Baldwin v. United States

732 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 106 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5369, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86557, 2010 WL 3172773
CourtDistrict Court, Northern Mariana Islands
DecidedApril 22, 2010
DocketCivil Action 09-0033
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 732 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (Baldwin v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, Northern Mariana Islands primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Baldwin v. United States, 732 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 106 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5369, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86557, 2010 WL 3172773 (nmid 2010).

Opinion

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SEAL EXHIBIT AND ORDERING EXHIBIT UNSEALED

ALEX R. MUNSON, Senior District Judge.

Now before the court is Plaintiff Mr. John K. Baldwin’s Motion to File Exhibits to Complaint Under Seal. Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the court finds this motion suitable for disposition without oral argument. LR 7.1a. Having carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs and the legal authority, and good cause appearing, the motion to seal is hereby DENIED. The exhibits attached to the complaint shall be unsealed.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a dispute over federal income taxes. Plaintiff Baldwin seeks a refund from the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) of over five million dollars in allegedly overpaid federal income taxes for the year 2002. (Comp. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff filed for the refund on February 20, 2009. (Id. ¶ 23.) The IRS failed to respond to the request within six months. (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff thereafter filed suit in this Court under 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a), seeking a refund of the overpaid taxes and a declaratory judgment that Plaintiff does not owe the IRS any additional taxes for the year 2002. Plaintiff attached the tax-related documents that he filed with the IRS to the complaint in this matter. (Id., Ex. A (“Claim for Refund”).) Plaintiff moved to seal the exhibit because it contained personal tax-related information. (Doc. # 2.) The request was granted. (Id. # 3.) The Court later granted Defendant the opportunity to file an opposition to the motion to seal. (Id. # 21.) Now before the Court is Defendant’s opposition to the motion to seal. The Court will discuss additional specific facts as required in the analysis.

ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Seal Legal Standard.

Generally, a party seeking to seal judicial records bears the burden to demonstrate “compelling reasons” to deny the public access to public records. Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir.2006). “This standard derives from the common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and docu *1144 ments, including judicial records and documents.’ ” Pintos v. Pacific Creditors Ass’n, 565 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir.2009) (“compelling reasons” standard applies to seal a credit report attached to a summary judgment motion). The “compelling reasons” must be “supported by specific factual findings ... [that] outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure.” Id.

However, a party must only demonstrate “good cause” to seal documents where either: (1) the documents are “private materials unearthed during discovery;” or (2) the documents are previously sealed discovery documents that are attached to nondispositive motions. Id., Private materials unearthed during discovery are not part of the judicial record and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), “a trial court may grant a protective order [sealing such documents] ‘to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). To demonstrate “good cause” to seal a document, “the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir.2002) (“good cause” standard applies to seal a confidential settlement agreement produced during discovery). “If a court finds particularized harm will result from disclosure of information to the public, then it balances the public and private interests to decide whether a protective order is necessary.” Id. at 1211 (trial court has broad discretion under Rule 26(c) “to issue ‘any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden.’ ”). The burden is lower for discovery-related documents because the “cognizable public interest in judicial records that underlies the ‘compelling reasons’ standard does not exist for documents produced between private litigants.” Pintos, 565 F.3d at 1115.

Similarly, where previously sealed discovery documents are attached to nondispositive motions, the party seeking protection must only show “good cause” to seal the documents. Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1213 (when “a party attaches a sealed discovery document to a nondispositive motion, the usual presumption of the public’s right of access is rebutted.”) The court reasoned that the public right of access does not necessarily apply to information that surfaces during pretrial discovery because much of it is “often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted).

II. The Compelling Reasons Standard Applies to the Attachment.

As an initial matter, the Court must determine which standard to apply to the exhibit attached to the complaint. The Court begins with the presumption that the “compelling reasons” standard applies because the exhibit is a part of the judicial record. In addition, “Rule 26(c) does not govern these documents because they are not ‘private materials unearthed during discovery’ but have become part of the judicial record.’” Pintos, 565 F.3d at 1116.

Next, Plaintiff argues that the Phillips exception to the presumption of access applies because the complaint is a nondispositive pleading. Defendant responds that the Phillips exception does not apply because the complaint is dispositive. A “dis-positive” motion or pleading is one that adjudicates issues on the merits. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (dispositive motions resolve disputes on the merits); Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135-36 (9th Cir.2003) (summary judgment is dispositive because *1145 it “adjudicates substantive rights and serves as a substitute for trial”); see also Black’s Dictionary, Dispositive (“Being a deciding factor; (of a fact or factor) bringing about a final determination”). A complaint is not a dispositive pleading. A complaint is a short and plain statement of the claims and the relief sought by an aggrieved party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). A complaint does not resolve any issues on the merits. Thus, the complaint is a nondispositive pleading.

However, the exception applied to nondispositive motion attachments does not apply here. In Phillips,

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732 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 106 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5369, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86557, 2010 WL 3172773, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/baldwin-v-united-states-nmid-2010.