Baltimore & OR Co. v. United States

9 F. Supp. 181, 1934 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1189
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedDecember 1, 1934
Docket305
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 9 F. Supp. 181 (Baltimore & OR Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Baltimore & OR Co. v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 181, 1934 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1189 (E.D. Va. 1934).

Opinion

SÓPER, Circuit Judge.

This suit in equity was brought under the provisions of the Act of October 22, 1913, c. 32, 38 Stat. 219 (28 USCA § 41 (28) and §§ 43-46), to enjoin, set aside, and annul certain orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in which the Commission prescribed divisions, as between northern and southern carriers, of the through rates on Florida citrus fruit moving by railroad to destinations in official classification territory. 1 An interlocutory injunction was likewise sought, and a court of three judges was organized to hear and determine the controversy, under the further provisions of the act (38 Stat. 220 [28 USCA § 47]). Petitioners here are the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Company, the principal northern lines participating in the Florida citrus traffic, which were defendants in the proceedings before the Commission; and certain other Carriers in official territory have intervened as petitioners. 2 The complainants assail the prescribed divi *183 sions as confiscatory and claim that the Commission exceeded its statutory and constitutional powers in certain respects hereinafter more fully described. The Commission has intervened as a defendant in support of its order, as have the principal southern carriers of Florida citrus traffic, complainants before the Commission. 3

Proceedings Before the Commission.

There were two cases before the Commission. In the first, designated No. 24069, certain southern carriers, most of which are intervening defendants here, complained of divisions which they received on citrus fruit moving from Florida to destinations in the eastern portion of official territory. The complaint was filed November 22, 1930. Carriers in that destination territory, some of which are petitioners and intervening petitioners here, wore made defendants, and the Commission was asked to prescribe just, reasonable, and equitable divisions for the future, and to require retroactive adjustment of divisions from the date of the filing of the complaint. This case involved by far the more important portion of the Florida citrus fruit traffic moving to official territory; for the movement to the eastern portion, known as the trank-line territory and New England, 4 is very heavy, amounting in the shipping pexiod from November 9, 1928, to Juno 30, 1929, to 29,221 cars, while for the same period only 8,773 cars were shipped to central territory. Divisions on shipments to central territory were not put in issue in the complaint in No. 24069. Defendants to this complaint on April 20, 1931, filed a cross-complaint, likewise alleging that existing divisions of joint rates on Florida citrus fruit were unjust, unreasonable, inequitable, and unduly prejudicial as to them, and praying for the establishment of just, reasonable, and equitable divisions, to have retroactive effect from the date of the filing of the eross-eomplaint.

The other case, No. 24160, is a general investigation instituted by the Commission on its own motion, on January 3, 1931, to determine whether present divisions of joint rates on classes and all commodities between points in official territory, including Illinois, and points in southern territory, are unjust, unreasonable, inequitable, or unduly prejudicial as between carriers in the two territories, and, if so, what will be the just, reasonable, and equitable divisions to be received by respondents. The carriers in official territory had filed a petition seeking a review of the divisions of interterritorial class rates and rates made certain percentages of class rates, as between that territory and the south; and on request of the southern carriers, the investigation was made broad enough to include all commodity rates as well. Evidence concerning the divisions on Florida citrus fruit moving to central territory was taken in No. 24160, and considered together with the evidence in No. 24069, so that in effect the issue concerning divisions of rates on citrus fruit from Florida to all of official territory was segregated from the general divisional controversy between northern and southern lines. It was dealt with as a single issue, apart from the general controversy, by the Commission in its successive reports and order’s.

History of Florida'Citrus Bates and Divisions.

The divisional controversy with respect to Florida citrus fruit had its immediate origin in the decision of the Commission in *184 Florida R. R. Commissioners v. A. & R. R. R. Co., 1441. C. C. 603, known as the Florida Case, which established a basis of rates on citrus fruits from Florida to destinations throughout the- United States, effective November 9,1928. Prior to that time, the rates were made up of combinations of proportional rates,, known as gathering charges, from point of origin to Jaeksonville, Fla., or other northern Florida gateways, plus other proportional rates from those gateways to northern destinations.' The old rates were stated in amounts per box, and, at least in the ease of the northern lines, were based upon an estimated weight of 80 pounds per box. The rates prescribed in the Florida Case were single-factor rates from point of origin to destination, stated uniformly in cents per 100 pounds, subject to. a minimum weight of 32,400 pounds per ear and an estimated weight of 90 pounds per box, which was found to be the actual average weight. The order in the Florida Case resulted in both increases and reductions in individual rates, but the net result, based on traffic which moved during the 1928-1929 season, was an average reduction of 67 cents per ton. To New England there was a small net increase; but there were important reductions in rates to interior points in trunk-line territory, and even greater reductions in rates to central territory. The average reduction in rates to trunk-line territory and New England was 35 cents per ton, while for central territory it was $1.74 per ton. The northern and southern carriers were unable- to agree upon a method of apportioning the aggregate reduction, and this litigation ensued.

The- prior history of citrus rates and divisions* whi'eh is detailed in the Commissioner’s first report in this ease, was considered of importance both by the Commission and by thp parties. When Florida citrus rates were first established about 1890, joint class and commodity rates between the south and New England' trunk-line territory, on traffic generally, were arrived at hy adding to the amounts fixéd by the southern carriers for their service south of the gateways, such as Richmond, Va., certain charges, known as “specifics’’ because they were stated in specific. amounts, established by the northern lines. Joint rates on Florida citrus were computed in this manner, and, as has been pointed out-, the specifics were stated in amounts per box based on the third-class specifics and a box of 80 pounds. Prior to 1908, the through rail rates were determined by the southern lines after the northern lines had advised them what division was acceptable for the haul north of the gateways..

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Atlantic Coast Line R. v. Boston & M. R.
18 F. Supp. 886 (D. Massachusetts, 1937)
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. United States
298 U.S. 349 (Supreme Court, 1936)
Atlantic Coast Line R. v. Baltimore & O. R.
12 F. Supp. 711 (D. Maryland, 1935)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
9 F. Supp. 181, 1934 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1189, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/baltimore-or-co-v-united-states-vaed-1934.