Baker v. Etsinger

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedMay 13, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-01478
StatusUnknown

This text of Baker v. Etsinger (Baker v. Etsinger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Baker v. Etsinger, (E.D. Wis. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ RAYMAN BAKER,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 24-cv-1478-pp

SGT. ETSINGER, et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2), SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A AND PROVIDING PLAINTIFF OPPORTUNITY TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Rayman Baker, who is incarcerated at Oshkosh Correctional Institution and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants violated his rights under federal and state law. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prison trust account. Id. On November 19, 2024, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $102.93. Dkt. No. 5. The court received that fee on January 21, 2025. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay the remainder of the filing

fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated person raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, “accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720

(citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The complaint names as defendants the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC); Sergeant Etsinger; Correctional Officer Stancheck; Unit Manager Mohnen; and John or Jane Doe defendants who worked as a Shift Supervisor, Health Services Unit (HSU) Supervisor and Q Building Supervisor at Oshkosh. Dkt. No. 1 at 1.

The plaintiff alleges that on August 13, 2024, he awoke “to a feeling of complete helplessness.” Id. at 3. He says he asked “all defendants” for aid, but they “responded with contempt, and did not render any aide [sic] whatsoever.” Id. He alleges that he “has multiple health related problems including but not limited to carple [sic] tunnel, asthma, arthritis and a torn ACL.” Id. He says the DOC is required to provide “reasonable accom[m]odations” to him because he is a “disabled person,” but that he did not receive any accommodation. Id. The plaintiff asserts that the defendants “failed to render aide [sic] due to

negligent training and supervision.” Id. at 2. He alleges that Unit Manager Mohnen “failed to manage unit operations appropriately due to negligent training and supervision.” Id. He asserts that “[a]ll defendants acted carelessly and recklessly to the safety and ultimate security of the institution in violation of [the plaintiff’s] constitutional and universal human rights and Wisconsin statutes.” Id. at 3. He seeks damages for the alleged violations of federal and state law. Id. at 4. C. Analysis

The complaint does not state a claim against any defendant. To state a claim under §1983, a complaint must do more than assert a cause of action. It also must allege facts describing what each defendant did—or did not do—that violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. It is not enough for the plaintiff to say that the defendants violated his rights; he must describe “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556). Nor is it enough for him to allege that “all defendants” violated his rights. See Grieveson v.

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Bluebook (online)
Baker v. Etsinger, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/baker-v-etsinger-wied-2025.