Ball v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

• Court: District Court, N.D. Alabama
• Decided: June 5, 2024
• Docket: 2:22-cv-01456
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA WESTERN DIVISION

DAVID ADDISON BALL ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) 2:22-CV-01456-LSC MARTIN O’MALLEY, ) Acting Commissioner of ) Social Security ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION I. Introduction The Plaintiff, David Addison Ball, (“Ball” or “Plaintiff”) appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying his application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). Ball timely pursued and exhausted his administrative remedies, and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Ball was forty-nine years old when he applied for SSI benefits (tr. 42), and fifty years old at the time of the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) decision (Tr. 37). He states he became disabled on March 1, 2015 at the age of forty- three. (Tr. 169.) According to the ALJ, Ball completed high school. (Tr. at 42, 52.)

Ball has no past relevant work experience. (Tr. at 42, 63.) He is 5’8” and has a 1 BMI of 46.95. (Tr. 531.) Ball attributes his disability to degenerative disc disease, depression, anxiety, dyslexia, hypertension, asthma, hyperlipidemia, obesity, and diabetes. (Tr. at 34-35, 169, 416, 433.) The Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential evaluation procSeeses for determining whether an indseivei dalusaol Diso udgishatbyl ve.d A apnfedl thus

eligible for SSI. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; , 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The evaluator will follow the steps in order until making a finding of either disabled or nSoet edisabled; if no finding is made, the analysis will proceed to the next step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),

416.920(a)(4). The first step requires the evaluator to determIidne whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). . §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i),

416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is not engaged in SGA, the evaluator moves on to the next step. The second step requires the evaluator to consider the combined severiItdy

of the claimant’s medica lly determinable physical and mental impairments. . 1 HeigShetes, weights, and BMIs have varied slightly in the record. Height ranges from 5’7” to §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An individual impairment or

combination of impairments that is not classified as “severe” and does not satisfy the durational requirements set forth Idin 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and 416.909 will result in a finding of not disableSde.e H. aTrhte v d. eFciinsciohn depends on the

medical evidence contained in the record. , 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding that “substantial evidence in the record” adequately supported the finding that the claimant was not disabled).

Similarly, the third step requires the evaluator to consider whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or is medically equal to one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the criteria of a listed

impairment and the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404Id.1509 and 416.909 are satisfied, the evaluator will make a finding of disabled. . If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not

meet or medically equal a listed impairment, the evaluator must determine the claimaSneet’ s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) before proceeding to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The fourth step requires the

evaluator to determine whether the claimant hSaese itdhe RFC to perform the requirements of his past relevant work (“PRW”). . §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), does not prevent him fIrdom performing his PRW, the evaluator will make a

finding of not disabled. . The fifth and final step requires the evaluator to consider the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience to deItdermine whether the claimant

can make an adjustment to other work. . at §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If thIed clsaeime aanlsto can perform other work, the evaluator will find him not disabled. .; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the

claimant cannot perform other work, the evaluator will find him disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g). Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ first established that Ball had not engaged in SGA since June 9, 2020, the date of his application for

SSI benefits. (Tr. 34.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Ball’s degeneratIidve disc disease, depression, and obesity qualify as “severe impairments.” ( .) However at step three, the ALJ found that the combination of these impairments

did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. at 35.) The ALJ then, based on the entire record, determined that Ball had the

following RFC: [T]o perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except that the claimant could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, stoop, ropes, or scaffolds; the claimant could have only occasional exposure to extremes of cold or full body vibration; the claimant should have no exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights and hazardous machinery; the claimant would be able to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions and tasks; the claimant can tolerate changes in the workplace that are infrequent and gradually introduced; the claimant can have occasional work-related interaction with supervisors and coworkers; the claimant should have no interaction with the general public; and the claimant would benefit from jobs that do not have strict production standards, but end of day requirements would be acceptable. (Tr. 37.) Relying on the testimony of a Vocational Expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that “[c]onsidering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” (Tr. 43.) The VE indicated that Ball could perform wIdork as a filters assembler, poly packer and heat sealer, or final inspector. ( .) As a result of these findings, the ALJ concluded that Ball was not disabled from June 9, 2020 through November 22, 2021, the date of the decision. (Tr. 44.) Following the ALJ’s decision, the Appeals CIIo. uncSilt daencdlianredd o Bfa Rlle’sv rieeqwu est for review. (Tr. 1.)

