Baker v. Commissioner of Social Security

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

TOMI J. BAKER, Case No. C23-5621-RSM Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES UNDER THE v. EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(D) COMMISIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Stipulated Motion for Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Dkt. #15. Under EAJA, the Court must award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in an action such as this unless it finds the government’s position was “substantially justified” or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). EAJA creates a presumption that fees will be awarded to a prevailing party, but Congress did not intend fee shifting to be mandatory. Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1995); Zapon v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 53 F.3d 283, 284 (9th Cir. 1995). Rather, the Supreme Court has interpreted the term “substantially justified” to mean that a prevailing party is not entitled to recover fees if the government’s position is “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 (1992). The decision to deny EAJA attorney’s fees is within the discretion of the court. Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002). Attorneys’ fees under EAJA must be reasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). This Motion is timely. Furthermore, upon review of the Motion and the record, the Court determines that Plaintiff is the prevailing party and the Government’s position was not substantially justified. Furthermore, “Plaintiff contacted Defendant [Commissioner] regarding this application and no objection was made against the total requested fee.” Dkt. #15 at 1. Defendant Commissioner has not filed any objection nor response to Plaintiff’s Motion. Under Local Civil Rule 7(b)(2), “[e]xcept for motions for summary judgment, if a party fails to file papers in opposition to a motion, such failure may be considered by the court as an admission that the motion has merit.” The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s requested EAJA fees in the amount of $9,175.81 are reasonable. For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS that Plaintiff’s Motion, Dkt. #15, is GRANTED. The Court awards Petitioner fees in the amount of $9,175.81 to be paid by Defendant, subject to verification that Plaintiff does not have a debt which qualifies for offset against the awarded fees, pursuant to the Treasury Offset Program discussed in Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010). If Plaintiff has no debt, the check shall be made out to Plaintiff’s attorney, H. Peter Evans. If Plaintiff has a debt, then the check for any remaining funds after offset of the debt shall be made to Plaintiff’s attorney. DATED this 25th day of March, 2024. A RICARDO S. MARTINEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE