Ball v. Hotel Markham, Inc.

120 F.2d 753, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 3544
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJune 9, 1941
DocketNo. 9741
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 120 F.2d 753 (Ball v. Hotel Markham, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ball v. Hotel Markham, Inc., 120 F.2d 753, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 3544 (5th Cir. 1941).

Opinions

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.

Appellants are holders of certificates of deposit1 for a large part, and speak for a substantial majority of, the common stock and the ten-year gold debentures of Hotel Markham, Inc., issued respectively in October and November, 1930, pursuant to the sale and purchase of Gulfport Hotel Corporation Properties on behalf of its bondholders, by a Bondholders’ Protective Committee, acting under an agreement made July 1, 1930, for the protection of the holders of First Mortgage Gold Bonds of Gulf-port Hotel Corporation, issued September 1, 1926.

Appellees are Delta National Bank, the present depository, Hotel Markham and the six individuals constituting at once, directors of the hotel and the protective committee.

The suit brought by Ball as plaintiff and joined in by Stone, Weddington and others as intervenors, was; to restrain the defendants from causing the hotel to issue ten-year refunding debentures in exchange for, and from taking up, the outstanding debentures for which plaintiffs held certificates; to terminate the control of the individual defendants over the stock and debentures and over the hotel; and to require the delivery to plaintiffs and intervenors, upon surrender of their certificates, of the stocks and bonds called for therein.

The claim was; that the objects and purposes of the protective agreement, under and in aid of which the certificates were issued had been fulfilled, the authority of the committee as trustees had come to an end, and plaintiffs were entitled to have and obtain full possession and control of their securities; that notwithstanding this, the members of the committee, for the purpose and with the effect of unreasonably renewing and extending its powers and control, were proposing over plaintiffs’ protest, to take up and refund plaintiffs’ bonds, and to continue to withhold from plaintiffs and the other holders of securities, their rightful control of their securities.

What makes the disputed issue in the case is the fact that neither the certificates, the 1930 protective agreement, nor the declaration of trust, issued after the purchase of the Gulfport Properties, contained any time limit; and that unless the term of the debentures fixes such a limit, such powers as the defendants have are exercisable without time limit until, either the objects and pur[755]*755poses of their trust have been fulfilled, or more than a reasonable time for their fulfillment has elapsed and it would he unreasonable to extend their powers further. It was the position of the plaintiffs therefore, that the objects and purposes of the protective agreement and of the declaration of trust had been fulfilled by the formation of the Markham Hotel Company, the issuance of its stocks and debentures and of the certificates of ownership therein, and the discharge by the committee of all of the indebtedness which it had created, under the terms of llie agreement, and the declaration of trust, the better to execute its powers.

It was the position of the defendants on the other hand that the purposes and objects of the protective agreement and the declaration of trust had not been fulfilled, that the broad and unlimited powers granted in the agreement and re-affirmed in the declaration of trust, authorized them to continue to hold and manage the properties until, in their discretion, they had effected a sale thereof for cash or other property, and that when this had been done and the proceeds distributed, and only then, would their power cease and authority terminate. Particular emphasis was laid in the answer of the defendants upon their belief that the purpose of the trust was to protect the small bondholders from the large ones and that should they permit the trust to end, small bondholders would be delivered to the mercy of large ones.

Much oral testimony was taken upon the objects and purposes of the plaintiffs in trying to obtain control of their properties and upon the objects and purposes of the committee in holding on to them. At the end of it all, the district judge rightly rejected the theory of defendants that they represented a part, the holders of a minority as against the holders of a majority of the bonds. Excluding most of the oral testimony, he pitched his judgment on the broad terms of the protective agreement and in effect held that in the absence of agreement by all the holders of all of the securities that the trust should be terminated, it was for the committee, in its discretion, and if that discretion was not abused, to determine when its objects and purposes bad been fulfilled, or whether they were incapable of fulfillment. Viewing the whole history of the operation, he concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in the action of the committee, and dismissed the bill.

What was established by the evidence was; that in the interest of the holders of the bonds of the Gulfport Hotel Corporation, a protective committee was formed, the agreement of July, 1930, was entered into and under and pursuant to that agreement, the Gulfport Hotel property was sold to and purchased by the committee. It thereupon, on August 7, 1930, issued a declaration of trust2 as to it, and on August 8th [756]*756wrote to the bondholders: “The committee is continuing the operation of the hotel for the account of bondholders- until it can work out some more advantageous disposition of the properties in your interest which the committee is diligently endeavoring to accomplish.” Thereafter, pursuant to the provisions of the declaration, it effected a reorganization by causing the Hotel Markham Corporation to be formed, with themselves as directors and stockholders, causing it to issue its debentures, and then arranging for the issuance of the depository certificates on which the suit is based. From that time until the present, the committee, as officers and directors of the corporation, have managed its affairs, have paid off the bonds they put on the property, over and above the amount of the original Gulfport bonds, and have paid a small amount of interest on the debentures called for in the certificates. The committee and the corporation are now proposing to take up and retire the certificate debentures and issue in lieu thereof, new ten-year debentures for the amount of the principal and interest thereof.

It is not disputed, that the property is not now worth this amount and that there is no prospect of its becoming so. Indeed, it is conceded that it is not worth the principal amount of the certificate debentures. The claim on the part of the defendants is that this is not an opportune time to terminate the trust and that a better time will come.

The sole question presented for decision here is whether the district judge was right in holding that the protective agreement entered into in May, 1930, for the purpose of protecting the Gulfport Corporation Bondholders, continues indefinitely so as to enable the committee to reform, extend, cancel or do what it pleases with the securities of Markham Incorporated, so long as it reasonably appears to the committee that what it is doing is in the interest of the certificate holders as a whole, or whether the agreement, applicable as it was, to the holders of Gulfport Corporation Bonds, has not been satisfied and become functus officio as to the Markham Company bonds and securities, when after ten years, the debentures held under the certificates, have matured, and all the debts and obligations created by the committee have been paid and discharged.

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Related

Hotel Markham, Inc. v. Ball
131 F.2d 424 (Fifth Circuit, 1942)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
120 F.2d 753, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 3544, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ball-v-hotel-markham-inc-ca5-1941.