This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the

findings Soef et hSet oCnoem vm. Ciosmsiomn’er ro af nSodc (. 2S)e wc.hether the correct legal standards were appliedC. rawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 544 F. App’x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing , 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)).

This Court gives deference to the factual findings of the Commissioner, provided that those findings are supporSteede bMyi lseus bvs. tCahnatitaelr evidence, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. , 84 F.3d 1397, 1400

(11th Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, this Court may not decide faDctyse,r vw. eBiagrhn heavritdence, or substitute its judgment for that of the CPohmillmipiss svi. oBnaerrn. hart , 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting , 357 F.3d 1232, 1240

n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)). “The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not

prevent an aPdamrkienris vtr. aBtoivwee angency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.’” Consol,o 7 v9. 3F eFd.2. dM 1a1r.7 C7o, m11m8’1n (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting , 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)).

Indeed, even if this Court finds that the proof preponderates against the Commissioner’s decisSieoen ,M iitle smust affirm if the decisMioanr tiins vs. uSpuplloivratned by F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

However, no decision is automatic, for “despite th[e] deferential standard [for review of claims], it is imperative that th[is] Court scrutinize the reBcroirddg eins ivt.s B eonwtiernety to determine the reasonableness of the dAerncioslido nv. rHeeacckhleedr.”

, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing , 732 F.2d 881, 883 (11th Cir. 1984)). MorBeoovweern, vfa. iHluercek letro apply the correct legal standards is grounWdisg gfoinr sr ve.v Secrhsawle. iker , 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th

Csuirp.e 1r9se8d4e)d ( ocnit iontgh er grounds by Harner ,v 6. S7o9c .F S.2ecd. 1A3d8m7in, 1., 3C8o9m m(1’1rth Cir. 1982), , 38 F.4th 892 (II1I1. th DCiirs.c 2u0s2s2io))n.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and remanded for two reasons: (1) the ALJ incorrectly evaluated the evidence and failed articulate her reasons for discrediting medical opinions, and (2) the failure to

give weight, deference, or special consideration to certain medical opinions runs cao.n tSruarbys ttaon thtiea lp Euvrpidoesen coef the Social Security Act.

Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ failed to articulately assess the “supportability” and “consistency” of various medical opinions in the record. and 416.920c declare that the ALJ “will not defer or give any specific

evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s).” Under this new regulatory scheme, the ALJ is not required to either assign more weight to medical opinions from a

claimant’s treating source or explain why good cause exists to disregard the treating source’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. Instead, the ALJ should focus on the persuasiveness of medical opinions

by assessing the following five factors: (1) supportability, (2) consistency, (3) relationship with the claimant, including length of the treatment relationship, frequency of examinations, purpose of the treatment relationship, extent of the treatment relationship, and examining relationship, (4) specialization, and (5)

other factors in evaluating medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5). While the ALJ must explain the role of the supportability and consistency factors in evaluating the opinion of a

medical source or administrative medical finding, she is not required to do the same for the other factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c. In responding to comments to these changes when proposed, the Social Security Administration explained,

The supportability and consistency factors provide a more balanced and objective framework for considering medical opinions than focusing upon the factors of consistency and the medical source's relationship with the individual. A medical with evidence from other sources, will not be persuasive regardless of who made the medical opinion. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence

, 82 FR 5844-01 (Jan. 18, 2017). Regarding supportability, “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s)…the more persuasive the medical opinions… will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1). For consistency, “[t]he more

consistent a medical opinion(s)… is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s)… will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2). If the above legal requirements are met, then thWe AinLsJc’hs edle vt.e Cromminma'tri oonf Swoicll.

bSeec u. pheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. , 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence, greater than a scintilla, tWhaatl k“ear rve. aSsoocn. Saebcl.e A pdemrsino.n, C womoumld'r accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” , 987 F.3d 1333, 1W33in8s ch(e1l1th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting i. NP, K6e3a1h Fe.3yd at 1178). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to address the consistency

and supportability of NP Cherie Keahey’s medical opinion. (Doc. 10 at 23-24.) Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c, ALJs are required to articulate how persuasive they find all medical opinions in the case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b). The

