Bakhtiari v. Nissan North America, Inc.

Opinion

SHADROO BAKHTIARI, et al., Case No. 25-cv-02521-JD

Plaintiffs, ORDER RE REMAND v.

NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., et al., Defendants.

Plaintiffs Shadroo Bakhtiari and Kirk Alan Scott originally filed this lawsuit in Alameda County Superior Court in connection with an allegedly defective car they purchased that was manufactured and sold by defendants Nissan North America, Inc. (Nissan NA) and East Bay Infiniti, Inc., doing business as Dublin Nissan. See generally Dkt. No. 1-1. They allege three claims against Nissan NA under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1790 et seq., and a single claim for negligent repair against Dublin Nissan. See id. at ECF 10- 15. Nissan NA removed the action to this court on diversity grounds. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiffs have asked for the case to be remanded. Dkt. No. 16. The remand motion is suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), and the hearing set for August 21, 2025, is vacated. The Court has written extensively on the standards governing removal, and that discussion is incorporated herein. See California v. AbbVie, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 3d 1176, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Wondeh v. Change Healthcare Prac. Mgmt. Sols., Inc., No. 19-cv-07824-JD, 2020 WL 5630268, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2020). The parties’ familiarity with the record is assumed. Remand is denied. Plaintiffs contend that, because defendant Dublin Nissan has its principal place of business No. 16 at 4-8. Nissan NA avers that Dublin Nissan is a “sham defendant” that is properly disregarded for purposes of assessing diversity jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 21 at 3-8. The Court has extensively discussed fraudulent joinder in prior orders, and the governing standards are incorporated herein. See, e.g., Healy v. FCA US LLC, No. 20-cv-01802-DJ, 2020 WL 3868799, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2020). Nissan NA has overcome the “general presumption against finding fraudulent joinder,” because there is no “possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action” against Dublin Nissan. Id. (cleaned up) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court of California recently stated that “tort recovery for breach of a contract duty is generally barred” unless (1) “the defendant’s injury-causing conduct violated a duty that is independent of the duties and rights assumed by the parties when they entered the contract”; and (2) “defendant’s conduct must have caused injury to persons or property that was not reasonably contemplated by the parties when the contract was formed.” Rattagan v. Uber Techs., Inc., 17 Cal. 5th 1, 20-21 (2024). The sole claim alleged against Dublin Nissan is one for negligent repair, and the only plausible duty Dublin Nissan could have owed to plaintiffs in this regard was one that arose from plaintiffs’ warranty or their entering into a contract for the repair of the vehicle. See also Dkt. No. 1-1 at ECF 8 (“These causes of action arise out of warranty and repair obligations.”). In light of Rattagan and the precedents on which it relies, there is no possibility a state court would find the complaint, as drafted, states a claim against Dublin Nissan, and it is properly disregarded for diversity purposes. Plaintiffs say that Nissan NA’s removal was untimely, Dkt. No. 16 at 3-4, but the objection is too little too late. Congress has provided that procedural objections to removal “must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Northwest Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1995). Nissan NA filed its notice of removal on March 13, 2025, Dkt. No. 1, and plaintiffs did not raise timeliness as a removal defect until their June 30, 2025 motion, Dkt. No. 16. Consequently, Nissan NA’s alleged untimeliness is not a basis for remand. Plaintiffs finally contend that Nissan NA did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the 1 not well taken. “The amount in controversy is simply an estimate of the total amount in dispute, 2 nota prospective assessment of defendant’s liability.” Lewis v. Verizon Commce’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 3 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs squarely alleged the vehicle’s purchase price was $68.992.56, 4 and in the prayer for relief, the complaint requested “recission of the purchase contract and 5 restitution of all monies expended,” “[a] civil penalty in the amount of two times Plaintiffs’ actual 6 damages,” and “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” Dkt. No. 1-1 at ECF 9, 15. Just based off 7 the alleged purchase price and civil penalties, the amount at stake in this case is over $200,000, 8 “which is comfortably above the diversity requirement.” Boone v. FCA US LLC, No. 21-cv- 9 01591-JD, 2021 WL 5331440, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2021); see also Chavez v. JPMorgan 10 Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 417 (9th Cir. 2018) (amount in controversy includes all remedies 11 provided by law, “whatever the likelihood that [plaintiffs] will actually recover them’). That is 12 the case without considering the additional damages the complaint seeks or the $20,000 in 13 attorney’s fees that counsel estimated in their August 2024 case management statement. See Dkt. 14 No. 21-5 at 7. “[Plaintiffs] have not shown to a legal certainty that they will recover less than the 3 15 $75,000 threshold amount.” Boone, 2021 WL 5331440, at *2 (citing Guglielmino v. McKee a 16 Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2007)). IT IS SO ORDERED. Datea: August 15, 2025 19 20 JAM ONATO 21 Unit@fi States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28