Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Mobile Tank Car Services

673 F. Supp. 1436, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10993, 1987 WL 4566
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedNovember 17, 1987
DocketNo. C85-1252
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 673 F. Supp. 1436 (Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Mobile Tank Car Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Mobile Tank Car Services, 673 F. Supp. 1436, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10993, 1987 WL 4566 (N.D. Ohio 1987).

Opinion

BATTISTI, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff, Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, asserts that $8,526.00 is due by Defendant, Mobil Tank Car Services, for rail transportation services provided in interstate commerce. Plaintiff is a company duly authorized to transport freight and passengers by railroad in interstate commerce and defendant is a Kentucky corporation which utilizes rail services.

The posture of this case may be stated briefly. Plaintiff alleges personal jurisdiction in the complaint by stating that Defendant was “doing business in the City of Cleveland.” Defendant counters, by affidavit of its President, that it is not licensed to do business in the State of Ohio and, during the period in question, it did not transact any business within Ohio. Plaintiff, for nearly two and one-half years, has not offered any evidence in support of its contention that defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction and thereby accountable to answer the complaint. Defendant, by special appearance for the sole purpose of contesting jurisdiction, moves this Court to dismiss the instant action for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper service of [1438]*1438process pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), (4).

In evaluating the question presented, whether lack of personal jurisdiction mandates dismissal of the instant action, consideration must be given to where the burdens of pleading and production rest on this issue.

In personam jurisdiction is one of the three horsemen sine qua non a lawsuit may proceed.1 It has been well established through Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877), and its progeny that a court must be able to exercise personal jurisdiction—jurisdiction in personam, in rem or quasi in rem—in order to render a valid judgment.2 Failure of such power is fatal to a Court’s ability to proceed. Traditionally, the presence or absence of personal jurisdiction was most carefully tested by special appearance. See generally 6 C.J.S. Appearances §§ 4-5. Today, however, a motion may be filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). Under the Federal Rules, an appearance for the sole purpose of challenging jurisdiction is unnecessary but permissable. United States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298, 303 (2d Cir.1956). No waiver of one’s ability to challenge personal jurisdiction is effectuated by an appearance to file a motion to dismiss, or an answer, including challenges to personal jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12. The merciful demise of the forms of action laid to rest the need for a special appearance; some struggling parties, however, continue to pursue such an approach.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction require consideration of the broad standard for finding such power to adjudicate over the person. In making this determination, consideration must be given to “the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2580, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977). Due process is thus met before a suit proceeds. However, before the due process standard is satisfied, a defendant not present in the forum must have had “certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).

With these broad principles in mind, it is necessary to narrow the focus on the requirements for bringing a party before this federal court. The nature and extent of in personam jurisdiction in federal court derives from application of the law of the forum. In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir.1972). Equally, federal service of process under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c) utilizes Ohio law. The Ohio long-arm statute, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2307.38.2, in pertinent part provides:

(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person’s:
(1) Transacting any business in this state;
(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this state;

To establish personal jurisdiction and valid service of proces, the statutory provisions must be strictly met.

A limit, marking the greatest reach of the Ohio long-arm statute, has been articulated in this Circuit. To find personal jurisdiction and valid service of process:

First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of juris[1439]*1439diction over the defendant reasonable. Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir.1968).

It is only through the establishment of a relationship between the Defendant Mobil Tank Car Services, the Ohio forum and the contract payments at issue that the suit may proceed.

Before turning to application of the facts at bar, the burdens of pleading and proof of jurisdiction must also be at hand. They are relevant to the instant decision.

A plaintiff, seeking to hail a foreign defendant into a distant forum, bears an initial burden of pleading jurisdiction. “He must allege in his pleadings the facts essential to show jurisdiction.” McNutt v. General Motors, 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 785, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936). Even more specifically, “[w]hen a plaintiff seeks to bring a defendant into Court under a long-arm statute, he must state sufficient facts in the complaint to support a reasonable inference that such defendant can be subjected to jurisdiction within the state.” Block Indus. v. DHJ Indus., 495 F.2d 256, 259 (8th Cir.1974). The minimal allegation that a defendant “transacts business” within the state can be sufficient to overcome this initial pleading requirement, if uncontroverted. Williams v. Vick Chem. Co., 279 F.Supp. 833, 837 (S.D.Iowa 1967).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
673 F. Supp. 1436, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10993, 1987 WL 4566, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/baltimore-ohio-railroad-v-mobile-tank-car-services-ohnd-1987.