Commissioner’s definition of a “medical opinion” is as follows: (2) Medical opinion. A medical opinion is a statement from a medical source about what you can still do despite your impairment(s) and whether you have one or more impairment- related limitations or restrictions in the abilities listed in paragraphs (a)(2)(i)(A) through (D)… (i) Medical opinions in adult claims are about impairment-related limitations and restrictions in: (A) Your ability to perform physical demands of work activities, such as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, or other physical functions (including manipulative or postural functions, such as reaching, handling, stooping, or crouching); (B) Your ability to perform mental demands of work activities, such as understanding; remembering; maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; carrying out instructions; or responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, or work pressures in a work setting; (C) Your ability to perform other demands of work, such as seeing, hearing, or using other senses; and (D) Your ability to adapt to environmental conditions, such as temperature extremes or fumes.

20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a)(2). Although the ALJ referenced Plaintiff’s visit to NP Keahey in discussing the onset of symptoms (tr. 38), the ALJ was not required recommendations because they were not medical opinions within the

Commissioner’s definition. Plaintiff initially visited NP Keahey in November of 2019 where he received treatment plans for his backpain, hypertension, depression, and

obesity. (Tr. at 447-56.) Regarding the back pain, NP Keahey recommended that Plaintiff adopt a low sodium and low-fat diet, walk daily for twenty to thirty minutes, refrain from lifting, pushing, or pulling anything greater than 10

pounds, take prescribed medication, and to receive x-rays on his back within three weeks. (Tr. 454.) None of these recommendations mentioned anything about what Plaintiff could still doS edeespite his impairments and they do not address Plaintiff’s ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a)(2). Following the

initial visit, Plaintiff saw NP Keahey on two other occasions. (Tr. 457-75.) The second visit reviewed Plaintiff’s back x-ray which displayed mild arthropathy in L3-5, but otherwise, there were no acute findings. (Tr. 457.) The treatment

recommendations remained the same as the initial visit except for a request for an MRI. (Tr. 463.) The third visit with NP Keahey was not focused on back pain and included no treatment plan for that ailment. (Tr. 466-75.) When Plaintiff’s

MRI results were reviewed with Dr. Christopher Cole, Dr. Cole stated that the results were “not significant,” and his recommended treatment was only to visits with NP Keahey, there were no medical opinions reflecting what Plaintiff

could still do despite his impairments and no discussion on how his impairments would negatively affect his ability to work. Because NP Keahey’s treatment recommendations are not medical opinions within the

Commissioner’s definition, the ALJ was not required to address the consistency and supportiai.b iDlitry. Coof sleu ch recommendations.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred as a matter of law in finding Dr. Cole’s medical opinion unpersuasive, alleging that the ALJ dismissed Cole’s opinion due to a short history of treatment and the form that it was provided on. (Doc. 10 at 24-25.) This argument fails because neither of these factors were

dispositive reasons in dismissing Dr. Cole’s opinion but were instead considerations in the ALJ’s evaluation of the consistency and supportability of Dr. Cole’s opinion.

Dr. Cole opined that Plaintiff would be able to sit or stand for less than thirty minutes at a time, would be off task 90% of the workday, and would miss fifteen days of work every month due to his low back pain, bulging disc, and

arthritis. (Tr. 507.) The ALJ notes that Dr. Cole’s opinion seems to be in a form created by Plaintiff’s attorney that consists of mostly circled options, checked discredits the opinion. (Tr. 41.) Instead, this is a consideration in the

supportability of Dr. Cole’s opinion. The ALJ addresses the lack of supportability in the provided form because the form “gives the opinions expressed on this form limited probative value because therIed is no narrative support or insight

into the reasons behind the conclusions.” ( .) The ALJ further addresses the lack of consistency between Dr. Cole’s opined limitations and the information in the record, including Dr. Cole’s own

treatment notes, as well as the MRI radiology report and the treatment notes of Dr. Cesar Munoz and NP Matthew Hall. (Tr. at 41, 508, 516, 532, 559, 564.) The ALJ specifically noted that these treatment records that contrast with Dr. Cole’s drastic limitations indicate that “during the relevant period, the claimant has

presented with largely unremarkable physical examinations and imaging has revealed mild findings.” (Tr. 41.) Further, Dr. Cole’s opined limitations directly contrast with the opinions of State consultants, Drs. Krishna Reddy and Alton

James, that aggregate the mild imaging findings and unremarkable physical examinations to believe that Plaintiff should be limited to light exertional level work. (Tr. at 39, 170-81.)

