Baltimore Scrap Corp v. RLI Insurance Company

CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedMarch 12, 2020
Docket1:18-cv-02743
StatusUnknown

This text of Baltimore Scrap Corp v. RLI Insurance Company (Baltimore Scrap Corp v. RLI Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Baltimore Scrap Corp v. RLI Insurance Company, (D. Md. 2020).

Opinion

FILED UNITED STATES DiSTRICT CouRT _iU.S. DISTRICT COURT . DISTRICT OF MARYLAND DISTRICT JF UARYLAND Chambers of 2020 HOR Weést □□□□□ □□□□□□ Etlen Lipton Hollander . Ge ee □□□ 21201 timore, Maryland 2 istrict Court Judge AT 10962;0742 BY. __DEPUTY March 11, 2020 MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL Re: Baltimore Scrap Corp. v. Executive Risk Specialty Insurance Co., et al. Civil Action No. ELH-18-2743 Dear Counsel: AS you know, plaintiff Baltimore Scrap Corporation (“Baltimore Scrap”) sued defendants Executive Risk Specialty Insurance Company (“Executive”) and RLI Insurance Company (“RLI”’), — - alleging breach of contract regarding insurance coverage “for a series of thefts” that occurred in one of Baltimore Scrap’s scrap yards. ECF 1, § 1. RLI timely answered the suit. ECF 24. The claim against Executive has been dismissed. See ECF 26; ECF 27; ECF 33. On May 23, 2019, I entered a Scheduling Order. ECF 29. Among other things, it set the close of discovery for December 2, 2019, and the deadline for dispositive pretrial motions as January 6, 2020. /d. at 1. Thereafter, on November 15, 2019, Baltimore Scrap obtained new counsel. ECF 36. In the interim, on October 21, 2019, well before the deadline in the Scheduling Order, Baltimore Scrap filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to defendant RLI. ECF 35 (the “Summary Judgment Motion”). Curiously, RLI did not timely file an opposition to the Summary Judgment Motion. See Docket. But, months later, RLI filed a motion for leave to file an opposition to the Summary Judgment Motion, and to file a cross motion for summary judgment. ECF 37 (the “RLI Motion”). It has also filed a “Consent Motion to Modify/Reset the Scheduling Order.” ECF 38 (the “Scheduling Motion”). There, RLI asks for additional time to respond to the Summary Judgment Motion and to “conduct limited discovery of the Plaintiff’? ECF 38, $9. RLI claims that, on or about November 15, 2019, RLI sought plaintiffs consent for an extension of time to respond to the Summary Judgment Motion, because “RLI needed additional time to conduct further investigations.’ ECF 37, | 3. According to RLI, plaintiff's counsel “consented to the late filing...” Jd Further, RLI asserts: “Counsel for both parties agreed to extend the response time and modify the scheduling order on the condition [that] RLI produces documents in response to the Plaintiffs request for the production of documents.” ECF 38, { 8. But, no “proposed date was agreed upon.” ECF 37, 3. . RLI contends that it complied and produced documents to plaintiff on November 25, 2019. ECF 38, 7 8. However, according to RLI: “The Plaintiff has recently informed RLI that it was withdrawing its consent due to the lengthy delay.” ECF 37, § 3.

Defense counsel certainly should have sought an extension from the Court. The Court could have ruled on the Summary Judgment Motion, thinking it was unopposed. Nevertheless, I am amenable to a modification of the Scheduling Order. The management of litigation is within “the inherent power” of the Court. See Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-631 (1962) (discussing “the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”). In my view, it is an inefficient use of the Court’s strained resources to decide claims in this case on a piecemeal basis, and before discovery is completed. The Summary Judgment Motion is premature because it was filed before the completion of discovery. “Summary judgment before discovery forces the non-moving party into a fencing match without a sword or mask.” McCray v. Maryland Dept. of Transp., 741 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2014). Moreover, I do not want the Summary Judgment Motion to languish on my docket while discovery is conducted. Therefore, I shall deny the Summary Judgment Motion (ECF 35) as premature, without prejudice to the right of plaintiff to renew this motion once discovery is completed. I shall also deny the RLI Motion (ECF 37), as moot. And, I shall grant the Scheduling Motion (ECF 38). . The following deadlines shall govern: DEADLINES April 15, 2020: Discovery deadline; submission of status - “report April 22, 2020: . Responses to requests for admission (if any) _ May 1, 2020: Deadline for plaintiffs motion for summary judgment May 15, 2020: Deadline for defendant’s opposition and cross motion for summary judgment May 29, 2020: Deadline for plaintiff’s reply and opposition . to defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment . June 15, 2020: Deadline for defendant’s reply

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Despite the informal nature of this Memorandum, it is an Order of the Court and the Clerk is directed to docket it as such. Sincerely, /s/ Ellen Lipton Hollander □□ United States District Judge

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Related

Link v. Wabash Railroad
370 U.S. 626 (Supreme Court, 1962)

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Bluebook (online)
Baltimore Scrap Corp v. RLI Insurance Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/baltimore-scrap-corp-v-rli-insurance-company-mdd-2020.