Balderas v. Illinois Central Railroad Company

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedJanuary 8, 2021
Docket1:20-cv-01857
StatusUnknown

This text of Balderas v. Illinois Central Railroad Company (Balderas v. Illinois Central Railroad Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Balderas v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, (N.D. Ill. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION JUANITA BALDERAS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) No. 20 C 1857 ) v. ) Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cole ) ILLINOIS CENTRAL RR CO., et al, ) ) Defendants. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER INTRODUCTION This is another in a surprising and ever-growing number of discovery disputes in which counsel not only have opposing views on what should have been produced, but also on what even exists. In this case, discovery requests were made by the plaintiff, with responses from the defendants that, according to the plaintiff, were some two months late. At that point, it became a question of defendants claiming they produced all that was properly requested and that there was nothing else to produce. The plaintiff did not accept certain of the defendants’ objections or its claims that nothing else existed. The plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Defendants to Comply with their claimed discovery obligations. [Dkt. #47]. The motion is granted in part and denied in part. A. Generally, a party takes the word of the opponent that there has been compliance with discovery obligations as they relate to the existence of properly requested documents. Yet, from time to time courts supervising discovery are confronted by the claim that the production made is so scanty that “there must be more” that has not been produced or that relevant documents have been destroyed. But insistence that there must be more is not enough. Here, as always, merely “saying so doesn’t make it so.” United States v. 5443 Suffield Terrace, Skokie, Ill., 607 F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir.2010). See also Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 830 F. Appx 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2020); Illinois Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 770 (7th Cir. 2020); Madlock v.

WEC Energy Group, Inc., 885 F.3d 465, 473 (7th Cir. 2018); Hubbard v. Potter, 247 F.R.D. 27, 29 (D.D.C. 2008). And “speculation can[not] be employed as a substitute for proof.” United States v. Landry, 257 F.2d 425, 431 (7th Cir. 1958). Accord In re Cohen, 507 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2007); Louth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2005); Bos. v. Club Corp USA, Inc., 2019 WL 1873293, at *8 (C.D. Cal. 2019); Kendle v. Whig Enterprises, LLC, 2016 WL 898569, at *4 (S.D. Ohio 2016). So too in a discovery context. Courts will not accept mere suspicion or speculation that “there must be more.” Hunches don’t count. Harris v. Koenig, 271 F.R.D. 356, 370 (D.D.C. 2010); Steffan v. Cook County Sheriff, 2020 WL 7353411, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2020). If the rule were otherwise,

discovery – long and tedious as it often is – would never end. Thus, courts require that the moving party make out a case for further discovery by showing that it can reasonably be deduced that other documents exist, or may have at the time of receipt of the document request. A court cannot compel plaintiff to produce that which does not exist. Ideally, most discovery disputes are resolved within the confines of Local Rule 37.2. But unfortunately, here, there are disputes as to whether there were even proper “meet and confers,” and there has been disagreement on what has been requested, or produced, or what might exist. The resolution of discovery disputes is committed to the court's extremely broad discretion. Kuttner v.

Zaruba, 819 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 2016). Since an abuse of discretion occurs when no reasonable 2 person could take the view of the district court, U.S. v. Re, 401 F.3d 828, 832 (7th Cir. 2005), there are no hard and fast rules governing discovery decisions. Indeed, two decision-makers—on virtually identical facts—can arrive at opposite conclusions, both of which can constitute appropriate exercises of discretion. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 891 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'd,

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 289-290 (1987). Accord Mejia v. Cook County, Ill., 650 F.3d 631, 635 (7th Cir. 2011). Cf. United States v. Bullion, 466 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2006)(Posner, J.) (“The striking of a balance of uncertainties can rarely be deemed unreasonable....”); Elliot v. Mission Trust Services, LLC, 2015 WL 1567901, 4 (N.D. Ill. 2015). As a result, a party that inflexibly maintains its position could insist that it was “right,” but find itself on the losing side when the matter comes before a court. Given a court's vast discretion in overseeing discovery, a court could choose to accept the other side's “right” position while rejecting the contrary position of the opposing counsel. A negotiated outcome between counsel is generally more likely to give both sides a mutually satisfactory resolution. Unfortunately that

course is often not followed, and resolution of the dispute must come from the court. Here are the rulings. B. Interrogatory responses. Defendant IC claims that it has now provided interrogatory responses to plaintiff. In addition, defendants Chasko and Salamanca have stated they have no additional information and have verified their responses under penalty of perjury. Accordingly, this part of the motion is moot. ESI searches. At this late date, it seems that essentially nothing has been done in regard

to ESI searches. Unfortunately, the plaintiff’s Motion to Compel does not provide sufficient 3 information on which to make a ruling. The Motion complains that defendants rejected the search terms that were suggested, but does not tell us what those terms were or why they were rejected. We do know that in rejecting the plaintiff’s search terms defendants did not provide alternative terms, but have represented that there are no responsive documents. And, despite the parties’

representations of compliance with Local Rule 37.2, a compromise as to eleven document requests – Nos. 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 35, 36, and 40 – have not been reached. Document request 6 – seeks complete employee and/or personnel files for the individual defendants, Erick Chasko and Marcos Salamanca, and for similarly-situated or managerial employees, Jake Bruns, Dave Cook, Chris Davis, Andrew Fronce, Aaron Graziano, Chuck Hanks, Todd Hunt, Milton Patterson, Manny Salazar, Eli Soto, Rick Vallejo, and Don Stojakovich. Defendants have objected and have raised ineffectual, “boilerplate” objections, such as unduly burdensome, irrelevant, etc. But, boilerplate objections are tantamount to making no objection at all.

See authorities and discussion in Kelly v. Board of Ed., 2012 WL 1108135, 2-3 (N.D.Ill. 2012). Accordingly, they are overruled, and the documents sought will be provided within 14 days. This is targeted discovery. Cf. Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. of Coltec Indus., 328 F.3d 309, 320 (7th Cir. 2003). Records of similarly situated and managerial employees are relevant. See McCowan v. Educ. Servs.

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Related

McCleskey v. Kemp
481 U.S. 279 (Supreme Court, 1987)
United States v. 5443 Suffield Terrace, Skokie, Ill.
607 F.3d 504 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Mejia v. Cook County, Ill.
650 F.3d 631 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Kenneth Landry
257 F.2d 425 (Seventh Circuit, 1958)
United States v. Randall Re and Anthony Calabrese
401 F.3d 828 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)
Chester A. Lauth v. Daniel L. McCollum
424 F.3d 631 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)
United States v. Bullion, James D.
466 F.3d 574 (Seventh Circuit, 2006)
Susan Kuttner v. John Zaruba
819 F.3d 970 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Rosemary Madlock v. WEC Energy Group, Inc.
885 F.3d 465 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)
Illinois Republican Party v. J. B. Pritzker
973 F.3d 760 (Seventh Circuit, 2020)
Chavez v. Daimlerchrysler Corp.
206 F.R.D. 615 (S.D. Indiana, 2002)
Hubbard v. Potter
247 F.R.D. 27 (District of Columbia, 2008)
Harris v. Koenig
271 F.R.D. 356 (District of Columbia, 2010)

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Bluebook (online)
Balderas v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/balderas-v-illinois-central-railroad-company-ilnd-2021.