Because the ALJ addressed the consistency and supportability of Dr. Cole’s opinion, the legal standard of review under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c was various inconsistencies between the opinion and the record as a whole, the

decision to find Dr. Cole’s opinion unpersuasive is supported by substantial evidence within the record which a reasonable person could reach the same conclusion.i iAi.c cMorrd. iHngalryv, ethye, LACLSJW di d not err.

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred as a matter of law in finding Mr. David Harvey, LCSW’s medical opinion unpersuasive based on the same

reasoning above regarding Dr. Cole’s opinion. (Doc. 10 at 27.) Similarly, these arguments fail because neither the limited treatment history nor the form in which the opinion was drafted were dispositive reasons to disregard Mr. Harvey’s opinion. Instead, the ALJ analyzed the short treatment history and

opinion form in her consideration of Dr. Harvey’s opinion. Mr. Harvey completed a form that consisted of various “yes” or “no” questions. These responses included that Plaintiff could not understand,

remember, or carry out very short and simple instructions; could not maintain attention, concentration, and pace for periods of at least two hours; could not perform activities within a schedule and be punctual; could not sustain

ordinary routine without special supervision; could not adjust to routine and infrequent work changes; could not interact with supervisors and/or basic standards of neatness and cleanliness. (Tr. at 41, 506.) In complying with

the regulatory requirements in evaluating medical opinions, the ALJ noted that supportability in Mr. Harvey’s opinion was lacking due to short treatment history of only one prior visit and no clarification or explanation as to why Mr.

Harvey circled “yes” or “no” to the questions. (Tr. 41.) She also stated thIdat Mr. Harvey’s opinion was inconsistent with the record as a whole. ( .) In discussing consistency, the ALJ cites to various areas of the record revealing

that Plaintiff had a GAF score of 90, suggesting significant functional ability, and that during the relevant period, Plaintiff had been feeling good or better regarding his depression. (Tr. at 38, 41, 510, 514, 519.) Additionally, in Plaintiff’s initial consultation with Mr. Harvey, Mr. Harvey’s treatment notes

state that Plaintiff had a cooperative attitude, logical thought process, average intelligence, and cognition, insight, and judgment were all within normal limits. (Tr. 478.) The severity of Plaintiff’s depression was noted as “moderate.” (Tr.

479.) Considering the lack of supportability in Mr. Harvey’s opinion and the inconsistencies between the opinion and various treatment notes throughout

the record, including Mr. Harvey’s own notes, the ALJ had substantial evidence to support her decision to find Mr. Harvey’s opinion unpersuasive. Accordingly, iv. Dr. Nichols

Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ provided no explanation or assessment of the supportability of Dr. June Nichols’s opinion. (Doc. 10 at 29-30.) This argument fails because although the ALJ did not expressly use the words “support” or

“supportability,” it is clear that her decision to find Dr. Nichols’Sse eopLeinwionno uv.n Kpiejarskuaazsiive was based on a lack of consistency and supportability. , No. 8:21-cv-1334-SPF, 2022 WL 3999282, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 1,

2022) (“Use of [the words supportability or consistency] is not required, hTohwaxetvoenr ,v a. sK liojankga azsi the ALJ's findings were ultimately based on these factors.”); , No. 1:20-cv-616-SRW, 2022 WL 983156, at *8 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 30, 2022) (“However, the ALJ need not use any magic words in discussing

whether a medical opinion is supported by evidence from the medical source himself and whether the opinion is consistent with other evidence of record.”). Dr. Nichols opined that Plaintiff could understand, remember, and carry

out simple instructions and could maintain socially appropriate behavior and adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness. (Tr. at 42, 570.) Contrarily, Dr. Nichols’s opinion also stated that Plaintiff could not maintain

attention, concentration, and pace for periods of at least two hours; could not perform activities within a schedule and be punctual; could not sustain infrequent work changes; could not interact with supervisors and/or

coworkers. (Tr. 570.) Further, Dr. Nichols believed that in addition to normal workday breaks, Plaintiff would be off task for 60-70% of an eight-hour day, and that Plaintiff would fail to report to work between twenty tIod twenty-five

