Baker v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co.

District Court, N.D. New York·Decided September 12, 2024·No. 1:16-cv-00917·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MICHELE BAKER, et al., Plaintiffs, V. 1:16-CV-917 (LEK/DJS) SAINT-GOBAIN PERFORMANCE PLASTICS CORP., et al., Defendants.

DANIEL J. STEWART United States Magistrate Judge MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER This case involves a dispute concerning the contamination of the drinking water in Hoosick Falls, New York by perfluorooctanoic acid, a chemical commonly referred to as PFOA. Following multiple settlement agreements with certain Defendants, DuPont is the only remaining Defendant. Plaintiffs allege that DuPont is liable for

producing the PFOA that ultimately contaminated the water supply in Hoosick Falls. Dkt. No. 335, Am. Compl. at {fj 1, 220-221. To bolster those allegations, Plaintiffs offer the testtmony of Dr. Michael Hickner. Presently before the Court is DuPont’s Motion to exclude Dr. Hickner’s testimony on the grounds that Dr. Hickner’s opinions are unscientific and would not aid the jury. Dkt. No. 400-5, Def.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 9-

19. Plaintiffs oppose the Motion, and DuPont has filed a reply. Dkt. No. 415, Pl. Opp., 425, & 430-2. This Court heard oral argument on this Motion, together with other motions to exclude expert testimony on September 10, 2024. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part. I. LEGAL STANDARD Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case. “The Second Circuit has distilled Rule 702’s requirements into three broad criteria: (1) qualifications, (2) reliability, and (3) relevance and assistance to the trier of fact.” Jn re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 299 F. Supp. 3d 430, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 396-97 (2d Cir. 2005)). “The Supreme Court has tasked district courts with a ‘gatekeeping’ role with respect to expert opinion testimony.” Pac. Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York Mellon, 571 F. Supp. 3d 106, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S.

579, 597 (1993)). In doing so the Court recognized that under the Federal Rules of Evidence trial courts have “the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. at 597. Faced with motions to exclude expert testimony, courts “) should apply Daubert in a “flexible” manner, id. at 594, and be reminded that “the admissibility of expert testimony should be viewed within the context of the entire rules of evidence and the presumption of admissibility of evidence.” TC Sys. Inc. v. Town of Colonie, New York, 213 F. Supp. 2d 171, 173-74 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). Despite this flexible standard, “a trial court is obligated to act as a gatekeeper with respect to expert testimony.” Travelers Indem. Co. v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 2014 WL 464769, at “)*1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2014). II. DISCUSSION Dr. Michael Hickner holds a Ph.D. in chemical engineering. Dkt. No. 400-2, Hickner Report, at p. 1. He has been retained by Plaintiff to offer his expert opinion on the harms surrounding PFOA and DuPont’s knowledge thereof. Hickner Report at p. 7.

DuPont seeks to preclude Dr. Hickner from offering the following opinions: (1) The Barr Processor Mass Balance Study released in 2005 definitively demonstrated that PFOA was not destroyed during AFD processing and that IR heated ovens released into the air . . . PFOA vapor during processing; (2) DuPont was aware since the 1980s that when AFD was heated to temperatures above 150 [degrees Celstus] APFO in the AFD would sublime to form PFOA vapors;

(3) DuPont was aware at least since the mid-1990s that PFOA was stable at 250 [degrees Celsius] and had a half-life of 31.5 minutes when heated to 300 [degrees Celsius]; (4) DuPont was aware since the 1970s that [released] PFOA . . . would not reach 300 [degrees Celsius] for more than a few minutes; and (5) DuPont recognized in the 1980s that PFOA released from heating AFD could contaminate drinking water and began a program to capture and recycle PFOA released from its fine powder dryers using scrubbers and other technologies. Hickner Report at p. 7; Def.’s Mem of Law at pp. 5-6. Because opinions two through five concern what DuPont was aware of and when, the Court will consider those opinions together.

A, Opinion # 1 DuPont first seeks to exclude Dr. Hickner’s opinion that the Barr Study definitively demonstrated that PFOA was not destroyed during AFD processing but instead was released into the air. DuPont does so on the basis that Dr. Hickner “offer[ed] nothing more than an interpretive narration of documents” to arrive at his conclusion. Def.’s Mem. of Law at p. 16. In formulating his opinion, Dr. Hickner summarizes the findings of the Barr Processor Mass Balance Study “performed in response to EPA’s concerns about PFOA in the environment.” Hickner Report at p. 5. In doing so, he states that the “study demonstrated that 39-54% of [chemicals were] released through the air to the environment as PFOA through the [infrared] oven process.” Hickner Report at p. 5. He goes on to state a number of statistics detailed in the Barr Study.

Hickner Report at p. 5. Dr. Hickner uses these statistics and other chemical data to support his ultimate finding that the Barr Study demonstrates that PFOA was released into the air rather than destroyed during processing. Hickner Report at pp. 5-7. DuPont takes issue with this method, arguing that the ultimate opinion is a “| “factual narrative based on nothing more than a review of documents and testimony.” Def.’s Mem. of Law at p. 14. Plaintiffs counter that the Barr Study is a “highly technical document that requires interpretation .. . for a lay jury to comprehend.” Pl. Opp. at p. 20. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs. Generally speaking, DuPont is correct that experts cannot provide a narrative of facts in the record that a layperson can comprehend on their own. See, e.g., Scentsational Techs., LLC v. Pepsi, Inc., 2018 WL 1889763, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[E]xperts are not percipient witnesses. They are witnesses who, by virtue of specialized expertise, are able to provide opinions or information beyond the ken of the layperson. It is therefore inappropriate for experts to act as a vehicle to present a factual narrative of interesting or useful documents for a case, in effect simply accumulating and putting together one

party’s story.”). However, an expert’s testimony is admissible when it is required to aid the jury in its understanding of highly technical documents. See, e.g., Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 315 F.R.D. 33, 45 (S.D.N.Y.

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