Balsewicz v. Bowen

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedAugust 12, 2022
Docket2:21-cv-00748
StatusUnknown

This text of Balsewicz v. Bowen (Balsewicz v. Bowen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Balsewicz v. Bowen, (E.D. Wis. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

JOHN H. BALSEWICZ, also known as MELISSA BALSEWICZ,

Plaintiff, Case No. 21-CV-748-JPS v.

VARNISHA BOWEN, C.O. ROBERT ORDER J. RYMARKIEWICZ, AIMEE WILSON, YANA PUSICH, TONIA MOON, JAMES MUENCHOW, and RANDALL HEPP,

Defendants.

Plaintiff John H. Balsewicz, also known as Melissa Balsewicz, an inmate confined at Kettle Moraine Correctional Institution filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated her constitutional rights. ECF No. 1. On March 18, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint, ECF No. 10, along with a proposed amended complaint, ECF No. 11. This action was initially filed in the Western District of Wisconsin, where the court took those motions under advisement prior to transferring the case to Eastern District of Wisconsin. ECF No. 17. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint. The remainder of this Order resolves Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and screens her amended complaint. 1. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because Plaintiff was a prisoner when she filed her complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the Court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with her case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. Id. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). She must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On November 30, 2020, Magistrate Judge Peter A. Oppeneer ordered Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $22.60. ECF No. 7. Plaintiff paid that fee on December 22, 2020. Plaintiff has since then paid a substantial portion of the filing fee in the Western District of Wisconsin, with a $32.00 balance remaining. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. ECF No. 2. She must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this Order. 2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived her of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived her of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 2.2 Analysis To state a claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A plaintiff should not plead every fact supporting her claims; she only has to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). There is a reason that the rule specifies a “short and plain” statement. “Rule 8(a) requires parties to make their pleadings straightforward, so that judges and adverse parties need not try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud.” U.S. ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003). “[L]ength may make a complaint unintelligible, by scattering and concealing in a morass of irrelevancies the few allegations that matter.” Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 844 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Garst, 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003)). “District judges are busy, and therefore have a right to dismiss a complaint that is so long that it imposes an undue burden on the judge, to the prejudice of other litigants seeking the judge’s attention.” Id. Plaintiff’s amended complaint violates Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and will therefore be dismissed. That complaint does not include “a short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” as the rule requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

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Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Jurijus Kadamovas v. Michael Stevens
706 F.3d 843 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
Balsewicz v. Bowen, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/balsewicz-v-bowen-wied-2022.