Bakri v. Venture Mfg Company
Opinion
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 File Name: 07a0023p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
X
Plaintiff-Appellant, -
REBECCA A. BAKRI, - - -
No. 05-4532
v.
, >
VENTURE MFG. COMPANY, -
Defendant-Appellee. -
N
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Dayton. No. 03-00405—Thomas M. Rose, District Judge.
Argued: November 1, 2006
Decided and Filed: January 17, 2007 Before: MERRITT and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges; HEYBURN, Chief District Judge.*
COUNSEL
ARGUED: William J. O’Malley, O’MALLEY & OGLESBEE, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. R. Gary Winters, McCASLIN, IMBUS & McCASLIN, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: William J. O’Malley, O’MALLEY & OGLESBEE, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. R. Gary Winters, Ian R. Smith, McCASLIN, IMBUS & McCASLIN, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee.
OPINION
MERRITT, Circuit Judge. The question in this ERISA case arising from a company’s deferred compensation plan is whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendant company by holding that the plaintiff, Rebecca Bakri, a former employee,1 was a participant in a “top hat” deferred compensation plan as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2) which
*
The Honorable John Heyburn II, Chief United States District Judge for the Western District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
1 Section 1051 of ERISA provides that the various protections for plans provided by ERISA do not apply to:
(2) A plan which is unfunded and is maintained by an employer primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select group of management or highly compensated employees . . . .
Such plans, therefore, fall outside the “coverage” of ERISA and are generally referred to as “top hat” plans.
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exempts such plans from the vesting or nonforfeitability requirements of § 1053. We do not believe that the plan in question qualifies as a “top hat” plan because it does not meet the “selectivity” requirements of § 1051(2). Therefore, we reverse the judgment below and remand for further proceedings.
The purpose of the “top hat” exception to ERISA coverage has been characterized by the Department of Labor as a recognition by Congress “that certain individuals, by virtue of their positions or compensation level, have the ability to affect or substantially influence, through negotiations or otherwise, the design and operation of their deferred compensation plan . . . and would, therefore, not need the substantive rights and protections of” ERISA. DOL, Office of Pension & Welfare Benefit Programs, Opinion 90-14A, 1990 WL 123933 at *1 (May 8, 1990). The Second Circuit has said that such “top hat” plans were “excluded from ERISA’s vesting, funding, and fiduciary responsibility requirements because Congress deemed top-level management, unlike most employees, to be capable of protecting their own pension expectations.” Gallione v. Flaherty, 70 F.3d 724, 727 (2d Cir. 1995). Accord Spacek v. Maritime Ass’n, 134 F.3d 283, 289, 297 n.12 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Top hat” participants should be “high-ranking management personnel” who “are therefore better equipped than ordinary pension plan participants to effectively protect their interests.”); Carrabba v. Randalls Food Markets, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 468, 477 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
In determining whether a plan qualifies as a top hat plan, we consider both qualitative and quantitative factors, including (1) the percentage of the total workforce invited to join the plan (quantitative), (2) the nature of their employment duties (qualitative), (3) the compensation disparity between top hat plan members and non-members (qualitative), and (4) the actual language of the plan agreement (qualitative). See Carrabba, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 479. The Carraba opinion concludes that “the ‘select group’ test is whether the members of the group have positions with the employer of such influence that they can protect their retirement and deferred compensation expectations by direct negotiations with the employer.” Id. at 478. The court then went on to say:
Of course, as a group, to the extent that they could act cohesively, they undoubtedly could influence the design and operation of the NSP [the deferred compensation plan], but that would be true of any group of employees within a company.
Id.
In this case we must accept as true the affidavit of Rebecca Bakri filed in opposition to the summary judgment motion of the company. Ms. Bakri’s affidavit claims that she was an excellent employee for 20 years who believed she was underpaid because she was a woman. When she sought a pay raise, the company president, Mr. Hollis, told her, “Women do not need to make as much as a man” and directed her to “destroy evidence relevant to [a similar ERISA] . . . case in federal court.” The affidavit further alleges the following relevant facts:
5. When my employment ended, Venture decided to keep all of the money in my deferred compensation plan. The deferred comp plan was created in 1992. It was explained to me that the plan was being created so that long term loyal salaried employees would have a retirement plan. The hourly employees at Venture already had a separate company funded retirement plan. The terms and conditions of the deferred comp plan that I participate in were the same as the plans created for the other salaried participants, except the amount contributed by Venture was different for each employee. 6. Venture Mfg. Company contributed regularly to the initial deferred compensation plan and then to the subsequent deferred compensation plan. Venture contributed roughly $5,500 per year for ten years (1993 through 2002). When I was terminated,
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