Baker v. State of Washington Department of Corrections

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: February 6, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-05893
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT TACOMA 9 JAMALL S. BAKER, CASE NO. 3:24-CV-5893-JLR-DWC 10 Plaintiff, v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 11 STATE OF WASHINGTON Noting Date: February 27, 2025 12 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 The District Court referred this action to United States Magistrate Judge David W. 15 Christel. Plaintiff Jamall S. Baker, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights 16 complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Having reviewed and screened Plaintiff’s Amended 17 Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §1915A, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth 18 Amendment claim against Defendant Renee Pyburn and has failed to allege an Americans with 19 Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim against the Washington State Department of Corrections 20 (“DOC”). Plaintiff has also not alleged any claims against Defendant Tim Lang. As Plaintiff has 21 not stated a federal claim, the undersigned recommends the Court decline supplemental 22 jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the 23 Amended Complaint be dismissed and this case be closed. 24 1 I. Background 2 In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff, an inmate housed at the Monroe Correctional 3 Complex -SOU, alleges Defendants DOC, Renee Pyburn, and Tim Lang failed to provide 4 Plaintiff with the proper medical care and accommodations for his Anoxic Brain Injury. See Dkt.

5 9. Plaintiff contends Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights and his rights under the 6 ADA. Id. He also alleges a state law tort claim. Id. 7 II. Discussion 8 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Court is required to screen 9 complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or 10 employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must “dismiss the 11 complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint: (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 12 state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant 13 who is immune from such relief.” Id. at (b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Barren v. Harrington, 14 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998).

15 A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Need 16 First, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Pyburn acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s 17 serious medical need. Dkt. 9 at 4-6. Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners 18 constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 19 (1976) (internal citation omitted); see Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992). An Eighth 20 Amendment medical claim has two elements: (1) “the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need 21 and [(2)] the nature of the defendant’s response to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 22 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 23 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

24 1 A medical need is serious “if the failure to treat the prisoner’s condition could result in 2 further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin, 974 3 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). “The existence of an injury that a reasonable 4 doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a

5 medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of 6 chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for 7 medical treatment.” Id. at 1059-1060. 8 If a plaintiff shows he suffered from a serious medical need, he must then show the 9 prison officials responded to the need with deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 10 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical need requires “a purposeful act or failure 11 to act on the part of the defendant.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. In other words, “[a] defendant 12 must purposefully ignore or fail to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need.” Id. A 13 prison official, accordingly, will not be found deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious 14 medical needs “unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or

15 safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the 16 inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the 17 inference.” Id. 18 “Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition, without more, does not 19 violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.” Hutchinson, 838 F.2d at 394. The Court also 20 recognizes differences of opinion between a prisoner and prison medical staff or between 21 medical professionals regarding the proper course of treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 22 claim. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). “[T]o prevail on a claim 23 involving choices between alternative courses of treatment, a prisoner must show that the chosen

24 1 course of treatment ‘was medically unacceptable under the circumstances,’ and was chosen ‘in 2 conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [the prisoner’s] health.’” Id. (citing Jackson v. 3 McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996)). 4 Here, Plaintiff alleges he requested medical care for his brain injury. Dkt. 9. He states

5 Defendant Pyburn notified him that the DOC does not treat or have a protocol to treat individuals 6 with brain injuries. Id. at 5. Plaintiff contends Defendant Pyburn agreed to treat Plaintiff’s 7 impulse control and emotional regulation issues with Wellbutrin. Id. However, “a week or so 8 later,” Defendant Pyburn notified Plaintiff that, based on DOC protocols, she could not prescribe 9 Wellbutrin. Id. at 6. Defendant Pyburn then prescribed a blood pressure medication that might 10 help Plaintiff concentrate. Id. Plaintiff felt the medication interfered with his ability to study and 11 stopped taking it. Id. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Pyburn failed to respond to his medical 12 kites. Id. 13 Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a deliberate indifference claim. The allegations show 14 Defendant Pyburn provided Plaintiff with treatment options and, when she could not provide him with a specific medication, she prescribed an alternative medication. Plaintiff did not like the 15 side effects of the medication and stopped taking it. At most, Plaintiff seems to disagree with 16 Defendant Pybrun’s treatment decisions, which is insufficient to state a deliberate indifference 17 claim. And, while Plaintiff states Defendant Pyburn did not respond to his medical kites, he has 18 not alleged she received the kites and acted with deliberate indifference in failing to respond to 19 the medical kites. In sum, there are no allegations in the Amended Complaint that show 20 Defendant Pyburn was acting with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. 21 Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Pyburn. 22 23 24 1 B. ADA Violation 2 Second, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his rights under the ADA. See Dkt. 9. “To 3 state a claim of disability discrimination under Title II of the ADA, the plaintiff must allege four 4 elements: (1) the plaintiff is an individual with a disability, (2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified

5 to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities, 6 (3) the plaintiff was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public 7 entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public 8 entity, and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the 9 plaintiff’s disability.” Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.2002); Duvall v. Cnty. of 10 Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on denial of reh'g (Oct. 11, 2001); 42 11 U.S.C. § 12132. 12 Plaintiff alleges the DOC violated the ADA because it denied him treatment for his 13 disability. Dkt. 9 at 7.1 “The ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability, not inadequate treatment for disability.” Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010) 14 (citing Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Act would not be violated 15 by a prison’s simply failing to attend to the medical needs of its disabled prisoners .... The ADA 16 does not create a remedy for medical malpractice.”)). “The Ninth Circuit has held it is not 17 discrimination under the ADA to deny treatment inextricably linked to a plaintiff’s disability 18 because a plaintiff is not ‘otherwise qualified’ to receive those services.” Evans v. City of San 19 Diego, 2024 WL 3907046, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2024); see O’Guinn v. Nev. Dep’t of Corr., 20 21 1 The Court notes that Plaintiff references he is entitled to receive rehabilitation and education classes. Dkt. 22 9 at 7. However, Plaintiff has not provided any allegations to support these bare assertions despite being given notice of the deficiencies. Additionally, the Amended Complaint references that Plaintiff is a college student. See id. 23 at 6. Therefore, the Amended Complaint belies Plaintiff’s contention that he has been denied education classes. Furthermore, the basis of Plaintiff’s ADA claim is the DOC’s failure to treat his disability (Anoxic Brain Injury), not 24 the lack of access to rehabilitation and education classes. 1 468 Fed. App’x. 651, 653 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding the ADA does not apply to claims that a 2 detainee “was discriminatorily denied mental health treatment because of his mental health 3 disability”). Plaintiff claims he was discriminatorily denied treatment for his brain injury because 4 the DOC does not treat brain injuries. In essence, Plaintiff is alleging he is being denied

5 treatment for his disability because of his disability. He only needs the treatment because he is 6 disabled. As such, Plaintiff has failed to state an ADA claim. See O'Guinn, 468 F. App’x at 653. 7 C. Personal Participation 8 Plaintiff names Tim Lang as a defendant. Dkt. 9. However, in the Complaint, Plaintiff 9 does not explain what actions Defendant Lang took or failed to take which violated his rights. 10 Rather, Plaintiff appears to sue Defendant Lang because he is the Secretary of the DOC. 11 Defendant Lang cannot be held liable under a theory of supervisory liability under § 1983. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 385-90 (a § 1983 suit cannot be based on vicarious liability alone, but must 12 allege the defendant’s own conduct violated the plaintiff’s civil rights); Jones v. Community 13 Development Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (vague and mere conclusory allegations 14 unsupported by facts are not sufficient to state section 1983 claims). Therefore, Plaintiff has 15 failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to Defendant Lang. 16 D. State Law Claim – Negligence 17 Plaintiff also asserts a state law claim for the tort of negligence against Defendant 18 Pyburn. Dkt. 8 at 8-9. A district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law 19 claims arising from the same set of operative facts that supports a federal claim. See Carlsbad 20 Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639–40 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(a), (c)); 21 Artis v. District of Columbia, 583 U.S. 71 (2018). However, “[w]hen district courts dismiss all 22 claims independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, they ordinarily dismiss as 23 well all related state claims.” Artis, 583 U.S. at 74. See also Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 24 1 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that a district court may, but need not, decide sua 2 sponte whether to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) 3 once all federal law claims have been dismissed). 4 As stated above, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state any federal claim and

5 recommends dismissal of those claims. The remaining claim is based solely in state law, and the 6 state courts will therefore be more familiar with the law governing Plaintiff’s negligence claim. 7 As there are no federal claims remaining, the Court finds it appropriate to decline the exercise of 8 supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim. 9 III. Leave to Amend 10 The Ninth Circuit has “established that a pro se litigant bringing a civil rights suit must 11 have an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome deficiencies unless it is clear that they 12 cannot be overcome by amendment.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1987). 13 The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show Defendants are liable under 14 §1983 or the ADA. The Court provided Plaintiff with notice of the deficiencies in his claims. See

15 Dkt. 6. As Plaintiff has had an opportunity to amend his complaint and has been instructed 16 regarding the deficiencies of all his claims, the Court recommends Plaintiff not be again given 17 leave to amend. See Swearington v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 624 F. App’x 956, 959 18 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without leave 19 to amend because the plaintiff did not cure the complaint’s deficiencies despite the district 20 court’s specific instructions about how to do so); see also Fid. Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan 21 Bank of San Francisco, 792 F.2d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The district court’s discretion to 22 deny leave to amend is particularly broad where the court has already given the plaintiff an 23 opportunity to amend his complaint.”).

24 1 IV. Conclusion 2 For the above stated reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth 3 Amendment claim against Defendant Pyburn and has failed to allege an ADA claim against the 4 DOC. Plaintiff has also failed to allege a claim against Defendant Lang. No federal claims

5 remain in this case; therefore, the undersigned recommends the Court decline supplemental 6 jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim. Further, as Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 7 which relief can be granted, the Court finds this dismissal constitutes a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1915(g). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the Amended Complaint be dismissed and 9 this case be closed. 10 Objections to this Report and Recommendation, if any, should be filed with the Clerk and 11 served upon all parties to this suit not later than fourteen (14) days from the date on which this 12 Report and Recommendation is signed. Failure to file objections within the specified time may 13 affect your right to appeal. Objections should be noted for consideration on the District Judge’s 14 motions calendar fourteen (14) days from the date they are filed. Responses to objections may

15 be filed by the day before the noting date. If no timely objections are filed, the matter will be 16 ready for consideration by the District Judge on February 27, 2025. 17 Dated this 6th day of February, 2025. 18 A 19 David W. Christel United States Magistrate Judge 20 21 22 23 24