Ballard v. CIR

522 F.3d 1229
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedFebruary 13, 2003
Docket01-17249
StatusPublished

This text of 522 F.3d 1229 (Ballard v. CIR) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ballard v. CIR, 522 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2003).

Opinion

321 F.3d 1037

Claude M. BALLARD and Mary B. Ballard, Petitioners-Appellants,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 01-17249.

No. 01-17251.

No. 01-17253.

No. 01-17255.

No. 01-17256.

No. 01-17257.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

February 13, 2003.

Robert Edwin Davis, Vester T. Hughes, Jr., David J. Schenck, Hughes & Luce, LLP, Dallas, TX, Steven Spencer Brown, Royal B. Martin, Jr., Martin, Brown & Sullivan, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Petitioners-Appellants.

Joan I. Oppenheimer, Tax Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent-Appellee.

Appeals from a Decision of the United States Tax Court.

Before HULL, FAY and GIBSON*, Circuit Judges.

FAY, Circuit Judge:

Petitioners-Appellants Claude M. Ballard ("Ballard") and Mary B. Ballard1 appeal the judgment of the United States Tax Court in which it found that Ballard fraudulently failed to declare and pay income tax on approximately $3,200,000. The Tax Court determined that Ballard earned the unreported income through a scheme with Burton W. Kanter ("Kanter") and Robert W. Lisle ("Lisle") to sell influence with Prudential Life Insurance Co. of America ("Prudential") whereby suitors of Prudential would pay Kanter kickbacks in exchange for the influence of Ballard and Lisle, senior Prudential employees. After receipt of the kickback proceeds, Kanter would funnel the proceeds of the scheme to Ballard and Lisle through a complex web of corporations, partnerships and trusts designed to shelter the money from the reporting requirements of the Internal Revenue Code. As a result of the Tax Court's findings, Petitioners-Appellants have been assessed tax deficiencies (including penalties against Ballard) totaling $1,318,648.

On appeal, Petitioners-Appellants assert (1) that application of Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure Rule ("Rule") 183, which allowed the Tax Court Judge to review the findings of the Special Trial Judge without making the findings of the Special Trial Judge available to the parties, violated their due process rights, and (2) that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support the Tax Court's findings. After extensive review of the record and consideration of oral argument, we find that the application of Rule 183 did not violate Petitioners-Appellants' due process rights and that the evidence is sufficient to support the Tax Court's finding that Ballard received and fraudulently failed to report income.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

The factual underpinning of the case involves allegations by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") that Ballard and Lisle sold influence with Prudential's Real Estate Department to would-be Prudential suitors via Kanter, a well-known tax attorney and University of Chicago Law School professor. Ballard worked for Prudential from 1948 until 1981, and Lisle worked for Prudential from 1950 until 1982. Both Ballard and Lisle worked in Prudential's real estate department which was divided into two divisions: equity operations and mortgage operations. During the years of Ballard's and Lisle's employment, Prudential was one of the largest owners of commercial real estate in the United States. Ballard worked in the equity operations division, ultimately becoming the senior vice-president responsible for all operations, acquisitions, sales and portfolio management of Prudential's equity investments in real estate. Ballard's position afforded him great influence over the choice of builders and contractors for Prudential projects and, resultantly, he could influence or prevent a project from going forward. Lisle worked in Prudential's mortgage operations division, ultimately becoming a vice-president and overseeing the lending of money and buying and building of real estate for Prudential. Lisle had the authority to commit any loan up to $20,000,000 and to award construction contracts.

Ballard and Lisle worked out of Prudential's Newark, New Jersey corporate headquarters. In fact, their offices were located next to one another. Further, both Ballard and Lisle worked under Donald Knab ("Knab"), the person in charge of all of Prudential's real estate operations. Knab highly regarded both Ballard's and Lisle's work. Consequently, Ballard and Lisle had great influence with Knab regarding the projects Prudential would pursue.

Ballard and Lisle met Kanter during the early 1970s and they all quickly became personal friends. Thereafter, as the IRS contends, Ballard, Lisle and Kanter proceeded to engage in a scheme whereby Prudential suitors would pay kickbacks to Kanter for securing Prudential business. Because Kanter himself had no influence over Prudential, in order to secure Prudential business, Kanter would rely on Ballard and Lisle. Specifically, the IRS contends that on five separate occasions, arrangements were made to buy Ballard's and Lisle's influence.2 For each of these arrangements, following the receipt of kickback proceeds, Kanter would funnel the money to Ballard through a complex web of corporations, partnerships and trusts. As alleged by the IRS, Ballard ultimately would receive kickback proceeds through a number of means including deposit of the funds by Kanter into a corporation completely controlled by Ballard, through sham loans by Kanter to Ballard, or through sham consultant payments to Ballard's family members.3

As the IRS asserts, in order to facilitate the scheme, Kanter formed Investment Research Associates, Ltd. ("IRA")4 which acted as the conduit through which all kickback proceeds to Ballard were funneled. IRA itself did not perform any business, had no employees other than bookkeepers and paid no salaries in any years other than minimal amounts from 1979 to 1982. However, IRA did have a controlling interest in various subsidiaries including TMT, Inc. ("TMT"), Carlco, Inc. ("Carlco") and BWK, Inc. ("BWK").5

TMT was formed in 1982 and remained inactive until IRA acquired all of its outstanding shares of common stock at the end of 1983. At that time, TMT issued 150 preferred shares of stock to Ballard's family trust ("the Orient Trust") and in 1984, TMT issued an additional 150 shares of preferred stock to the Orient Trust. The IRS contends that TMT was the personal pocketbook of Ballard exhibited by Ballard's complete control over TMT and its investment decisions as well as the fact that Ballard and his family had signatory authority over TMT's accounts and that TMT's designated business address was Ballard's personal residence.

By the end of 1983, the IRS contends that IRA had accumulated $4,771,445 in payments related to "the Five" and that in 1984, Kanter directed IRA to distribute the accumulated funds and its interest in the Essex Partnership6 in a 45-45-10 ratio to TMT, Carlco and BWK, respectively.

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Bluebook (online)
522 F.3d 1229, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ballard-v-cir-ca11-2003.