Bakula v. Bakula

243 N.W. 703, 186 Minn. 488, 1932 Minn. LEXIS 921
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedJuly 8, 1932
DocketNo. 28,893.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 243 N.W. 703 (Bakula v. Bakula) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bakula v. Bakula, 243 N.W. 703, 186 Minn. 488, 1932 Minn. LEXIS 921 (Mich. 1932).

Opinion

Per Curiam.

Plaintiff (appellant) and defendant (respondent) are husband and wife. Prior to May, 1922, plaintiff brought an action against defendant for absolute divorce. • As a result of the trial of that cause defendant on her cross-bill was granted a decree of separation from bed and board forever. In December, 1931, plaintiff sought a revocation of that decree on a petition signed by himself alone. *489 A motion to dismiss the proceedings was granted, and the petition of plaintiff Avas denied. From the order so made this appeal Avas taken.

The petition was not supported by any affidavits, nor did it set forth any Aralid ground for revocation. The notice of motion accompanying the petition stated:

“The grounds for said plaintiffs motion, among others, are: Said decree of said separation from bed and board has outlived its usefulness ■ and is against public policy, moreover injurious to the parties — parents and their children.”

The mere statement of counsel for plaintiff in his notice of , motion Avas by no means sufficient.

G. S. 1923 (2 Mason, 1927) § 8615, provides the manner in which a decree of separation may be revoked. It reads as follows:

“Upon a joint application of the parties, and satisfactory proof of their reconciliation, the court granting any decree of separation may revoke the same, under such regulations and restrictions as it shall prescribe.”

The petition is not a joint one. There has been no reconciliation; all efforts to that end have been without avail.

A decree for separation is not a bar to an action for absolute divorce on proper grounds. In Gustafson v. Gustafson, 178 Minn. 1, 7, 226 N. W. 412, 414, it is stated:

“While a decree of separation may by its terms be 'forever/ it is subject to termination by consent of the parties and the aid of the court. It suspends but does not destroy the marriage status. By vacation of the decree, as provided by statute " * * tbe matrimonial status is restored in all its original scope.”

The motion to dismiss the proceedings and to deny the petition Avas properly granted.

Order affirmed.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
243 N.W. 703, 186 Minn. 488, 1932 Minn. LEXIS 921, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bakula-v-bakula-minn-1932.