cal Rptr 3d 419, 427 [Cal Ct App]; Kent H. Landsberg Co. v Freeman, 2013 WL 2318883, *2-3, 2013 Cal App Unpub LEXIS 3757, *6-7 [Cal Ct App, No. C068067]). In New York, "'[c]onsideration to support an agreement exists where there is either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee'" (Guzman v Ramos, 191 AD3d 644, 646 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Hollander v Lipman, 65 AD3d 1086, 1087). In California, "[c]onsideration sufficient to support a contract is defined as 'Any benefit conferred, or agreed to be conferred, upon the promissor, by any other person, to which the promissor is not lawfully entitled, or any prejudice suffered, or agreed to be suffered, by such person, other than such as he is at the time of consent lawfully bound to suffer, as an inducement to the promisor, is good consideration for a promise" (Melican v Regents of University of California, 151 Cal App 4th 168, 176-177, quoting Cal Civil Code § 1605).

Here, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint, as the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that there was a valid contract between the parties.

In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendant's remaining contentions.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and deny that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint.

DUFFY, J.P., WOOTEN, LANDICINO and QUIRK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court