days in a thirty-day period due to his psychological symptoms. ( .) Similar to the opinions of both Dr. Cole and Mr. Harvey, Dr. Nichols’s opinion was on a form that required “yes” or “no” responses with no room to explain the

responses, however this questionnaire was submitted attached with an evaluation form describing Dr. Nichols’s consultation with Plaintiff. (Tr. at 42, 566-570.) The ALJ questioned the supportability of Dr. Nichols’s opinion based on

limited treatment history between Plaintiff and Dr. Nichols, and the fact that the opined limitations are very severe despite Dr. Nichols’s analysis that Plaintiff has adequate general knowledge, thought processes within normal limits, good

judgment and insight, could understand, remember or carry out short simple instructions, and can maintain socially appropriate behavior. (Tr. at 42, 566- 570.) The ALJ explicitly stated that Dr. Nichols’s opinion was inconsistent with

the record as a whole, specifically noting that “while claimant has presented with a depressed and/or anxious cognition/mood, as well as being distractible, memory . . . at other times the claimant has also presented with a normal mood,

a cooperative attitude, fair or good judgment/insight, average intellectual functioning, preserved cognition, and an adequate fund of knowledge . . .” (Tr. 42.) Notably, three days after his consultation with Dr. Nichols, Plaintiff

reported feeling “good” and “not anxious or depressed” after obtaining refills on his medication. (Tr. 510-511.) Although the ALJ did not explicitly use the words “support” or

“supportability” in her assessment of Dr. Nichols’s medical opinion, the use of such words is not required. Because the ALJ addressed both supportability and consistency in evaluating the persuasiveness or Dr. Nichols’s opinion, the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c were met. Moreover, the severe

limitations opined by Dr. Nichols contrast with numerous opinions and treatment notes that imply Plaintiff’s depression and mental competencies were adequately addressed in the ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s RFC. (Tr. at

37-43, 171-74, 178-79, 478, 504, 510, 512, 514, 519.) Thus, there is substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s decision to find Dr. Nichols’s opinion unpersbu. aTsirveea itnin ligg Phth oyfs tihciea enn Rtiurele r ecord.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have deferred to or gave heightened align with the purpose and text of the Social Security Act. (Doc. 10 at 32.) This

argument is contradictory to binding Eleventh Circuit precedent. Prior to 2017, ALJs were required to apply what was known as “the treating physician rule.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (2015). The treating

physician rule required ALJs to generally give more weight to medicIadl opinions from treating physicians unless there was good cause not to do so. . In 2017, the Commissioner eliminated the treating physician rule and directed ALJs to

“not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from [a claimant's] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). While this Court recognizes Plaintiff’s intent to preserve this issue for

appeal in anticipation of cases currently before the Supreme Court (Doc. 12 at 16), the Eleventh Circuit has, on numerous occasions, explicitly rejected the argument that the purpose and text of the Social Security ActS eimeHplayr nae nr eve. dS otco.

gSerac.n At dsmpeinci.,a Cl odmefmer'ernce to the opinions of treating physiScmiainths. v. So c. Sec. Admin., Comm'r , 38 F.4th 892, 898 (11th Cir. 2022); , No. 22-11407, 2023 WL 6938521, at *5 (11th Cir. Oct. 20, 2023)

(“[Claimant’s] argument that the text and structure of 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(B) creates a clear congressional directive to use the treating- to the Social Security Act.”); Matos v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-11764, 2022 WL 97144, at *4 (11th Cir. Jan. 10, 2022) (“[The] new regulatory scheme no longer requires the ALJ to either assign more weight to medical opinions from

a claimant's treating source or explain why good cause exists to disregard the treating source's opinion.”). In Harner, the Eleventh Circuit’s made clear that §404.1520c forbids ALJs from deferring or giving weight to any medical opinions, and that AL]s do not

err when they refuse to give amplified weight to the opinions of treating physicians. Harner, F.4th at 898. Accordingly, the AL] in Plaintiff's case did not

err in refusing to give heightened consideration to the opinions of Plaintiff's treating physicians. IV. Conclusion Upon review of the administrative record, and considering Ball’s

argument, this Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and is AFFIRMED. A separate order consistent with this opinion will be entered.

DONE and ORDERED on June 5, 2024. Xe United States Disthét Judge 215708 Page 20 of 20