BALCACER v. NOGAN

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedJanuary 26, 2022
Docket2:19-cv-22029
StatusUnknown

This text of BALCACER v. NOGAN (BALCACER v. NOGAN) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
BALCACER v. NOGAN, (D.N.J. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY _________________________________________ YOHAN BALCACER, : : Petitioner, : Civ. No. 19-22029 (KM) : v. : : PATRICK NOGAN, : MEMORANDUM AND ORDER : Respondent. : _________________________________________ :

Pro se Petitioner Yohan Balcacer has filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (DE 6.) This Petition, like his first, seeks to challenge a 2014 state conviction for possession of imitation controlled dangerous substances with the intent to distribute and eluding. (Id. at 1.) Petitioner was sentenced to four years with two years of parole ineligibility on the possession charge, to be served consecutively to eight years of imprisonment with four years of parole ineligibility on the eluding charge. (DE 6-5 at 2.)1 The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction. (DE 6-2.) The New Jersey Supreme Court then denied certification. (DE 6-3.) Petitioner’s trial judge denied Petitioner’s first petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). (DE 6-4 (App. Div. Op.); 6-6 (PCR brief).) The New Jersey Supreme Court again denied certification. State v. Balcacer, 240 N.J. 162, 220 A.3d 1005 (2019). Shortly thereafter, Petitioner filed his first habeas petition in this Court. In that petition, Petitioner cited his state court filings without elaborating upon his stated grounds for relief. I dismissed that petition, informing Petitioner that he had failed to comply with the rules governing habeas procedures because the petitions did not “specify all grounds available for relief” or “state the facts supporting each ground.” Rule 2(c), 4; 28 U.S.C. § 2254. As I stated in a subsequent order (DE 5), Petitioner’s next filing (DE 4), a letter, did not fix the issues with his petition. Petitioner’s newest filing (DE 6) remains ambiguous, asserting (as before) that the state court filings, including his PCR petition, “explain everything.” (DE 6 at 6). They do not. However, I will set forth what claims I can glean from Petitioner’s exhibits, grant Petitioner a chance to supplement or correct that interpretation, and order Respondent to answer or move to dismiss.

1 Petitioner was released from prison in 2020. (DE 8.) I will begin with the grounds which Petitioner has explicitly stated. First, Point One of Petitioner’s PCR brief alleges that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a timely notice of alibi and failing to elicit a complete alibi, and that appellate counsel on his direct appeal was ineffective for failing to pursue trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. (DE 6-6 at 12.) This is mentioned in this Petition’s Ground One, which alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present Petitioner’s alibi. (DE 6 at 6.) The claim was rejected by state courts. (DE 6-5 at 7; DE 6-4.) Second, Point Two of Petitioner’s PCR brief alleges that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a Wade hearing to challenge the eyewitness identification of Petitioner. (DE 6-6 at 22.) Like the alibi argument, this is also mentioned in the newest Petition’s Ground One. (DE 6 at 6.) This claim was also rejected by the Appellate Division. (DE 6-5 at 8.) Grounds Two through Four are more enigmatic. They simply cite Petitioner’s PCR brief and the Appellate Division opinion without any elaboration. (DE 6 at 8-11.) From those documents, I can discern two more claims. The first (Petitioner’s third overall) comes from Petitioner’s third point in his PCR appeal, that he was “coerced into forgoing his testimony due to trial counsel’s ineffective representation.” (DE 6-5 at 6.) The second (Petitioner’s fourth overall) derives from Petitioner’s fourth point in the same appeal: that the “cumulation of errors by trial counsel resulted in a fundamentally unfair process.” (Id.) I take this to reference the prior grounds and encompass additional allegations contained in Petitioner’s PCR certification: that his trial attorney failed to meet with Petitioner to discuss trial strategy and that Petitioner did not have access to full discovery. (DE 6-6 at 11.) It is unclear to what extent Petitioner actively pursued these claims in state court, or whether any state addressed these claims. Each claim passes muster under the required habeas screening and may proceed. However, the stated grounds for relief must be made explicit because any second or successive habeas petition under § 2254 must be dismissed unless certain very specific and rare circumstances (not clearly present here) exist. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244. “As a result of the AEDPA’s two-strike rule, it is essential that habeas petitioners include in their first petition all potential claims for which they might desire to seek review and relief.” Mason v. Myers, 208 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2000). In other words, absent rare exceptions, Petitioner will be limited to the contents of this Petition, as I have interpreted them. Should Petitioner believe that I have mischaracterized or missed an intended ground for relief, he will have 30 days to supplement his Petition. If Petitioner does not send any response, he will be bound by his current petition, as I have interpreted it. When that 30 day deadline has passed, with or without a response, Repondent will have 45 days to file an answer or motion to dismiss.

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BALCACER v. NOGAN, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/balcacer-v-nogan-njd-2022.