Baltimore Federation of Labor v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America

4 Balt. C. Rep. 21
CourtBaltimore City Circuit Court
DecidedNovember 1, 1939
StatusPublished

This text of 4 Balt. C. Rep. 21 (Baltimore Federation of Labor v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Baltimore City Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Baltimore Federation of Labor v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 4 Balt. C. Rep. 21 (Md. Super. Ct. 1939).

Opinion

GORTER, J. (Orally)

The bill in this ease was filed by the Baltimore Federation of Labor to restrain the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America from calling a strike at. a certain factory, which, it; was alleged, they threatened to do, unless two members of the Baltimore Federation of Labor were discharged from the employ of this factory. This is not a contest between capital and labor ; it is not a contest between the public .and labor, although both of them may be indirectly affected by the decision in this case. It is a contest between two labor organizations.

The defendant, does not deny that it had so threatened to call a strike — at least that it had so intimated to the employer of the two men. ft maintains that it; has the right to call a strike if those two men were not discharged, and the reason they give for the course which they intend to- pursue is that these two men a short time before, together with seventeen other men, all of whom were members of the plaintiff’s organization, went on a strike and abandoned the Monumental Custom Tailoring Company because throe members of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union were taken into that employ. Whether or not a court would think that was a sufficient justification need not he decided because the evidence in this case shows that such was not the case. The undisputed evidence shows that these men left the employ of the Monumental Custom Tailoring Company because the hours were changed, because their employer wanted 1hem to work in, five days what llioy had been doing in six days. The circular to that effect was read to them ou the Saturday previous 1o their leaving, and while it might very well have been thought by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America that these men left because of their men coming in there — and in this case I am going to credit; everybody with acting in good faith — I think the evidence shows that they left only because of the change of hours and because they were not willing to do the six days’ work in the five days. Therefore, the reason given, or the motive given, for asking that these two men he discharged, the evidence has shown, was not really, in point of fact, justi[22]*22fled. Now, if that were the only object in this strike, if that were the only motive in this strike, or in this proposed strike, after having heard the testimony in this case, the Amalgamated, I think, should be willing to say, “We are perfectly willing to allow Mr. Linglebacb, as he did not leave on account of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers’ men coming into the Monumental Custom Tailoring Company’s plant, hold his place,” and the case would be over. The other man, Newman, in regard to whom the threat was made, has joined the Amalgamated, left the Baltimore Federation of Labor and has gone back to the Monumental Custom Tailoring- Company, where he was originally.

But the case has taken a broader scope. It has been contended upon the part of the defendants that they have the right as a union to call their men on a strike when the employer refuses to dismiss from his employ a man who is not a member of their union, and this would he so whether that man was a member of the plaintiff’s union or any other union or no union. That is the position which the counsel for the defense has contended for and that, of course, is the important question to be decided in this case. I am not as much interested in the welfare of the Federation of Labor, or in the welfare of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, as I am interested in the rights of every working man within the ranks of both of them, and I have fried in reaching the decision which I have reached today, to do that which is most conducive to uphold the rights and to promote the welfare of every individual working man in that line of business or in any other lino of business. A working man has a right to earn his living for himself and: Ms wife and his children, and it is of the highest importance to society that he should be allowed to maintain that right unimpaired. I think that right is as strong, if not stronger, than the vested right of property, and in deciding this case, while I know that there is a conflict of authority upon the point, I am aiming to do that which is most conducive to his interest, whether he belongs to the Federation of Labor, or whether he belongs to the Amalgamated Workers, or whether he belongs to no union at all. A man has a right to keep his employment whether it be under a contract which is still running or whether it be under a contract which Ms employer at any time can terminate, and 1 think that this is such a sacred right that nobody lias a right to interfere with it. unless for very good and sufficient reason. I believe, on the other hand, and the law is perfectly clear on it, that unions have a right to call a strike if they do so cither to increase the wages of men, to lessen the hours, or to accomplish anything that is to advance the welfare of their members. But a union is a great power and when you have a great power to do good you must be very careful not to exercise that power to do wrong. It is a great responsibility. As long as you are able to advance the members of your union, to increase their wages — provided it is not unjust to the rest of the world — to shorten their hours, to a reasonable degree or to promote their welfare, it may answer a very wise and useful purpose; but the second you use that groat power to do anything that is unjust, or wrong, then you ought to ho stopped, not only on account of the rights of the person that you interfere with but on account of yourselves, because no one is justified in doing what is unfair or wrong to other people.

When you come to the next position which is contended for by the counsel for the defendant in this case, that you not only have a right to strike to increase wages, to shorten hours, or for anything to promote the welfare of the members, but that you have a right to strike to put a man out of a position that he is holding in order that you may put your own members in bis place, or that you have a right to strike -because that man is in the employ of somebody, yon take a position which is objected to by the counsel for the plaintiff, and I think the objection is sound. I am convinced if you are going to call a strike because you do not want a man to hold a position in a factory, and the only reason you do not want him to hold that position is because he does not belong to your union, whether be belongs to any other union, or no union, it seems to me yon ought to be restrained from doing it, and I believe if you would consider it carefully yourselves you will see it is not a fair way to advance your union because you are striking [23]*23one mail witli a number of men, and when, under such circumstances, you put up to him the option of joining your union or leaving his position, yon coerce him; you take away his freedom of action. I think that ought to be the law and I believe that is the law in Maryland.

Lucke’s case, in 77 Md. 396, has recognized that a man is entitled to continue in a certain employ regardless of whether the term of his employment has ended or not. That is distinctly stated, and I think that anybody who interferes with his employment is violating a very sacred right. The Supreme Court of the United States, also, 245 U. S., Hitchmond Mine case, the opinion delivered by Justice Pitney, recognizes that principle. While there is considerable conflict of authority throughout the country, I believe that the position taken by the Court of Appeals of Maryland and the Supreme Court of the United States is the correct position and that the principle is the just principle.

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Related

Lucke v. Clothing Cutters & Trimmers' Assembly No. 7507
19 L.R.A. 408 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1893)

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Bluebook (online)
4 Balt. C. Rep. 21, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/baltimore-federation-of-labor-v-amalgamated-clothing-workers-of-america-mdcirctctbalt-1939.